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Abstract 
The first part of this thesis is concerned with tax competition when the tax receipts fund 
an anti-crime measure. Both the capital and criminals are mobile between two jurisdictions. 
The resulting pure strategy Nash equilibrium tax rates are distorted from the optimal tax 
by the equilibrium migration response of the rich; if positive at the equilibrium then tax 
competition will result in taxes that are too high whilst if it is negative taxes will be too 
low compared to the optimum. The best response functions of the model are tested using 
data from England and Wales. The possibility that they engage in tax competition cannot be 
ruled out. It is possible for a central government to devolve tax raising powers without the 
distortion occurring if they can impose an optimal sanction. This, though, is independent of 
the harm caused by the crime and could be politically difficult to introduce. 
The second part looks at the Ministry of Defence's procurement policy since 1985. The role 
of competition has increased but scant attention was played to the trade-off between max- 
imising the benefits of current competition and obtaining future competition. The Ministry 
of Defence always chose to take the benefits in the short term arguing any loss of competition 
merely eliminated excess capacity which the Ministry of Defence would no longer have to pay 
for. Whilst the empirics suggest this is true during the 1990s, the problems encountered on 
the Type 45 project at the start of the millennium demonstrate the difficulties they have in 
procuring given the limited number of domestic firms they can contract with. An alternative 
mechanism of directed buys, with recourse to a competitive market off the equilibrium path, is 
suggested as a way in which the Ministry of Defence can preserve competition into the future. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with two areas of microeconomics: tax competition when the tax 
receipts fund policing and the Ministry of Defence's recent naval procurement programme. 
These are two sets of key issues that face a government which, in their different ways, af- 
fett the security of its residents. The first concerns the level of government at which tax 
decisions ought to be taken when the tax receipts fund a police service to the benefit of the 
capital's owners. This is of particular relevance to the United Kingdom as central government 
distributes funds to police forces which the police forces themselves are able to supplement 
through local taxation. The question arises as to whether allowing local police forces to levy 
their own taxes results in suboptimal outcomes if they compete in taxes. The second issue 
concerns how a central government can manage the decline of an industry from which it is the 
sole purchaser and there are barriers to entry for new firms. Is it more efficient, if the firms 
possess different cost structures, to allow a monopoly to occur or is their a case for duopoly? 
In the United Kingdom the surface warship procurement programme was reduced in the 1990s 
causing some firms to leave the industry and now the Ministry of Defence only views two firms 
capable of building its vessels. The question arises as to whether this is one firm too many. 
The approach adopted in this thesis is to firstly consider the current system in which policy 
makers determine their actions. Simple games were then applied to both sets of issues to help 
analyse them. Crime was introduced into a model of tax competition to see whether the 
local determination of taxes, if jurisdictions compete with one another, result in suboptimal 
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taxes being levied. For naval procurement a model is written to demonstrate an alternative 
procurement mechanism the Ministry of Defence can use to purchase vessels and achieve long 
term efficiency, though demonstrating the loss in short term efficiency. Finally both topics 
needed empirical investigation. The policy recommendations for which level of government 
ought to tax depends on whether there is any evidence of police authorities engaging in tax 
competition whilst the government's repeated assertion that competition was not being lost 
when the number of naval shipyards fell also needed testing. The remainder of this introduction 
gives more details on each part and the contents of each of the chapters. Discussion of the 
related literature is left to subsequent chapters. 
Tax competition and policing 
Previous studies of tax competition have focused on the tax receipts funding a public good or 
transfer payments. An alternative use of the tax receipts is to prevent a bad from occurring. 
The most obvious bad that can occur is if the capital itself is subject to some risk and therefore 
the tax receipts can be used to mitigate the risk. The risk considered is crime - the capital 
can be stolen so the tax funds a police force which lessens the risk of the capital being stolen. 
The question arises as to whether the presence of tax competition can distort taxes. 
The first half of this thesis is concerned with tax competition and policing. The initial 
motivation for the paper came from the location of the University of Warwick. The university 
straddles two policing areas: West Midlands and Warwickshire. The governing body of each 
police force in England and Wales is able to set its own funding requirement. Although 
they receive transfers from central government any excess has to be recouped through the 
Council Tax of the police force's residents. Thus the police in either area are effectively able 
to determine their own taxes; in 2004/05 the difference between them for an average property 
(band D) was £46.47. There are also two major towns in which students reside: Leamington 
Spa (in Warwickshire) and Coventry (in the West Midlands). Therefore the question arises 
as to which jurisdiction would you choose to commit a crime in if you are criminally minded? 
Where is best to reside if you could potentially be a victim of crime, trading-off post tax 
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income against the level of security provided? Further there are interactions between the two 
groups which can influence where individuals reside. For example, an increase in the number 
of taxpayers can decrease the expected return from crime, if the level of policing increases. 
Chapter two employs a modified version of Hindriks tax competition model (1999). It 
assumes one group of individuals receives a dividend income of one. They pay tax on their 
capital and are mobile between two jurisdictions. It is possible for the post tax income to 
be stolen from them by one of the criminals. The criminal group is also mobile between the 
jurisdictions, though they can only commit a crime in the jurisdiction in which they reside 
and do not pay tax. The resulting pure strategy Nash equilibrium taxes are distorted from the 
optimal by the equilibrium migration response of the taxpayers. Thus under- or over-taxation 
is possible compared to the optimal tax which would be levied by the federal government. The 
chapter then continues by presenting a linear version of the model to allow the best response 
functions to be determined. These are then tested empirically using data for the last five years 
from police authorities in England and Wales. Thus can the £46.47 difference in tax levels 
between the two police forces be explained by tax competition or by factors intrinsic to each 
jurisdiction? The results suggests the presence of tax competition between police authorities 
in England and Wales cannot be ruled out. 
Chapter three presents a more generalised model of crime and tax competition, whereby 
holders of capital are mobile between jurisdictions but are subject to a crime unrelated to 
their capital. Again criminals are also mobile between the jurisdictions and the resulting 
pure strategy Nash equilibrium tax is distorted by the equilibrium migration response of the 
taxpayers to a change in the tax rate. The chapter then introduces changes to the model 
which demonstrate, with the use of a numerical example, how the resulting equilibrium tax 
responds to changes in the underlying assumptions. It also shows a couple of benefits that 
tax competition can bring, for example the possibility of increased funding for crimes when 
only a minority of the population is affected by them. A second crime is also introduced and 
the effect of competition between jurisdictions is again to misallocate resources between the 
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the two crimes. The chapter concludes by discussing which level of government is best placed 
to determine the tax rate. 
UK naval procurement policy 
The second part of the thesis is concerned with the Ministry of Defence's surface warship 
procurement strategy since 1985. With the end of the Cold War the size of the Royal Navy 
fleet has fallen so, as a consequence, the demand for new vessels also fell. This has meant the 
naval shipbuilding industry has had to contract. The government's policy of only purchasing 
domestically built hulls combined the barriers to entry for firms wishing to enter the market 
means the Ministry of Defence needs to manage the decline of the industry to ensure its long 
term interests are protected; there is the possibility that if the decline is left to the market 
then the short term efficiency can be offset by the long-term inefficiency that results if the 
wrong yards survive. Therefore this part of the thesis is also composed of two chapters. The 
first looks at how future projects influenced naval procurement decisions; whether long term 
efficiency considerations ever outweighed the short term cost savings. The second presents 
a procurement mechanism for an industry in decline with a sole purchaser of their products 
which maintains competitive pressures but ensures longer-term value for money is achieved. 
Chapter four describes how the procurement policy has evolved since the early 1980s when 
British Shipbuilders, the nationalised monopoly, was the only domestic firm the Ministry 
of Defence could order its ships from. The government privatised the warship yards first 
as they were the most profitable. Privatisation brought increased competition to the sector 
and, according to the Ministry of Defence, lowered the price paid for ships. After the end of 
the Cold War the demand for ships fell further and some of the yards closed. Whilst aware 
of the possible consequences on future prices, the Ministry of Defence continued to pursue 
competition for procurement contracts insisting when any firm left the industry it would have 
no effect on future prices. Thus short term considerations always took precedent over longer 
term concerns. The chapter considers how this has influenced the procurement policy for the 
current expanded naval procurement programme, with only two yards currently considered for 
14 
naval contracts in the UK. The chapter concludes by considering whether or not the Ministry 
of Defence's assertion regarding the loss of competition and prices is correct. 
Chapter five follows by asking whether the process of contraction ought to continue leaving 
only one domestic firm able to construct vessels. The model assumes a vessel takes two periods 
to build and is perfectly divisible in each period. Furthermore it assumes only two firms, each 
possessing a different cost, remain and if one receives no work in the first period it is unable 
to compete for work in the second period. The game proceeds by the government offering one 
firm a portion of the project for a price which they can either accept or reject. If they reject 
the same contract is offered to the other firm. If they too reject the contract is auctioned until 
one firm accepts. The solution is for the government to offer contracts with prices whereby the 
dominant strategy for each firm is to accept the contract, otherwise the other firm will accept 
forcing the firm to leave the industry. The simple game suggests both firms remaining in the 
industry is beneficial and can even be cheaper than auctioning a complete contract for the 
whole project in period one. Although this procurement mechanism allows the possibility of 
one firm earning a supernormal profit in the presence of full information, it ensures there is no 
preferential treatment between the firms (so both can view it as being fair) and is sufficiently 
simple for the Ministry of Defence to introduce. 
Chapter six concludes and offers thoughts on where this research can go next. 
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Part I 
Tax competition and crime 
16 
Chapter 2 
Property crime and tax competition 
Responsibility for the police in England and Wales is shared between central government, the 
local police authorities and the Chief Constable of each police force. The balance amongst 
the constituents of this tripartite relationship changed after the introduction of the Police 
Reform Act 2002. The Police Act 1964 formalised the notion already written in case law 
of constabulary independence; each police force has operational independence from central 
government in pursuit of the maintenance of law and order. However central government still 
had a major input as the main finance provider for each police force. The Police Reform 
Act 2002 allows for central government to stipulate a National Policing Plan with associated 
targets which have to be taken into account by the Chief Constable thus extending their role 
into the operation of police forces. 
Loveday and Reid (2003) argue that this merely continues a process of centralisation that 
has been occurring over the last 50 years. They cite the number of police forces the England 
and Wales has decreased from 126 in 1968 to 43 today. Concurrent with this they suggest 
the level of influence local communities have in determining the police service provided has 
also fallen (with the reduction of the size of police authorities from 35 members to 17). This 
denigrates an important role police authorities still possess - the budget. Although about 
85% of a police force's budget comes from central government, subject to excessive spending 
constraints each authority is able to determine its own budget. This in turn will have an effect 
on the level of implementation of centrally determined priorities. 
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In determining the local budget the police authority has the power to issue a precept 
payable as part of the Council Tax. A Tiebout model would suggest jurisdictions provide 
different levels of security and the rich and criminals would then locate according to their 
preferences. However if people have preferences for a particular jurisdiction independent of 
the tax/anti-crime measure combination on offer (for instance people have an attachment to 
home measure in their utility functions) then the issue for the jurisdictions' governments is 
how can the optimal taxes be determined taking these into account when people are mobile 
across the jurisdictions. 
This paper is based on the notion that the anti-crime measure is determined by central 
government though the extent to which it is funded is determined locally. People are mobile 
between the jurisdictions, settling in the jurisdiction that maximises their expected utility. 
The jurisdictions compete in taxes to attract the mobile capital (rich people) to settle in their 
Jurisdiction. This chapter differs from Marceau (1997) by allowing not only the capital to 
be mobile but criminals, who commit crimes for economic reasons, as well. Under Marceau's 
model the tax competition results in too many resources being spent on crime fighting relative 
to the Pareto optimum. 
The theory considers four anti-crime measures: benefit payments, fines related to the 
amount stolen, fines unrelated to the amount stolen and imprisonment. The proposed transfer 
payments are an act of impure altruism on behalf of the rich population as they act like a 
bribe; if crime is motivated by economic circumstances then means tested benefits should 
take some people out of the position where they have to commit crime. To go along with the 
carrot are three sticks used by the legal system as retribution for crimes. Fines related to the 
amount stolen are linked to the tax rate whilst fines unrelated to the amount stolen require 
the payment of a fixed fine. The third punishment strategy is imprisonment. This removes 
some criminals from society (reducing the numbers available to commit crime in any given 
period). This chapter also differs from Marceau (1997) by allowing these measures to have a 
deterrent effect; an increase in the funding of an anti-crime measure in a jurisdiction can stop 
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some criminals from committing a crime. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 gives a brief overview of the relevant literature. 
Section 2 introduces the model for a single jurisdictional economy whilst section 3 does likewise 
for a two jurisdiction economy competing in taxes. Section 4 gives some extensions and policy 
implications before section 5 investigates whether there is currently any tax competition taking 
place between police forces in England and Wales. Section 7 concludes. 
2.1 Previous work 
For a long time there has been investigation into the roots of crime. Some have felt that 
people are born with criminal tendencies whilst others believe the environment in which they 
are raised is the cause. ' However the seminal work on the economics of crime was written 
by Becker (1968). He developed a principal-agent model, whereby rational agents respond to 
incentives - people undertake criminal activities not because of intrinsic characteristics, rather 
as a result of utility maximising behaviour. A person can either undertake legal employment 
with a known return or illegal activities with uncertain returns; earnings are monotonically 
related to the time spent in each (and both are perfect substitutes with no spill-over effects). 
Agents know the probability they will be apprehended and the punishment that will follow 
(expressed in monetary terms). With this information they then make their decision on 
whether or not to participate in crime. 
The economic model of crime has been rigorously tested. The general conclusion of em- 
pirical testing is that the crime rate is lowered when deterrent measures are increased. 2 The 
tests do, however, report different magnitudes of the effect on the crime rate . 
increasing the 
'The nature argument can be traced to Darwin's The Origin of Species (1859), which suggests an animal's 
characteristics are determined at birth and cannot be altered. The nurture argument suggests that animals 
are conditioned by the society and environment they are raised in. Singer et al. (1998) attribute this argument 
to "the Romantic movement, in particular the writings of Jena-Jacques Roussea (eg The New Heloise in 1761 
and Emile in 1762)" (page 633. 
zone exception is Myers (1983) who finds severity of punishment is only weakly related to crime and 
increases in the certainty of punishment are positively related to participation in crime. The estimation, 
though, has been criticised by Witte (1983). 
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probability of arrest or increasing the sanction imposed if caught has. Davis (1988), Mathur 
(1978), Sjoquist (1973) and Witte (1980) all report that increasing the probability of arrest 
deters more crime than a comparable increase in the severity of the sanction. However a 
debate remains as to whether increasing the size of the police force has an effect on the crime 
rate through increasing the probability of arrest. 
Police numbers are weakly endogenous to changes in the crime rate according to Cameron 
(1988) due to the endogeneity of hiring police; a common public policy response to rising 
crime is to hire more police. Levitt (1997) finds the mean percentage change in sworn police 
officers in mayoral election years is 2.0%, compared to 0.0% in non-election years. However 
increased police officers do reduce the crime rate (an additional officer results in 1.6 to 12.4 
fewer property crimes). This view is supported by Tauchen et al (1994), where the deterrent 
effect is even greater for those with no previous contact with the law. Mathur (1978) finds 
police expenditure is neither a crime deterrent nor does it increase the probability of arrest. 
Sherman (1992) reports evidence suggesting police actions can reduce, increase or make no 
difference to the crime rate depending on the model specification used. 
There are however criticisms of the estimation techniques. The early empirical work used 
aggregated data when trying to test a model based on individual choice. Unfortunately reliable 
and detailed panel data sets have not existed for a sufficiently lengthy period to fully test 
the model. Cornwell and Turnbull (1994) argue that omitted heterogeneity of aggregate 
data leads to an upwards bias in the effectiveness of the deterrents (whereas panel data can 
control for this). Corman, Joyce and Lovitch (1987) suggest deterrence variables and the 
crime rate are integrated and the presence of multicolinearity makes it difficult to assess the 
relative contributions of deterrence variables and employment variables. However all empirical 
investigations suffer from basic problems with the data used: not all crimes are recorded 
(Levitt (1996) states only 38% are) and not all criminals are caught. 
Criticisms have not been limited to the empirical methodology. Block and Lind (1975a, 
1975b) presented theoretical objections. In the former they argue punishment cannot always 
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be expressed in monetary equivalents; in the latter preferences of the poor are important. 
Assuming the cost of crime to be independent of wealth, if the population was ordered ac- 
cording to its legal wealth (equivalent to current assets and discounted future earnings), the 
percentage of individuals engaged in crime would decrease as wealth increases. However when 
wealth consists only of future earnings, an "increase in legal earnings will have a larger deter- 
rent effect than an equal increase in transfer payments for some crimes and no smaller effect 
for any crime" (page 488). Thus an increase in future legal earnings has a greater deterrent 
effect than a corresponding increase in benefit payments. Further, proportional changes in 
the probability of apprehension have a greater deterrent effect than proportional changes in 
sentencing. Phillips (1972) and Myers (1983) find evidence to support this. Other models of 
criminal behaviour have also been presented. Ehrlich (1973) uses a state-preference model in 
which individuals choose the amount of time to devote to illegal activities. The effectiveness 
of any public policy response is dependent on the extent to which people are involved in crim- 
final activity. Block and Heineke (1975), as reported by Pyle (1983), include the amount of 
time directly devoted to legal and illegal activities in wealth. The deterrence theory is more 
ambiguous with the response dependent on the preference for honesty. 
If people choose to commit a crime but are caught there are two sanctions available: fines 
or incarceration. Becker argues fines are the optimal form of punishment as they are socially 
costless; optimal fines at the margin fully compensate the victim whereas incarceration requires 
the victim to be economically punished as well - incarceration has to be paid for by taxpayers 
and uses social resources. The optimal fine depends on the marginal harm and the cost, not 
on the perpetrator's ability to pay. Further it is independent of motivation or intent behind 
the crime. If a criminal is unable to pay the fine, then the option of sending them to prison 
remains. 
Economically, incarceration ought to give the exact same loss of utility as fines. However 
Becker suggests the rate of exchange between fines and time spent in prison places too low a 
value on the latter. If fines are the price of an offence in monetary terms then incarceration 
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should be the price expressed in terms of time. Block and Lind (1975a) argue that despite the 
difficulty in exchanging monetary and time terms, the status quo is correct as it encourages 
people to pay fines rather than be sent to prison. Ehrlich (1981) argues if the social cost 
of punishment by fines is zero and the criminal can afford to pay them, then fines are far 
superior to incarceration. However as the social cost of fines is generally greater than zero 
(due to administration costs and evasion in payment by the criminals), if the elasticity of the 
equilibrium crime rate with respect to imprisonment is sufficiently greater than the elasticity 
with respect to fines, fines should be replaced by, or used in conjunction with, incarceration. 
Polinsky and Shavell (1984) support the Becker view and find fines are more socially ben- 
eficial than imprisonment. When considering different income groups, the rich ought to be 
fined more (although the amount of time they should spend incarcerated is uncertain). If 
individuals are risk averse (as Ehrlich (1973) finds), the probability of apprehension should 
be higher and the sanction lower. Levitt (1996) finds increasing the prison population by one 
reduces the number of crimes committed by 5.54. Of this total, 2.6 are crimes of larceny and 
1.3 are burglaries. (Due to only 38% of crimes being reported, the true figure is 15 which 
is the same as the median number obtained from prisoner surveys). In a later paper (1998), 
he finds when a juvenile reaches the age of majority in states that punish adults particularly 
harshly relative to juveniles, the juveniles' violent crime rate drops 25% and property crime 
rate falls by 10 to 15%. 
The second major area of literature relevant to this, and the next, chapter concerns multi ju- 
risdictional economies and tax competition. Tiebout (1956) argued that competition amongst 
jurisdictions in providing public goods can deliver an efficient outcome if households are mo- 
bile. The mobility of households allows them to `vote with their feet' and reside in the 
jurisdiction that offers their preferred fiscal package. However the Tiebout hypothesis has 
been much critiqued due to the underlying assumptions; indeed Oates (1981, page 93) de- 
scribed the assumptions underpinning the model as "so patently unrealistic as to verge on the 
outrageous". 
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Oates (1972) argued that an inefficiently low level of public goods will be provided if 
jurisdictions compete for business capital due to the presence of a fiscal externality between the 
jurisdictions (the existence of which is ruled out by Tiebout). The government of a jurisdiction 
has to take into account the possibility of capital leaving the jurisdiction dependent on the 
tax level chosen; it is assumed the amount of capital in the global economy is fixed. Capital 
flight increases the marginal cost of any tax resulting in a lower level of public goods being 
provided. Since all jurisdictions face the same incentives, all will provide an inefficiently low 
level of public goods. Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) provided the first formal model. 
It is the presence of these interjurisdictional externalities that led to the early literature 
finding that tax competition results in inefficiencies, as reported in Wilson's survey (1999). 
However he states more recent contributions have suggested tax competition can be efficiency 
enhancing, for example where there are imperfectly competitive market structures or political 
economy considerations. Contributions to the literature on redistribution and tax competition 
have disagreed on whether local governments can or cannot redistribute efficiently. 
The model in both this and the next chapter is based on Hindriks' model (1999). His 
paper allows two groups of individuals, rich and poor, to be simultaneously mobile across two 
jurisdictions. The aim of each jurisdiction's government is to redistribute income from the 
rich to the poor, with individuals moving between the jurisdictions depending on the tax or 
benefit provided by each jurisdiction. As would be expected, increasing the mobility of the 
rich decreases the equilibrium tax rates as the elasticity of the tax base increases. Generally, 
increasing the mobility of the poor also hinders redistribution, though this is not always the 
case. Hindriks also finds, like Wildasin (1988), that when jurisdictions compete in taxes there 
will be less redistribution than when they compete in benefits. In comparison to these ineffi- 
cient outcomes when local jurisdictions redistribute income, Pauly (1973) found redistribution 
by local governments can be Pareto efficient when some individuals are immobile and the in- 
come level of the poor enters the utility function of the rich. This utility interdependence is 
not necessarily born from altruism, rather for other reasons, for example poverty offending 
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aesthetic and moral sensibilities and possible reductions in crime. 
To link these two areas, crime and tax competition, there are papers that focus on the 
spatial aspects of crime and policing. Deutsch et al. (1987) present a model showing how 
a criminal decides in which jurisdiction to commit their crime. The strategy that criminals 
follow is to start in a jurisdiction where the probability of success is the greatest but returns 
are the lowest before moving to crimes which have a greater return. The final crime committed 
has the highest return of all but the least probability of success. 
Mehay (1977) studies the effects of spillovers in crime expenditure. The model presented 
takes the other jurisdiction's spending as given and finds the best response. Hakim et al. 
(1979) allow for the jurisdictions to be playing a Nash equilibrium in terms of crime expen- 
diture. The spillover effect can be either positive or negative. They estimate there is a small 
crime expenditure spillover of around $0.05 in each dollar. Marceau (1997) looks at a micro 
founded model of crime expenditure as a deterrent between jurisdictions. He finds that if 
either criminals or capital are mobile across jurisdictions then there will be a Pareto subop- 
timal level of crime deterrence. However the Nash equilibrium is not one of under-provision 
rather too many resources are devoted to the fight against crime. He does not extend his 
model so both capital and criminals are mobile across jurisdictions. The model below allows 
this when searching for the Nash equilibrium. The idea that crime can influence the location 
choice of individuals comes from Cullen and Levitt (1996). They seek to explain urban flight 
from American cities using crime. The aggregated data shows a correlation between outwards 
migration from cities and changes in the crime rate. Further workings suggest that there is 
a causal link between the two, with crime being the cause of the urban flight. The panel 
data looks at similar issues, finding that rich households are five times more responsive to 
changes in the crime rate than poor households. Thus crime would appear to be a motivator 
for migration, though not of a great distance as the majority occurs as urban flight, ie merely 
relocating in the suburbs. Although they look at the likely fiscal effects this urban flight 
causes (a downwards spiral) they do not include local taxes as a variable. 
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2.2 Crime in a single jurisdictional economy 
The model assumes crime is motivated by economic circumstances; poor people commit of- 
fences against the rich in order to gain income. Let there be nl poor people who have no 
income and n2 rich people with a dividend income of one with nl < n2.3 The poor can obtain 
income in two ways: benefits or crime. ' Benefits are a transfer payments from the rich to the 
poor. These transfers represent impure altruism; if economic circumstances dictate whether 
or not a poor person participates in crime, paying benefits can prevent some crimes. The 
poor's second source of income is stealing from the rich. It is assumed there are no financial 
institutions in which money can be deposited so money has to be carried around in pockets or 
left at home. Although a criminal can steal from both, he is only able to attempt to commit 
one crime during the tax period. The rich and poor are easily distinguishable by sight. 
Not all the poor are necessarily criminals; the decision of whether or not to participate in 
illegal activities is determined endogenously. Assume each poor person has a reservation level 
of income, b where bE [b, ]. How b is distributed amongst poor people is common knowledge, 
however the authorities do not know any individual's reservation valuation. Thus if a benefit 
of level B is paid then any poor individual j will be a thief if B< bj, otherwise he will be law 
abiding. 5 It is assumed that only the rich are victims; successful criminals cannot themselves 
be subject to crime. Further, a criminal is always successful in his endeavours. 6 
Assuming there is a requirement for the government to maintain a balanced budget then 
B= tni 
. 
Although the poor are more concerned with the benefit paid to them than the 
tax rate, in a single jurisdiction with a fixed population and a balanced budget, the transfer 
payment is directly proportional to the tax rate (as-2- is fixed). This means a well defined 
propensity to commit crime function exists that depends on the tax rate levied in the jurisdic- 
3The subscript one denotes the poor and two the rich throughout this chapter. 
41t is assumed that crime is committed for the money rather than to gain the other instantaneous rewards 
that can come with it; drugs, status and sex (Delulio, 1996). 
5As the income of a poor person has been normalised to zero only the level of the benefit paid is of interest. 
6This can be viewed as an extension of the labour choice model. As there are no legal earning opportunities 
for the poor, they can devote all of their time to criminal activities. The specialisation that results ensures 
success in their endeavours. 
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tion, p(t). The propensity to commit crime is the probability any poor person will commit an 
act of crime during one period of time. If b<0 then there will be no crime in the jurisdiction; 
if b>0 then all poor people will be criminals if no benefit is paid. Assume b<0 and b>0. 
An increase in the tax rate increases the funds available for redistribution causing the number 
of people for whom bi <B to fall which means there are fewer criminals. Thus aätt) < 0. 
So far benefits have been the only crime reduction method. An alternative is to fund a 
police force and apply criminal sanctions if an individual is caught. In the absence of any 
transfer payment there is a fixed proportion of the poor prepared to commit a crime in order to 
increase their income. However the possibility of any legal sanction, 1, expressed in monetary 
terms by ej1, enters the utility function of a potential criminal. Assume the distribution of e 
is known by the government but the draws are private, where ej E [e, e]. A poor person will 
then decide to commit a crime if 1-t- zejj > 0, where z the probability of the sanction 
being implemented. As z is dependent on the tax rate levied by the government (the more 
funds the police receive the more crime they are able to prevent or detect) another propensity 
to commit crime function exists, p(t), with aättý <0 (any increase in the tax rate lowers the 
expected return from crime by lowering the return if successful and increasing the probability 
of a sanction being applied). 
Assume the government is seeking re-election. As n2 > nj this implies, via the median voter 
theory, the government seeks to maximise the utility of the rich individuals.? Rich individuals 
are unable to take any private action to reduce p; the only mechanisms come from the state. 8 
The expected utility of a rich person (u2) is given by 
pni 
u2=(1-t)(1- 
n2 
(2.1) 
where t is the tax rate levied. 9 This expresses utility purely in terms of the expected utility 
of money and does not allow for other factors, for example the fear crime can engender. 
'Assuming the rich only vote over the level of taxation. 
8Goldberg and Nold (1980) find that households which are more likely to report crime are less likely to be 
the victims of crime. 
9Although the words tax rate are used, as there has been a normalisation of income the tax rate is equivalent 
to a lumpsum tax. 
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The second bracket represents the probability a rich individual will not be a victim of crime 
during one period of time (hence the probability he will retain his money). This probability is 
increasing in n2 but decreasing in pand n1; as the number of criminals (given by pnl) increases 
relative to the number of rich people the likelihood anyone of them is a victim increases. Thus 
in determining the tax rate the government, on behalf of its voters, has to trade-off post tax 
income against the security tax receipts can fund. 
In the absence of a government the expected utility of a rich individual is the probability he 
retains his money (as t equals zero). Given there are no transfer payments nor a police force 
with sanctions, p is simply the proportion of poor individuals who have a value of b greater 
than zero. 
2.2.1 T ansfer payments 
Now assume there is a government. The first crime reduction mechanism they can use is 
transfer payments. Under this specification, the utility function of the rich is 
U2 
p(t)nl i. (2.2) 
n2 J 
Due to the utility function always being concave if p(t) is convex10, the tax rate which max- 
imises the rich's utility function solves 
ni 
[+ 
n2 - P(t)ni 
t 
nl 
[ apýt)] 
at 
However this is unbounded so t can take on values below zero. " As only positive rates of tax 
can be levied (0 <t< 1), the constrained tax rate solves 
nl 
[8(t)] 
+ n2 - p(t)nl 
t= max 0; 
P(2.3) nl 
[ý(t) 
at 
Taxes will only be levied on the rich if - 
[(t)] > n2-P(t)711 . 
Thus in order for there to be 
a tax the reduction in the propensity to commit crime must be greater than the ratio of the 
'°The necessary condition for concavity is 2 
[bätt)] < (1- t) 
[2LP-(t ]. As the first derivative of p(t) is always at2 
negative, this will always hold if p(t) is convex. 
"It cannot take on values above one as this would require p(t)nl > n2, which the restrictions of the model 
setup do not allow. 
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number of rich individuals who are not victims of crime to the number of poor people. In 
other words the probability of being a victim of crime has to be sufficiently high to warrant 
a tax being levied. If it is not high enough then the rich would rather risk being a victim 
of crime than pay the poor any benefit as the threat is just too low (or the effectiveness of 
paying benefits as an anti-crime measure is too low). Thus the greater nl, the greater the tax 
levied. 
2.2.2 Fines 
A police force can serve two functions in society; crime prevention and crime investigation. The 
previous section is analogous to the police force solely having a prevention role. Tax receipts 
fund a police force able to prevent crime either by patrolling and having a high visibility or 
by informing rich individuals on crime prevention techniques. Either way the opportunities to 
commit crime are reduced thus decreasing the probability any poor person commits a crime. 
As such the optimal tax rate is still given by (2.3), although the propensity to commit crime 
function will be different. Therefore the question arises which is more effective in giving the 
rich a higher expected utility, transfer payments or crime prevention. The answer to this lies 
in the specification of p(t) under each: how much can crime be reduced through one unit 
of funding? With transfer payments some people are being brought out of crime altogether 
whilst prevention only limits the extent to which crime can be committed. 
The police, however, can also investigate crime and detect criminals after it has been 
committed. After a rich individual has become a victim of crime they can report the incident to 
the police who then investigate it, given the funds available. If the investigation is successful, 
the criminal will be brought before a court and tried. If convicted he will be required to 
compensate the victim by either paying an amount related to the sum stolen or an unrelated 
punitive fine. To model this process assume all crimes are reported. Further assume everyone 
arrested by the police has committed the crime and accordingly is found guilty by the courts 
(so a sanction is imposed). The success rate of the police's investigations is a probability, 
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dependent on police funding (as measured by the tax rate), z(t), where z(O) =0 and 
[a-ý: 
a(t)] t> 
0.12 If crimes are not always reported or prosecutions are not always successful this can be 
incorporated by a lower value of z(t) for each tax rate (assuming no one's utility decreases if 
someone is wrongly prosecuted). 
Fines related to the amount stolen 
If the government chooses to punish criminals by levying fines proportional to the amount 
they have stolen, h(1 - t) where h is a constant expressing how much they are punished, the 
utility function of the rich is given by 
U2 = (1 - t) I1- (1 - hz) 
p(t)nl I. (2.4) 
L n2 J 
The utility of a poor person randomly drawn from the population is ul = p(l - hz)(1 - t). If 
h is low, so h<z, then ul >0 meaning it is possible for p to be fixed as a greater expected 
utility results from attempting to commit crime than doing nothing; thus e could represent the 
expected loss a criminal is prepared to bear if he commits a crime. Alternatively, if personal 
stigma is attached to being caught then it is possible that crime can be deterred even when 
the expected pay-off is positive, meaning aP- < 0. For larger values of h the expected return 
from crime is negative which will always deter some. This model assumes there is no default 
in the payment of fines; although this can be included in h (so h is the multiple of the fine 
and the probability it is paid). The possibility of default is considered in the next subsection. 
If p is convex in t and z concave then the utility of a rich individual is concave in t if hz 
is sufficiently small. 13 Assuming the utility of the rich is concave in t then the optimal tax 
solves 
-n2 +pn1(1 - hz) +pnih 
[ý- n1(1 - hz) 
ýaýrý 
pnlh [. ]- nl(1 - hz) 
[äPt] 
12The poor are informed and know the true z(t) so the perception of punishment equals the reality (as 
opposed to Sah (1991) where criminal decisions can be based on lack of knowledge). This assumption is 
relaxed in the next chapter. 
13The necessary conditions for the tax rate to maximise utility is -2[hp [ 
ät ]- (1 - hz) 
[ ät ]]- (1 - t) [(1 - 
hz) [a ]- lip []- 2h [ä ] [Ozll < 0. 
29 
However this is an unconstrained tax rate; the tax the government can levy can only be 
between zero and one. As the optimum tax cannot take on a value above one 14 the tax rate 
that maximises the utility of the rich is given by 
-n2 + pnl (1 - hz) + pnl h at - nl (1 - hz) 
[22] 
t=max 0, (2.5) 
pnlh Lä] -'ni(1 - hz) [a] 
The optimal tax has the properties of the previous tax, namely a tax will only be levied if the 
likelihood of a rich individual being a victim of crime is sufficiently high. When the poor are a 
minority the threat is sufficiently low not to warrant state intervention whereas this becomes 
necessary as their number, relative to the number of rich individuals, increases. Whilst the 
right-hand side is decreasing in h the response of the optimal tax is unknown and depends on 
the specification of the probability functions. 
Fines unrelated to the amount stolen 
Alternatively the government could choose to punish convicted criminals by imposing punitive 
fines unrelated to the amount stolen. The magnitude of the fine is f, where f>0. The 
previous subsection mentioned the possibility of default; as there is no upper limit placed on 
f it is possible that a criminal is unable to pay the fine imposed on them if caught. Let q(f) 
be the probability a convicted criminal does not default in the payment of the fine, where 
q(O) = 1, q(oo) =0 and 
a^f -<0. Since the participation decision depends on the expected 
return from crime (which is influenced by the extent to which the police force is funded and 
the fine imposed if caught), the propensity of the poor to commit crime will be a function 
of the level of the fine and the probability of being arrested, p(t, f). Therefore the utility 
function of a rich individual is given by 
U2 = (1 - t) 
p(t, f)nl + z(t)q(f)f Lp(t, 
f)nll (2.6) 
n2 
] 
nz J 
[1_ 
"The tax rate is unable to take on a value above one as this would require -n2 + pnl (1 - hz) >0 which 
never holds. 
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The utility function ought to be concave if p(t, f) is convex in t and z(t) is concave (as in 
previous sections). 15 The utility maximising tax rate for the which solves 
t -_ 
ni []- n14f (p [2-fl +z äc + n2 - 7ýni 
nlL? 
where f is exogenous. 16 However this is the unconstrained tax rate as t can take on values 
below one and above zero. Therefore the constrained tax rate solves 
ý_{ 
1 
n1[äi]-nigf(p[at]+z[at])+nz-pni if 1< 'La-pnl <1- nl[ 
ät] (2.7) 
nl[ä ] n14f(p[et]+z[et]) n14f(p[at]+z[etj ]) 
0 
if n2-Pnl f<1 
nigf(p[ 
] +--[t]) 
otherwise. 
The possibility of the tax rate being one is paradoxical. If the expected compensation is 
sufficiently high then the rich would want to become victims of crime because criminals, if 
caught, have to pay a high ratio of the amount stolen back to the victims in compensation. In 
order for the rich to benefit from these elevated levels of compensation the police force has to be 
able to catch the criminals, necessitating a high tax rate so they can be fully funded. However 
the paradox kicks in when t=1 as there is no income left to be stolen so no compensation 
can be paid. Thus in practice the tax rate can approach one but not reach it. In order for the 
optimal tax to be levied the likelihood of being a victim of crime has to be sufficiently high to 
warrant a police force, for example nl needs to be sufficiently high. This is for the same reason 
as when benefits are used as an anti-crime measure; when the poor are a small minority the 
rich do not need protection as the poor do not represent a significant threat. However as they 
become more numerous, the threat increases so the rich start to fund a police force to protect 
15 The necessary condition for the utility function to be concave is 2[ 
af] 
- (1 -t- zqf) 
[] 
+ pqf 
[ ät2 ] 
-I- 
2q f[ at ] <_ 0. If p(t, f) is convex and z(t) concave, then this should hold for the majority of cases. 
16If equation (2.6) is maximised with respect to f (taking t to be exogenous), then the optimal fine for a 
single jurisdictional economy to levy is 
(1 - T) 
[]- 
pqz 
qz[ 
]+pzrýf] 
This is a maximum providing -(1 -t-zqf) 
[ä] 
+pzf 
[ä1] 
+2pz 
[äf] 
+ 2zq 
[] 
+ 2zf 
[äf] [äf, 
< 0. 
Although this does not always hold if q(f) is concave in f it helps. If the second order condition does not hold 
then the government would seek to impose ever larger fines. 
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themselves. The police force also needs to be sufficiently effective if the rich are to fund it, 
as expressed through [ý2-fl . The role of the fine in the tax rate is ambiguous. The right-hand 
side of the optimal tax is increasing in f if p[ ät ]> -z [22]. Thus the specification of the 
two functions will determine which effect dominates and how the optimal tax responds to the 
fine. 
2.2.3 Incarceration 
The final anti-crime measure considered is incarceration. Prisons help to reduce the probability 
of being a victim of crime in two ways. The first is to reduce the number of poor people in the 
jurisdiction thus making it less likely any one rich individual becomes a victim of crime. The 
second is to increase the deterrent (resulting from the loss of liberty if caught and convicted) 
and lower the propensity to commit crime by increasing the sanction and lowering the expected 
return from crime. Despite the advantages prison holds over the other anti-crime measures it 
also has one significant disadvantage, namely it requires tax payers to fund them. Whereas 
the payment of fines can compensate the victim for their monetary loss, prisons require the 
tax rate to rise further. 
For the model again assume all crime is reported and if the police catch a person he is 
guilty and will be found so by the courts. If found guilty he is incarcerated for one period 
of time. The rich individuals pay taxes to fund a police force at the beginning of the time 
period. They also have to pay an additional amount to house the criminals that are caught. 
Therefore the utility function of a rich individual is given by 
U2 = (1 -t- k) 
{1- p(t)nl [l - z(t)] (2.8) 
n2 
where k(t) is the amount each rich person is required to pay towards the cost of prisons and 
p(t) the propensity of the poor not in prison to commit crime. During each time period there 
will be niz(t) criminals incarcerated from the previous time period. As such this can be 
thought of as the stage game of a repeated game. It is assumed that k(t) is convex in the 
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number of criminals caught, as there is congestion in housing more prisoners. 17 The tax rate 
which maximises (2.8) solves 
t__ -(1 
+ [ät])[n2-prii(1-z)]+(1 - k)[pni [ýt] -nl(1-z) [I] ] 
pnl [at] - nl(1 - z) [äc] 
This expression is the unconstrained tax rate as a government is unable to levy a negative tax 
rate. 18 Therefore the tax rate which maximises the utility of the rich solves 
1 -(1 + [ýc])[n2 - pnl(1 - z)] + (1 - k)[pni [ä] - nl(1 - z) [ät] ] t= max 10; (2.9) 
pnl [ at] - ni(1 - z) [ät] 
As usual the government will only levy a tax if the number of active criminals is sufficiently 
high relative to the number of potential victims. The right-hand side of the optimal tax is 
decreasing in the cost and marginal cost of housing criminals; as the sanction is no longer 
costless any increase in costs corresponds to a lower tax rate as the rich would prefer fewer 
criminals be caught due to the increased costs of housing them. 
2.3 Crime in a multi jurisdictional economy 
The previous section introduced the base crime models. Now assume that tax decisions are 
devolved from the federal government to local jurisdictions' governments. Assume the country 
is composed of two symmetric jurisdictions, each with the capacity to house the entire popu- 
lation located. For ease of exposition the two jurisdictions are called the domestic and foreign 
jurisdictions. 19 The two jurisdictions are located at either end of a unit interval. Individuals 
possess a preference for a jurisdiction by a taste parameter, xE [0,1]. A stronger preference 
for the domestic jurisdiction is represented by a lower value of x, a stronger preference for 
the foreign jurisdiction by a higher x. A value of x of one half represents no real preference 
17The necessary condition to find a maximum for u2 is - 
[aa ] [n2 - pn(1 - z)] + (1 - k)[2n1 
[äßt] [äi] + 
pnl 
[a1] 
- n1(1 - z) 
[a ]]. Assuming p(t) is convex and z(t) is concave in t, then this always holds if k(t) 
is convex. 
"'It cannot yield a tax rate of above one as this would require -(I + [])[n2 - pnl (1 - z)] - knl [p 
[ 
at 
]- 
(1 - z) 
[ ät ]]>0. The cannot hold as both terms are always negative. 
"Assume there are no relevant cultural differences between the jurisdictions as they are part of the same 
federation; however in a study of robberies in California, Japan and the United Kingdom Wolpin (1980) found 
there were differences. 
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for either jurisdiction. We assume both the rich's and poor's locational preferences are evenly 
distributed along [0,1]. Although the anti-crime measure is determined at the federal level 
each jurisdiction is able to determine the extent to which it is funded. This rules out compe- 
tition in crime reduction methodologies but allows there to be competition in funding (which 
is analogous to the system in England and Wales). It also excludes competition in sentencing 
policy should a criminal be caught and convicted. The funding decision means the domestic 
jurisdiction is able to levy a tax of t on the rich to fund the anti-crime measure whilst the 
foreign jurisdiction levies t*. Assume criminals can only commit a crime in the jurisdiction 
they choose to reside in. Finally the requirement to maintain a balanced budget is imposed 
on local jurisdictions as well as the federal government. 
Individuals are utility maximising, basing their choice of residence after comparing the 
utility to be gained from living in either jurisdiction. Thus individuals settle between the two 
jurisdictions according to 
s(c, c*) _ 
{x E [0,1] :u (c, c*, x) 
> ui(c, c*, x) (i = 1,2) 
1 
s*(c, c*) = 
{x E [0,1] : ui(c, c*, x)< t (c, c*, x) (2 =1ý 2)} 
where an asterisk denotes the foreign jurisdiction (Hindriks (1999)). The jurisdictions compete 
in taxes in order to attract the rich (the mobile capital) and repel the poor (the criminals). 
Allowing both groups to be mobile between the two jurisdictions causes this paper to differ 
from the existing literature. 
The most relevant existing study is Marceau (1997). He assumes one of the groups is split 
between the two locations and is unable to move between them whilst the other is able to 
move freely between the two jurisdictions. The movement of one of the groups allows the 
jurisdictions to engage in expenditure competition to try to deter criminals from operating 
in their jurisdiction (in order to repel criminals or attract the capital); one jurisdiction's 
expenditure has a spillover effect on the other jurisdiction as it causes people to move between 
the jurisdictions. Whilst Wildasin (1988) reports competition between two jurisdictions in 
taxes and competition in expenditure leads to different equilibrium outcomes, there is also a 
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difference in this model due to both groups being mobile. In this tax competition game, a 
pure strategy Nash equilibrium is characterised as the tax rate at which no individual desires 
to migrate and no jurisdiction desires to change its tax rate given the policies of its neighbour. 
Hence a policy outcome (a, c*) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in taxes if a= r(s(c, a*) It*) 
with aE C(s(c, a*)) and c* = r(s*(a, c*)It) with c* E C(s*(c, a*)) (Hindriks (1999)). 
The decision rule r is common to both jurisdictions, either for electoral reasons or it is 
specified by the federal government. This is the rule that the jurisdiction's leaders have to 
fulfil when determining their tax rate - the objective function to be maximised through their 
choice of tax rate. The decision rule used is for each jurisdiction to maximise the expected 
income of the rich. If the government of each jurisdiction is seeking re-election then they need 
only be concerned with the utility of the rich as n2 > n1. Although their utility also includes a 
locational element, this is an idiosyncratic element which a jurisdiction's government is unable 
to influence. In a symmetric equilibrium where both governments levy the same tax which 
funds identical anti-crime production functions, every individual will reside in the jurisdiction 
they prefer and therefore local government need only concern itself with maximising expected 
income. This decision rule is consistent with the previous section and is easily measurable for 
the jurisdiction's leaders. The next section considers including the locational element in the 
objective function. 
The utility functions of the rich are similar to those in section 2.2 but with the addition of a 
locational preference. This is represented by -d2x for the domestic jurisdiction and -d2(1-x) 
for the foreign jurisdiction. d2 is the attachment to home measure of the rich; a decrease in 
d2 represents the rich becoming more mobile. The model assumes d2 is sufficiently large for 
both jurisdictions to be evenly populated at an equilibrium. Assume there is no government 
so all poor people commit crime. Assume half the criminals reside in each jurisdiction and 
that they are immobile between jurisdictions. In order for there to be an interior solution to 
the residency decision for the rich 
1- 
nni - 
d2x2 =1- 
pnl 
x- 
d2(1 - x2) 2n2 X2 (I - 2) 
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must hold for 0< x2 < 1. This simply states one rich individual must be indifferent between 
living in either jurisdiction. Thus in order for x2 =2 to be an equilibrium, an individual with 
locational preference 2+b (where b is very small so the preference for the foreign jurisdiction 
is weak) must obtain a greater utility from living in the foreign jurisdiction than they could 
gain by moving jurisdiction, or 
1- pnj d2 
(2 
+ b) <1-p nj -d2 2n2 
12 - bl (a 
which reduces to n2l+2) < 
d2. As b approaches zero the requirement for there to be a 
symmetric equilibrium becomes d2 > ?. If d2 is too small then the increase in security 
experienced from decreasing the probability they are a victim of crime, given there is one 
additional potential victim but no change in the number of criminals, is greater than their 
attachment to the foreign jurisdiction causing them to leave. This decreases the security of 
the remaining rich in the foreign jurisdiction and could cause some of them also to leave. If 
d2 is sufficiently low then there could be complete depopulation of rich individuals from one 
jurisdiction leaving it wholly to the remaining poor. Note that the same conditions apply to 
prevent people in the domestic jurisdiction migrating to the foreign jurisdiction. Thus this 
model excludes perfect mobility. If the rich were perfectly mobile (d2 = 0) and then they 
would all reside in the same jurisdiction. In order to attract them, the jurisdiction would have 
no choice but to levy the tax rate that maximised their expected income given the number of 
poor who reside there (or, if mobile, migrate there). In this model both the rich and the poor 
are partially mobile and therefore their migration responses to any change in the tax rates 
have to bee accounted for when jurisdictions determine taxes. 
If the poor are also mobile then their attachment to home measure, dl, can play a similar 
role in their residency decision. The greater the attachment to home the less emphasis is placed 
on income in the residency decision. Again, therefore, the measure needs to be sufficiently 
high for there to be an interior solution for x1. In the simple model above where government 
is absent, a poor person will only consider leaving their preferred jurisdiction if there were no 
rich individuals to steal from. However when there is a government able to tax and fund a 
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policing service there are advantages to grouping as it becomes less likely they will be caught. 
Thus the movement of this group is also dependent on the movement of the rich as this also 
determines the extent to which an anti-crime measure is funded. (Similarly the movement 
of the poor will influence the movement of the rich to minimise the probability they become 
a victim of crime). It is assumed the authorities are not able to observe who migrates in 
response to a change in the tax rate; only criminals would respond by leaving a jurisdiction 
if the funding of the police force was altered as the honest poor, those with no intention of 
committing a crime will maximise utility and remain in the jurisdiction they prefer. As such 
implicit in the model is that each poor person has a propensity to commit crime which the 
authorities are unable to observe. Given the law of large numbers the propensity to commit 
crime becomes the probability any poor person is a criminal. 
Little is known about the relationship between dl and d2. It is possible to speculate that 
dl is high, either because the poor have little ability to move jurisdiction, they possess better 
knowledge of their preferred jurisdiction when committing crime or because gangs can view 
their homeground as being important (as it confers rights to control the local drug tarde and 
other benefits). Alternatively it is possible to speculate that dl is low as criminals need to be 
able to move on when the police or other gangs come after them necessitating an ability to 
move on at short notice. It appears both of these phenomena (low and high dis) are occurring 
simultaneously in the United States at the moment; the fierce battles between gangs in Los 
Angeles to control the narcotics trade are causing some gangs to flee the cities and migrate to 
mid-western towns where they displace the existing trade and forces it to move on. Likewise 
it is possible to speculate that d2 can be either high (their dividend is dependent on them 
living in the jurisdiction) or low (they have the money to be able to move jurisdiction and 
skills to obtain their dividend). Thus it is assumed the two attachment to home measures can 
take on different values. 
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2.3.1 Transfer payments 
If the central government decides to reduce crime by paying transfer payments to the poor, 
then the equilibrium response for a rich person will be characterised by the marginal individual 
x2 who is indifferent between the two jurisdictions, satisfying 
(1 - t) 1-p_1- d2x2 = (1 - t*) 
11- P*ni(1 x, )1 
- d2(1 - x2) (2.10) 
where xl - xl(t, t*) and x2 - X2 (t) t*). 20 The propensity to commit crime in the domestic 
jurisdiction is now p=p 
(). Equation (2.10) shows the location choice of the rich is 
influenced by the location decision of the poor; the number of potential criminals living in a 
jurisdiction influences the probability they become a victim of crime. This in turn implies the 
propensity to commit crime in the foreign jurisdiction, p* 
(i_x2t), is influenced by the tax 1-x1 
rate in the domestic jurisdiction. By definition 1- xl and 1- x2 are the proportion of poor 
and rich individuals in the foreign jurisdiction so any alteration in the domestic tax rate will 
change not only the tax base but also the number of recipients and therefore the effectiveness 
of the measure. 
Differentiating with respect to t and applying symmetry (where xl = x2 =2 when t= t*) 
gives the equilibrium migration response of the rich to a change in the domestic tax rate of 
atI 
n2 - Pni + nl (1 - t) 
[ äf i- 4nlt(1 - t) [ 
äp] L al ]+ 4Pn1(1 - t) L 
ätl 
4pn1(1 - t) - 4nit(1 - t) Li- 2n2d2 
(2.11) 
where [ap] _ 
[wat)]; this is the partial derivative of the propensity to commit crime function 
with respect to t treating xl and x2 as being fixed at one half. The denominator must be 
negative in order for a symmetric equilibrium to exist. The first two terms represent the 
increase in security that a person in the foreign jurisdiction with the lowest value of x would 
gain if they moved to the domestic jurisdiction. The first term comes from the lower probability 
of being a victim of crime resulting from an additional rich person, given a fixed number of 
criminals. The second term is the decrease in the propensity to commit crime resulting from 
an additional taxpayer increasing the tax yield (which increases the benefit paid if the number 
20Throughout this section, xl(t, t*) is represented by xl and x2(t) t*) by x2. 
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of poor is fixed thus removing the need for some of them to steal). The final term represents 
the loss in utility stemming from moving to a jurisdiction that is preferred less. Therefore in 
order for there to be an interior solution for x2,2pnl(l - t) - 2nlt(1- t) [ä] - n2d2 <0 (the 
loss in locational utility is greater than the increased security if they moved). Thus (2.11) is 
decreasing in magnitude in d2; as the rich become more mobile their equilibrium migration 
response increases. As mentioned before the movement of poor impact in the movement if 
the rich in response to a change in the domestic tax rate. Unsurprisingly the equilibrium 
migration response of the rich responds negatively to the equilibrium migration response of 
the poor. 
The equilibrium response of a poor person will be characterised by the marginal individual 
xl who is indifferent between the jurisdictions, meaning 
p(1 - t) + 
tn2x2 
- dlxl = p*(1 - t*) + 
t*n2(1 - x2) 
- d1(1 - x1). (2.12) nix, ni(1 - x1) 
Although p takes on the values of either 0 or 1 (depending on whether or not an individual is 
a criminal), the government of a jurisdiction does not know whether the marginal poor person 
is a criminal or not and can only base their decision on the expected migration response. 
Differentiating (2.12) with respect to t and applying symmetry in the same way as before 
leads to an equilibrium migration response of the poor to a change in the domestic tax rate of 
212 axl na - pnl + nj (I - t) 
[äp] + 4nlt(1 - t) 
[LP] [ 
at 
]+ 4n2t [ at (2.13) 
at 4nlt(1 - t) 
[at] +4n2t+2n1d1 
In just the same way as the movement of the poor impacts on the movement of the rich, the 
equilibrium migration response of the poor is dependent on the equilibrium migration response 
of the rich. The denominator has to be positive if there is an interior solution for the poor. 21 
The first term represents the change in the return from crime whilst the second represents 
the change to the benefit level. The final term represents the change in utility stemming from 
moving to the jurisdiction they prefer less. Whilst the response to the migration response of 
the rich is ambiguous (higher benefits compared to lower returns from crime), the equilibrium 
21 Strictly speaking the denominator, when multiplied by -1 needs to be negative. 
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migration response of the poor is decreasing in magnitude in dl; as they become less mobile 
the migration response decreases in magnitude. 
The decision rule the local governments have to follow is to maximise the expected income 
of its rich inhabitants, so the domestic jurisdiction aims to max(1- t) 
I1- pnlxl ] with respect 2X2 
to t (remembering xl = xl(t, t*) and x2 = xi(t, t*)). The trade-off faced by the rich is between 
increased post tax income and increased security for the post tax income. Given the presence 
of xl and x2, p being convex in t is no longer sufficient to ensure the equilibrium tax rate 
maximises utility. However assume the specification of p ensures the expected income of the 
rich is concave in t. Due to the symmetry, the tax rate that maximises the expected income 
of the rich inhabitants in the domestic jurisdiction will also be the tax rate that maximises 
the expected income if the inhabitants of the foreign jurisdiction at the equilibrium. 
Proposition 1 In a two jurisdictional economy where the jurisdictions are free to compete in 
taxes to fund transfer payments as an anti-crime measure, there exists a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium tax rate which solves 
t= 
nl [22-9] ]+ n2 - pn1 - 2n2d2 L at J 
- 721 [ä] 
If 0<t<1 then both jurisdictions will levy a tax of t. Otherwise the jurisdictions will charge 
0 if t<0 whilst they will charge 1 if t>1. 
Proposition one states that a Nash equilibrium in taxes exists. The form of the interior Nash 
equilibrium tax rate is similar to the tax rate levied by a single jurisdiction, however with 
the addition of a term dependent upon the equilibrium migration response of the rich. If 
the migration response of the rich to a change in the domestic tax rate at the equilibrium 
is positive then the Nash equilibrium tax rate will be higher than optimal. If the migration 
response of the rich to a change in the domestic tax rate at the equilibrium is negative then 
the Nash equilibrium tax rate will be lower than optimal. Thus the effect of tax competition 
is to distort taxes away from the optimum. 
It is interesting to note the role the attachment to home measure of the rich plays. Although 
excluded if there is to be a symmetric equilibrium, if the rich are perfectly mobile (so d2 = 0) 
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the resulting Nash equilibrium tax is the optimal tax. If d2 > 0, so the rich are imperfectly 
mobile, in the majority of cases a non-optimal tax will be levied (the exception being if 
]= 0). Whilst the effect of the distortion on the equilibrium tax is increasing in d2, the at 
attachment to home measure of the rich is decreasing in d2. As the properties of the tax in 
relation to d2 is not transparent a numerical example is used to demonstrate the properties 
the equilibrium tax can have; a more detailed examination of this issue is in the next chapter. 
Assume nl = 800, n2 = 1000 and p=1-5B=1 -alt The optimum tax to maximise 
the expected income of the rich is 0.375. If dl is fixed at 0.22 then by increasing d2 from 
0.08 to 0.12 one of the equilibrium tax rate decreases from 0.431 to 0.234. Thus as the rich 
become more mobile the equilibrium tax decreases and can move away from the optimum. 
For comparison if d2 = 0.1 then one of the equilibrium tax increases from 0.246 to 0.337 if dl 
increases from 0.18 to 0.22. There is, however, a second equilibrium tax. 
Corollary 2 When transfer payments are used as an anti-crime measure and both the rich 
and the poor individuals are risk neutral, the tax rate that would be levied in a one jurisdictional 
economy is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a two jurisdictional economy. 
The proof follows from rewriting the equilibrium migration responses of the rich as xi 
a/ 0+alx'/ a0+ a3xI 
a1+a22 and x' = a3+a41 where ao = n2 - pnl 
+p nl(l - T), cal = 4p/n1T(l - T) + 
4rn2T, a2 = 2nldi, a3 = 4pni(1 - T) - 4p'n1T(l - T) and a4 = -2n2d2. From propo- 
sition six the Nash equilibrium tax rate solves a0 + a4x2 = 0. Solving for x' gives . x'2 = 
ao(a1+a2+a3) Substituting this into the expression for the Nash equilibrium and rearranging a1a4+a2(a3+a4) 
aP +n2-pn1 
ao[2a4(a1+a2) ß"a3(«2+a4)J n1 6T 
gives ala4+a2(a3+a4) = 
0. The tax rate that solves ao =0 is T=T[ TI which 
is the same tax rate as for the single jurisdiction. Thus the tax levied optimally when there is 
one jurisdiction causes the equilibrium migration response of both the rich and the poor to be 
exactly equal to zero leading to neither jurisdiction having any incentive to deviate from this. 
The implication of this corollary is that tax competition need not introduce any distortions to 
tax rates. If the service starts being provided by the federal government and is then devolved 
to local government there need not be any change in the tax rate charged. 
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In the discussion on transfer payments in a single jurisdiction it was mentioned that they 
acted in a similar manner to the prevention role policing can have. Increasing the tax rate 
results in more police on the streets presenting fewer opportunities for criminals to commit 
crime. However this modeling no longer holds true in a two jurisdiction world as the utility 
functions of the poor are now misspecified. Let p 
(1') be the propensity to commit crime 
in the single jurisdiction when the tax receipts fund visible policing. Whilst (2.10) and (2.11) 
still hold for the rich individuals the equilibrium poor person will be characterised by the 
marginal individual xl who is indifferent between the jurisdictions according to 
p(l - t) - dlxl = p*(1 - t*) - d1(1 - x1) (2.14) 
meaning the equilibrium migration response of the poor to a change in the domestic tax rate 
is given by 
_ 
(1 - t)(1 + 4t [x [8x1] at at 
]) [aP] 
-p (2.15) 
atJ 2d1+4t1-t aP 
Whilst proposition one still applies for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium tax, the equilibrium 
migration response of the poor is now given by (2.11) whilst the equilibrium migration response 
of the rich is still given by (2.15). The consequence of this is that the collarary, when the tax 
receipts are used to find visible policing, no longer applies. Whilst the equilibrium migration 
response of the rich remains x' "+"'I the equilibrium migration response of the poor is 2- a3+a4 
äp+a1 T2 a4 ((YOa1+coa2+«Oa3) 
now xl = a1+a2 meaning 
the optimal tax rate now solves coo + CQQ4+a2a3+a2a4 - 
ýý ao 
is no longer a solution. Although the payment of benefits as an anti-crime measure can be 
devolved to local governments without any affect on the tax rate levied, devolving tax raising 
powers to provide visible policing will, most likely, result in distorted taxes being levied. 
2.3.2 Fines related to the amount stolen 
If both jurisdictions now punish by using fines related to the amount stolen, then the equi- 
librium response for a rich person will be characterised by the marginal individual x2 who is 
indifferent between the jurisdictions satisfying 
r pnlxi1 r p*nl(1 - xl) (1- t) Ll - (1 - hz) 
xI- d2x2 = (1- t*) I1- (1 - hz*) n2(1 - x2) 
- d2(1- x2) (2.16) 
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The propensity to commit crime is assumed to be the amount spent per crime, p 
()' 
meaning the probability of detection is z 
(alt) in the domestic jurisdiction. Differentiating 
with respect to t and applying symmetry to find the migration response of the rich to a change 
in the domestic tax rate at the equilibrium yields 
axe 
_ 
-n2 + pnl(1 - hz) - nl(1 - t){(4t []- 1)[ph [d] - (1 - hz) [ät]] + 4p(1 - hz) [ 
at 
] 
2n2d2 - 4n1 1- t) ft 
az -1- hz) +p (I - hz at at 
(2.17) 
where [ at 
]_[ 
at 
tý 1 keeping xl = x2 =2. As before the denominator has to be positive if 
there is to be a symmetric equilibrium (otherwise the gains of increased security outweigh the 
disutility from living in a jurisdiction that is preferred less). Thus the equilibrium migration 
response of the rich is decreasing in magnitude in their attachment to home measure. Further 
the interactions between the two groups means the movement of the rich depends on the 
movement of the poor. This will always have a negative relationship if 1> hz or the expected 
compensation is less than the amount stolen. 
The equilibrium response for a poor person will be characterised by the marginal individual 
xl who is indifferent between the jurisdictions, satisfying 
p(1 - t)(1 - hz) - dlxl = p*(1 - t*)(1 - hz*) - d1(1 - x1). 
(2.18) 
Differentiating with respect to t and applying symmetry gives an equilibrium migration re- 
sponse to a change in the domestic tax of 
ax, 
_ 
-p(1 - hz) + (1 - t) (4t 
at ]+ 1) [(1 - hz) 
[ äP] - ph 
ý äc]] 
(2.19) 
at 
] 
2d1 + 4t(1 - t) [(1 - hz) 
ýP 
- ph 
[ ät ]] ýatý 
The denominator has to be positive in order for the poor to reside in both jurisdictions at 
the equilibrium. Again the interdependence between the two groups is present. If 
[ ät }>0 
and 1> hz then the response will be negative; the increase in the tax rate attracts the rich 
lowering the return from crime causing the poor to leave. However under other circumstances 
the direction of the equilibrium migration response of the poor is ambiguous. 
The decision rule of the local government is to maximise the expected income if its rich 
inhabitants, max(1 - t) 
I1- (1 - hz)Pnixi with respect to t gives rise to the equilibrium tax n2X2 
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rate. Again assume that the specifications of p and z ensure the expected income is concave 
in t. 
Proposition 3 In a two jurisdictional economy where the jurisdictions are free to compete 
in taxes to fund a police force (where the sanction imposed on criminals, if caught, is a fine 
related to the amount stolen), there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium tax rate which 
solves 
nl [ph [ at 
]- (1 - hz) [ 
a] ]- nl + pnl (1 - hz) + 2n2d2 [ at t- 
ph [ ät ]- (1 - hz) 
If 0<t<1 then both jurisdictions will levy a tax of t. Otherwise the jurisdictions will charge 
0 if t<0 whilst they will charge 1 if t>1. 
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists that possesses a similar structure to the optimal 
tax for a single jurisdiction. As for transfer payments the equilibrium tax is distorted by 
the equilibrium migration response of the rich to a change in the domestic tax rate. If the 
migration response of the rich to a change in the domestic tax at the equilibrium is positive 
then the equilibrium tax will be higher than optimal. Conversely if the migration response 
of the rich to a change in the domestic tax rate at the equilibrium is negative then the 
equilibrium tax will be lower than optimum. The role of the attachment to home measure 
of the rich remains ambiguous. Whilst the effect of the distortion in the equilibrium tax is 
increasing the equilibrium migration response of the rich is decreasing in the attachment to 
home measure. However there is no corollary stating the optimal tax rate is a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium. 22 If the rich are imperfectly mobile then unless [L-1] ]=0 the outcome is 
for a distorted tax to be levied if the tax raising powers are devolved to local government. 
2.3.3 Fines unrelated to the amount stolen 
Assume both jurisdictions punish by means of a punitive fine. For the domestic jurisdiction 
the police production function can be written as z 
(xlt) 
and the propensity to commit crime 
function can be written as p 
(x2t f) =p 
(xlt) 
since the fine is determined at the federal level 
22The equilibrium migration responses of the poor and the rich can be written as xi = «°+«1X2 and x2 «1+a2 
o+pixi Solving for x2 gives x2 = «oß1+«1ßo+01200 Substituting this into the expression for the Nash 01+02 «iß2+«2ßi+a2ß2 ' 
equilibrium tax gives 0= )00 +)32x2 or 0= 
2ß0R2(«'+«2)+01(«oß2+«2ßo) Unlike for transfers where ao = ßo 
«1Q2+«20i+a2ß2 
here ßo is not a factor and therefore the optimal tax (with no migration) is not a Nash equilibrium tax. 
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and thus a variable outside the control of local government. The equilibrium response of a 
rich person will be characterised by the marginal individual x2 who is indifferent between the 
jurisdictions satisfying 
pnixi1 pnixi P*ni(1 - xi) pni(1 - xi) (1-t) Ii - J-{- zqf-d2x2 = (1-t*) 1- 
l+ 
zqf-d2(1-x2). n2x2 Tb2x2 
[ 
n2(1 - x2) J n2(1 - x2) 
(2.20) 
Differentiating with respect to t to find the migration response of the rich to a change in the 
domestic tax rate and applying symmetry yields 
axe -n2 + Pnl + ni (l -t- zqf) [(4t [1 - 1) 
[2-1-] 
- 4P 
[a" ii- Prei of (4t L at 
i- 1) L äc i 
at 
] 
2n2d2 + 4n1 1-t-zt dP - 4t nl 
az ( 4f)ß Latý ý' of IIý 
(2.21) 
The denominator has to be positive if there is to be a symmetric equilibrium meaning the 
equilibrium migration response of the rich is decreasing in magnitude in their attachment 
to home. Their response is also dependent on the migration response of the poor as the 
tax increase reduces the return from crime and therefore influences their movement. If the 
expected compensation is small then the rich respond negatively to the migration response of 
the poor. 
The equilibrium response for a poor person will be characterised by the marginal individual 
xl who is indifferent between the jurisdictions satisfying 
p(1 - t) - pzqf - dlxl = p*(1 - t*) - p*z*qf - d1(1 - xl). (2.22) 
Hence the equilibrium migration response of the poor to a change in the domestic tax is given 
by (applying symmetry where xl = x2 = Z, t= t*) 
ax, 
- 
(1+4t[ät])[(1-t)[a] -4f(z[äP]+p[ätý)] (2.23) 
[ 
at 
] 
2d1 + 4t [(l - t) 
ap 
- 4f z 
aP +p az at 
[ 
The equilibrium response of the poor to a change in the domestic tax rate is ambiguous. The 
denominator has to be positive if there is to be a symmetric equilibrium so the equilibrium 
migration response is decreasing in magnitude in dl. However the numerator can be either 
negative or positive depending on the equilibrium migration response of the rich and whether 
the propensity to commit crime or detection dominates at the margin. Recall the aim of each 
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jurisdiction is to maximise the income of the rich, max(1 - t) 
[1 
- pn1x1 
]+' ---rl zq f, with n2X2 12x2 
respect to the domestic tax, t. Assume expected income is concave in t. 
Proposition 4 In a two jurisdictional economy where the jurisdictions are free to compete 
in taxes to fund a police force (where the sanction imposed on criminals, if caught, is a fine 
unrelated to the amount stolen), there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium tax rate which 
solves 
n2 - Pnl + nl [ at - nlgf 
(p [ äc ]+z äý 2n2d2 
t= 
ni 
If 0<t<1 then both jurisdictions will levy a tax of t. Otherwise the jurisdictions will charge 
0 if t<0 whilst they will charge 1 if t>1. 
Changing the type of fine imposed does not alter the structure of the equilibrium tax. The 
equilibrium tax is distorted from the optimum tax by the equilibrium migration response of 
the rich to a change in the domestic tax rate. Further the direction away from the optimum 
is the same as the direction of the equilibrium migration response of the rich. Again there is 
ambiguity in the role the attachment to home measure of the rich plays. Changing the sanction 
imposed on a criminal, if caught, does not alter the effect devolving tax raising powers to fund 
anti-crime measures has. 
2.3.4 Incarceration 
The final method of punishment the federal government can choose to impose is incarceration. 
The equilibrium migration response of a rich individual will be characterised by the marginal 
individual x2 who is indifferent between jurisdictions satisfying 
\ [i_Pximi(1_z)1 
x2 n2x2 
d2x2 
p*(1 - xl)nl(1 - z*)1 
- d2(1 - x2) (2.24) C1- x2/ 
L 
n2(1 - x2) 
J 
where k=k 
(2. L). This model assumes responsibility for funding the sanction is also devolved 
to the local jurisdiction (preventing a jurisdiction free-riding on the other's federal tax receipts 
to fund their more productive police force). Accordingly if the total cost of the domestic prison 
is k then the jurisdiction's x2 rich residents have to pay 2 for it. The presence of the 2 in k 
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reflects a given tax rate only catching half the number of criminals compared to the federal 
system. This model can be viewed as the stage game of a repeated game; at the start of the 
period a number of people are in prison who will be released at the end of the period only 
to be replaced by the same number of new criminals caught and convicted. The equilibrium 
migration response of a rich individual, calculated in the usual manner, is 
äx2 -(1 + 
[aý] 
- 4t [aýý ])A+nl(1 -t- k) [(4t 
[awl] 
- 1)B - 4p(1 - z) 
[-9-', -] ] at at at at at 
[ 
at 2ri2d2 + 4(t a- 2k )A + nl(1 -t- k) [4tB - 4p(1 - z)] 
(2.25) 
where A= n2 - pnl (1 - z) and B= (1 - z) 
[ at ]-p[ at ]. As usual the denominator is 
increasing in d2 (in order for a symmetric equilibrium to exist) so as the group becomes less 
mobile, the equilibrium migration response falls in magnitude. The usual interdependency 
between the two groups is also present. 
The equilibrium response of a poor person will be characterised by the marginal individual 
xl, who is indifferent between jurisdictions, satisfying 
k 
P(1-z) 1-t- -pzv-dixl = p*(1-z*) 
(1-t. 
- 
k* 
I -p*z*v-dl(1-xl) (2.26) x2) 1- x2/ 
where v is the disutility associated with being caught and thrown in prison - this value is 
assumed to be the same for all criminals. Hence the migration response of a poor person to 
an increase in the domestic tax rate, calculated in the usual way, is 
atl 
C(1+4t [' ])-p(1-z)(1+81 [ät]) 
2d1 + 4tC 
(2.27) 
fl. This where C=(1-z)(1-t-k)[äp]-p(1-t-k)[ ] -p(1-z)[äe]-zv[äi]-pv[It 
follows the same form as the other equilibrium migration responses of the poor to a change in 
the domestic tax rate. As the poor become more mobile the equilibrium migration response 
increases in magnitude, however the direction is influence by the movement of the rich. 
The domestic jurisdiction, seeking to maximise the utility of its rich residents, will maximise 
their non-locational utility. Assume this is concave in t. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium, 
given the movement of both capital and criminals in a symmetric world, is the tax rate that 
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solves 
t- -(1+[ät])[n2-pnl(1-z)]+(1-k)[Pni[ä]+ni(1-z)[ät] 
]+2n2d2[ät]. 
(2.28) 
Pnl [ýt] - n1(1 - z) 
[ýt 
Changing the anti-crime measure to imprisonment does not alter the structure of the tax in a 
two jurisdiction world; the optimal tax for a single jurisdiction is distorted by the presence of 
the equilibrium migration response of the poor. However as the equilibrium migration response 
of the rich is dependent on the equilibrium migration response of the poor the resulting tax rate 
is now directly affected by the sanction imposed. In a single jurisdictional world the severity 
of the sanction only impacts on p, the participation in crime decision. Whilst this remains the 
case in a two jurisdiction world, the sanction is included in the equilibrium migration response 
of the poor and therefore directly influences the resulting tax. This feature will be returned 
to in the next chapter. 
Proposition 5 In a two jurisdictional economy which uses incarceration as its anti-crime 
measure and competes in taxes, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium is the tax rate which solves 
t= -(1 
+ ýäý)[n2 - pni(1 - z)] + (1 - k)[pni 
[äc] + nl(1 - z) [ä ý] + 2n2d2 
Pnl [ ýt 
]- nl (1 - z) 
[a] 
If 0<t<1 then both jurisdictions will levy a tax of t. Otherwise the jurisdictions will charge 
0 if t<0 whilst it will charge 1 if t>1. 
An alternative model would be for taxes for policing to be determined at the local level 
whilst the federal level funds prisons, as they retain the power to determine the sanction. This 
is the system that occurs in England and Wales. This changes the cost of prisons charged to 
each rich individual to k 
(+ (1-x2)t* This means the equilibrium migration response of 2xj 2(1-xi) 
)- 
a rich individual becomes 
0x2 -A+nl(1-t-k)[(4t[ät] -1)B-4p(1-z) 
[ät]] [ 
at 
] 
2n2d2 + nl(1 -t- k) [4tB - 4p(1 - z)] 
This differs from the previous specification as the marginal cost of incarceration disappears; 
as the cost of incarceration are shared any change due to a change in t cannot be avoided 
by moving jurisdiction. The k remains as it impacts on post tax income. The equilibrium 
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migration response of the poor is also altered to 
8x1 D(1 + 4t [x ]) - p(1 - z) 
at 
] 
2d1 + 4tD 
where D= (1- z) (1- t- k) [-92] ]- p(1- t- k) [ ät ]- zv [ ät ]- pv [u]. Both the equilibrium 
migration responses have the usual properties, for example they decrease in magnitude in the 
attachment to home. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium is the tax rate that solves 
t 
(1+2 [ ät ]) [n2 - pnl (1 - z)] + (1 - k) [pnl { at 
]+ nl (1 - z) [ at 
2P-] ]+ 2n2d2 [2, T2 
pn1 at - nl(1 - z) 
[ýpý 
This follows a similar form to before; the tax is distorted by the equilibrium migration response 
of the rich. There is also a change to the coefficient in front of [! Lk] ] stemming from its exclusion 
from the equilibrium migration response of the rich. Thus devolving the funding for policing 
but not for prisons can introduce another distortion providing the prisons have to be funded 
by taxpayers. The next chapter allows a socially costless sanction to be imposed if a criminal 
is caught and demonstrates the power the federal government holds when it retains the power 
to determine the sanction. 
Thus irrespective of the anti-crime measure deployed by a jurisdiction all the pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium tax rates follow the same form if the decision rule is to maximise the non- 
locational utility of the rich. The equilibrium tax rate is the optimal tax rate for a single 
jurisdiction distorted by 2n2d2 [2'121]. at Thus the equilibrium tax will 
be higher than optimal if 
the equilibrium migration response is positive at the equilibrium whilst the equilibrium tax 
will be lower than optimal if the equilibrium migration response of the rich is negative at the 
equilibrium. 
2.4 Extensions and policy implications 
The preceding section gives a series of equations detailing the pure strategy Nash equilibrium 
tax rates. This section relaxes some of the assumptions underlying these results and pull 
together some of the theoretical results in an attempt to infer some policy conclusions from 
them. Throughout this section the anti-crime measure considered is fines related to the 
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amount stolen though the key result, tax competition distorting the equilibrium taxes by the 
equilibrium migration response of the rich, was common to all the specifications. 
2.4.1 Functional forms of the production functions 
In section 4 the production function depended on the amount spent per poor person in a 
jurisdiction. This is restrictive as the relevant variable could be the total funds allocated 
to the police or some other functional form. Therefore now assume both the propensity to 
commit crime and detection are functions of the proportion of rich people in the jurisdiction, 
the proportion of poor people in the jurisdiction and the tax rate levied. Thus p(xl, 12) t) 
and p(xl, x2) t) in the domestic jurisdiction whilst p*(-xl, -x2, t*) and z*(-xl, -x2, t*) in the 
foreign. It is assumed both jurisdictions share the same technology. The equilibrium migration 
responses of the poor and the rich can now be given by 
ax, -p(1 - hz) + (1 - t) (1 - hz)(2ä 
ät + ä) -ph(1 - t)(2ä2 
-+ 
at 
at 2d1 -21 
( 
-hz 1- 
)( t- + 2ph (1-t az t) ) -a2- 
)axl 
and 
at 
az a az aa ap axl A+ ni(1 - t)[ph(2ax, atxl + at) - (1 - hz)(ä atwl + at) + 4p(1 - hz) at 
] 
2n2d2 - nl(1 - t)[2phäxz - 2(1 - hz) 
äZ+ 4p(l - hz)] 
where A= -n2 + rani (1 - hz). The pure strategy Nash equilibrium tax rate, found in the 
usual way if the jurisdiction aims to maximise the expected income of the rich, is the tax rate 
that solves 
t= 
n1 [ph [ät ]- (1 - hz) [2ap]] - nl + pnl (1 - hz) + 2n2d2 
ph[ät]-(1-hz)[äp] 
Although the equilibrium migration responses change, the structure of the optimal tax remains 
unaltered meaning the distortion is not due to the production functions employed. This holds 
across all the models considered, meaning, for example, it might not be the benefit level 
that determines the participation in crime decision, rather another form of income inequality 
between the rich and the poor could be the cause. 
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2.4.2 Decision rules 
It has been assumed so far that the aim of each jurisdiction is to maximise the expected 
income of its rich individuals. This need not necessarily be utility maximising as their utility 
functions contain not only expected income but also a locational choice parameter. If the 
decision rule is altered to maximise the expected utility of the rich individual with the least 
strongest preference for the jurisdiction, max(1 - t) 
[1 
- (1 - hz)Pnlxll - d2x2i then the pure n2X2 
strategy Nash equilibrium tax rates is exactly the same as those derived in section 2.2. If 
the aim of the jurisdictions is to maximise the expected welfare of its rich inhabitants then 
a symmetric equilibrium will not induce any distortions in the optimal tax rate. Thus if the 
federal government imposes this decision rule on local jurisdictions, then the taxes levied will 
be optimal for the rich inhabitants. 
2.4.3 Distortions 
In this subsection we allow for there to be a distortion between the amount paid by the rich 
and the amount spent on the anti-crime measure. Let A be the distortion where AE [0,1). 
Thus for every t paid by a rich individual (1- A)t is spent. The resulting pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium tax rate for a two jurisdictional economy solves 
nl[ph(1 - A) [ä 
] 
-(I - hz)(1 - A) 
[äc]] 
-n1 + pnl(1 - hz) + 2n2d2 
[ ät 
ph(1 - A) [är] - (1 - hz)(1 - A) 
[OP] 
where 
and 
1 
at 
ax, -p(l-hz)+(1-A)(1-t)(4t[ät]+1)[(1-hz)[ 
-] 
-ph[ät]i 
at] 2d1+4t 1-A 1-t 1-hz ap -ph 
az 
at at 
A-nl(1-A)(1 -t){(4t[ä 
] ] -1)[ph[ at -(1 -hz)ý, 
] ]+4p(1 
at -hz) 
2n2d2 - 4n1(1 - A)(1 - t){t[p 
[i] ]- (1 - hz) 
[ä] + p(l - hz)} 
]} 
at 
(and A= -n2 + pnl(1 - hz)). The effect of the distortion is to lower both the marginal 
detection rate and the marginal propensity to commit crime. Although this equates to a 
lower optimal tax rate it is difficult to tell, due to the non-linearities, what the overall effect 
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on the equilibrium tax rate is. However an increase in efficiency will increase the underlying 
tax and result in increased resources for the police. 
2.4.4 Attitude towards risk 
In the preceding analysis it has been assumed that both the poor and rich are risk neutral. 
In this subsection we alter this assumption to allow the rich to be risk averse. Further it is 
assumed they possess constant relative risk aversion in the utility money provides. To simplify 
matters assume h=1, so if caught a criminal repays the amount stolen. The utility of a rich 
individual is now given by u2 = 
(1 it)' f1- (1 - z)2) . This ensures utility is now concave 
in wealth. The tax rate that maximises the non-locational utility of the rich is 
t= -(1 - 
a)[n2 - pnl(1 - z)] + ni[p 
[ät] 
-(I -z) 
[ät]i 
nlý [at] - (1 - z) 
I 'apt Ij 
As would be expected the tax rate that maximises expected income is lower than the non- 
locational utility maximising tax rate. Further the more risk averse individuals are, the higher 
the tax they are prepared to pay. In a two jurisdictional world the equilibrium migration 
response of the rich to a change in the domestic tax rate is given by 
axe A- nl(1 - t){(4t {Q ý- 1) [p [5z] - (1 - z) 
[äi] ] +4p(1 - z) L at 
]I 
at 
2n2d2 1-a 1-ta-4n 1-t t az - 1-z 
ap + z)jj ( at at 
where A= -(1- a) [n2 + pnl(1 - z)]. Using this the pure strategy Nash equilibrium tax rate 
is the tax that solves 
nl[p [ät] - (1 - z) 
[ä ]] 
- (1 -a) [ni +pni(l - z)] + 2n2d2(1 - t)1 [ 
äf 1 
pHal I -(1-z)IatI 
The story is the same as for risk neutral individuals. The equilibrium tax rate is similar to the 
optimal tax levied in a single jurisdictional world, however it is distorted by the equilibrium 
migration response of the rich. As before this determines whether there will be under- or 
over-taxation compared to the optimal at the equilibrium. However constant relative risk 
aversion introduces a function of the tax rate in front of the equilibrium migration response. 
This is not the only difference. Introducing constant relative risk aversion alters all the 
optimal taxes in the same way, irrespective of the anti-crime measure deployed. However when 
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benefits are paid to reduce crime the corollary no longer holds true; the tax rate that maximises 
the utility of the rich is no longer a pure strategy Nash equilibrium tax rate. Even when the 
poor have the same risk aversion the corollary disappears. Thus changing the attitude to risk 
does not alter the basic underlying result of tax competition resulting in a non-optimal tax 
being levied. The cause of the distortion, although different in magnitude, remains the same. 
2.4.5 Policy implications 
The theory has shown that when two jurisdictions compete in taxes to provide a police force 
that benefits the owners of capital it is possible for the resulting equilibrium taxes to be dif- 
ferent from the optimal taxes levied by a federal government. If the jurisdiction's government 
aims to maximise the expected income of its residents then the tax receipts used to fund a 
police force will be higher or lower than optimal depending on the equilibrium migration re- 
sponse of the rich to a change in the domestic tax rate when there is imperfect labour mobility. 
Whilst this could result in increased safety being offered, the jurisdictions would be too safe. 
The clear policy implication is that devolving tax raising powers to fund the police force to 
a local level can result in non-optimal taxes being levied. Thus it is possible that the police 
force will be too small or too large when funded locally. In order to avoid this, the federal 
government needs to consider this outcome before devolving the tax raising power. 
An oddity occurs when benefit payments are used as the anti-crime measure. Whilst the 
other anti-crime measures result in a tax which includes the distortion, the optimal tax for 
paying benefits eliminates the distortion. Thus the optimal benefit, from the rich group's 
perspective, can be paid to the poor irrespective of which level of government funds the anti- 
crime measure. It is difficult to tell whether the poor benefit from tax competition. When a 
police force is used the poor, as a group, will be worse off if the equilibrium tax is higher than 
optimal whilst they will be better off if the equilibrium tax is lower than optimal. A higher 
tax at the equilibrium increases the probability of apprehension and causes the level of crime 
to decrease. Thus overall the group becomes worse off. Ironically the possibility of increased 
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benefits due to tax competition is ruled out. Thus the one opportunity which benefits all the 
poor excludes the possibility of increased benefits being paid. 
One consequence of non-optimal taxes being levied is it changes the extent to which a police 
force is funded and therefore can change the optimal anti-crime measure. If one method is 
most effective in a single jurisdictional environment (gives the rich the highest level of utility) 
then it will not necessarily do likewise in a two jurisdiction world as the distortion introduced 
to the equilibrium tax could be greater than for another anti-crime method. Thus another 
anti-crime methodology which has a less distorted tax could result in a greater utility being 
obtained by the rich overall. Therefore it is possible for tax competition not only to affect the 
tax rate levied but also to influence the anti-crime measure deployed. 
2.5 A linear model 
The preceding analysis concerns the equilibrium tax rates however empirical methods for 
detecting tax competition rely on the best response functions. For the generic model above 
it is difficult to find the best response functions due to the non-linear interaction between xl 
and x2. Therefore to show the properties the best response functions are likely to have the 
model is re-written in a linear form. 
2.5.1 Basic model 
Let yl represent the proportion of criminals in the domestic region and y2 the proportion of 
rich people in the same region. As before each group has an attachment to home measure of 
di and each group's location preference is uniformly distributed along the unit interval. The 
probability that a rich person (an individual who has a dividend income equal to one) is not a 
victim of crime is given by -yo+'ylt+'y2(x2-xl) in the domestic region and 'yo+'ylt*+-y2(xl-x2) 
in the foreign. The probability can be split into two parts. The first part, -yo+'ylt is the direct 
effect of the tax in reducing crime so as the tax rate of the jurisdiction increases better 
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protection is offered. The second part, -y3(xj - xi), is the indirect effect of the spillover. 23 If 
there are different tax rates in each of the jurisdictions then there can be different proportions 
of rich and criminals in them. If a jurisdiction has a higher proportion of criminals than rich 
each remaining rich individual faces a higher probability of being a victim of crime. These are 
the same properties as the previous model but are now in a linear manner. In order for there to 
be a taxed levied if there is only a federal government we assume -yo < -yl, -yo +71 < 1. If there 
is only a federal government setting taxes then the objective function is max (-yo +'ylt) (1- t) 
which yields an optimal tax of t 2 Y1 
Assume there are no crowding effects on criminals so the probability a criminal is successful 
in the domestic jurisdiction is 1- -yo - 'y1t. The corresponding probability for the foreign 
jurisdiction is 1- -yo - -ylt*. Therefore if utility functions are the same as before the marginal 
individual in each group is given by24 
and 
Y2 (t, tW) = 
Yi(t, t*)= 
di +(1-`Yo-711)(1-t)-(1-'Yo-'Yit*)(1-t*) 
2d1 
d2 + (70 +'Y1t)(1 - t) - ('Yo +'Yi t*) (1 - t*) - 72y1(2 -t- t*) 
2d2-72(2-t-t*) 
(2.29) 
(2.30) 
As before if t= t* then yl = y2 = 2. The objective function for the domestic jurisdiction is 
max [-yo +'y1t +'y2(y2 - yl)] (1 - t). Optimising and applying symmetry, where t= t*, the pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium tax rate is given by 
where 
t_ y1 - 
lyo + 2d2 Läj (2.31) 
2'Yi 
3Y2 
- 
'Yo - 'yi + 2-yl t+ 2-y2 (1 - t) 
[ä1 
(2.32) 
7t 21y2(1-t)-2d2 
The pure strategy Nash equilibrium has the same structure as the more generic model; the 
tax is the same as the optimal tax but with the additional factor of the equilibrium migration 
23This is a linear approximation of 7 Note this model assumes policing 
is a private good; the nature of 
policing as a good is discussed in the next chapter. 
24To simplify the model no sanction is imposed if a criminal is caught. Therefore this represents the preven- 
tion role of the police. 
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response of the rich. As before if the migration response is positive then the equilibrium 
tax will be higher than the optimal tax whilst if the equilibrium response is negative at the 
equilibrium the tax will be lower than optimal. In order to solve for specific values dl = d2 =b 
is assumed for the remainder of this section. 
If we substitute equations (2.29) and (2.30) into the objective function of the domestic 
Jurisdiction, differentiate with respect to t and set equal to zero we obtain the best response 
function. Applying symmetry we can solve for the (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium tax rate 
of 
t= 
'Y2 + 26(lyl - -yo) (2.33) 
'Y2 + 46-y1 
This tax rate is always higher than the optimal tax as long as rye > 0; in the absence of 
spillovers the tax levied will be the same as if only a federal government taxed. In order for 
this to be an optimal tax the necessary second order condition is -[6Jý172+ss2ryI+ry2(i-ryo-7l)] < 0. b(72 -2ryi 72+4&y1-2-yo'Y2 ) 
As the numerator is always negative it is necessary to assume the denominator is positive, 
or b(-y2 - 2'yl-y2 + 4b-yl - 2-yo-y2) > 0. As such this model does not allow for perfect mobility 
(6=o). 
The properties of the equilibrium tax are as follows: ac = +48 
at __ (-y2+ro-72) a70 72+4S-yi '8 yi (-y2+4b-Y1)2 i 
at 
_- _ 
25(ryo+-yl) 
>0 and at _ -2-r2(-ro+y2) < 0. Both the optimal tax and the equilibrium a-Y2 'Y2+4b-y1 öb ('y2+4&yl) 
tax respond in the same direction to a change in 'yo; if the probability of not being a victim 
of crime, irrespective of the tax policy of the government, increases then the tax levied will 
be reduced. Furthermore the optimal tax decreases more than the equilibrium tax as -7 < 
-2S Whilst the optimal tax is increasing in the effectiveness of the police, 'yl, the direction -y2+46-y1 
for the equilibrium tax is ambiguous. If there is low labour mobility (a high b) then the 
response is more likely to be positive though if the spillover coefficient is large ('y2) then the 
response is likely to be negative. The response of the equilibrium tax is clearly increasing in 
the spillover effect; slight differences in the proportion of each group living in a jurisdiction 
have a greater effect on the probability of being a victim of crime causing the tax to increase. 
The equilibrium tax is decreasing in labour mobility. As labour mobility approaches zero the 
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tax rate approaches one. Any increase in b lowers the migration responses to a change in 
taxes and therefore allows lower taxes to be levied as they will attract fewer criminals. This 
property, which runs counter to the general tax competition literature, is discussed more in 
the following chapter. 
In order to test the model with econometrics the properties of the best response function 
need to be investigated. The best response function used to calculate the Nash equilibrium 
above was totally differentiated and then re-arranged to give at; . 
After this symmetry was 
applied where both jurisdiction's tax rates equal the Nash equilibrium to give the best response 
for the domestic jurisdiction to a change in the foreign jurisdictions's tax rate at the Nash 
equilibrium of" 
at 
- 
'y2[4b'Yi +'Y2(l - 2-yo - 2-yl)] > 0. (2.35) at* 2[6b'yl72 + 882'Yi +'Yz (1 - 'Yo - 'Yl)] 
The explanation for the positive response of the domestic jurisdiction to a change in the foreign 
jurisdiction's tax rate at equilibrium is the denominator is always positive whilst the numerator 
has to be positive in order to satisfy the second order condition above. The maximum value 
that it can take is one half. This can be proved by firstly differentiating with respect to 'yo. 
As the expression is decreasing in -yo we can substitute -yo =0 and differentiate the resulting 
expression with respect to ryl. This too is decreasing in the variable so substituting ryl =0 gives 
the value of 2.26 Therefore if the foreign jurisdiction were to raise its tax at the equilibrium 
the domestic jurisdiction would respond by rasining their tax as well, though the increase 
would be at a maximum a half of the other jurisdiction's rise. 
2SAs the empirical section tests the excess police precept, then removing the optimal tax from the best 
response, totally differentiating and re-arranging gives 
at 
- 
457i + y2(1 - 2-yo - 2yi) ) 
at* 2[4öyi(1 + yo + yi) + y2(1 - yo - y1)] 
> 0. (2.34 
Thus for the difference in tax from the optimal the direction remains the same. 
A then 
a'4 
__ 2[66'Yi'Y2-+86722ry7l2+'Y2+4dry1 (1)-2'Yo-71)J2 < 0. After substituting -yo =0 into A then 26Let t* It=t` = a'Yo dt 
QA 
__ 
-72[Y23+245ry2+16ö2'Yi'Y2(1-ryi+326Yi <0 a7i 
ß, o_0 
2[6bryi'Y2+862ry1 
2(1-'Y1)] . 
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2.5.2 Risk aversion 
If we drop the assumption of risk neutrality and replace it with all agents having constant 
relative risk aversion of c and assume the aim of the government is to maximise the expected 
utility of wealth then the objective function for the domestic government becomes max 1r 
[-YO + 
'Y1 t+ 'y2 (y2 - yl )] (l - t)1-c where yl and y2 have altered to take account of the new functional 
form. If we further assume that c=2 then the (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium tax rate is 
given by 
t -'y2 
+ 1262 71 - 6ä270'Y1 + 'Y2 'Y2 + 12627,2 + 1262, yo`Yi 
1882'2 
(2.36) 
Whilst it is not shown here the best response function can be totally differentiated as before 
to show the best response of the domestic jurisdiction to a change in the foreign jurisdiction's 
tax at the equilibrium; the ate >0 property remains. If we make the same substitutions into 
it, namely that -yo = ryi = 0, then the value obtained is 3. Therefore if all agents have the 
same constant relative risk aversion then the response of the domestic jurisdiction to any tax 
changes by the foreign jurisdiction can be larger than would be obtained under the assumption 
of risk neutrality. 
2.5.3 Horizontal and vertical tax competition 
Assume now the federal government can levy a tax on all capital at rate s. This funding 
augments the tax raised locally so the probability a rich individual is not a victim of crime 
becomes 'yo + ryi (s + t) + rye (y2 - yl) and -yo + -yl (s + t*) +'y2 (yl - y2) in the domestic and foreign 
jurisdictions respectively. In the timing of the game the federal government sets its tax first 
and then the local jurisdictions simultaneously set their taxes. Solving the game backwards 
gives the best response of the jurisdictions to the federal tax as 
t=t*= 
72 + 26(ryi - 'Yo) 
- s. (2.37) 72 + 4b-y1 
Note that the effective tax charged (s + t) is the same as when there is only horizontal tax 
competition. When this is substituted into the objective function of the federal government 
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(to maximise the income of the rich weighted by jurisdiction size so W= y2(1 -s- t)[-yo + 
'Y1 (S + t) +''2(x2 - xl)] + 
(1 
- y2)(1 -s- t*)['Yo + 71(s + t*) + 72 
(x1 
- x2)]) it yields 
25('y2 + 267i)('Yo +'Yi)2 (2.38) 
('ya + 46-yi)2 
which is independent of the tax that it can levy, s. Recall xl = x2 =2 when the federal 
government sets a tax as it does not alter the location decision of its citizens. Therefore at 
the equilibrium the same effective tax being levied as if there were no federal tax; the local 
tax is merely the difference between the competition tax rate and the federal tax rate. 
Assume the government sets the tax rate at s then the best response of the domestic 
jurisdiction to a change in the foreign jurisdiction's tax rate at the equilibrium, keeping federal 
taxes fixed, is given by 
at 'y2 [46-yl + -y2 (1 - 2-yo - 2-yi)] 
->0 (2.39) at* 2 [66-yl-y2 + 862'Yi + Y2 (1 - 'Yo - 71)] 
The equation above is the same as in the absence of the federal government and therefore 
has the same properties. It is interesting to note that s appears nowhere. This is due to 
the jurisdictions having a aggregate equilibrium tax rate independent of the federal tax set. 
The response of the domestic tax rate to a change in the federal tax, keeping the foreign 
jurisdiction's tax fixed, is given by 
at 
__ 
- (-y2 + 48-y1) 2 C0 (2.40) 
as 2[66-yi y2 + 862'y +'y (1 -'Yo - 71)] 
The response is always negative with the greatest response being -1. Therefore if the federal 
government were to alter only the domestic jurisdiction's tax rate then it cause the domestic 
government to lower their tax rate though not enough to offset the government. When the 
response of the foreign jurisdiction is taken into account then it can be seen from equation 
(2.37) that it is perfectly negatively correlated (ie takes a value of -1). The jurisdictions have 
an ideal amount that rich individuals should be taxed so any increase in central taxes will be 
exactly offset by a decrease in local taxes. 
The timing of the game reflects the system in England and Wales however it also ensures 
there is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. If all three governments were to set their taxes 
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simultaneously then the best response functions for the local jurisdictions require s+t= 
rye rye+4bry1ryo) 
whilst the federal government seeks to solve s+t= 'y'-"O. There are no pure 
strategy tax rates that ensure both these conditions hold meaning an equilibrium in mixed 
taxes exists. 
2.5.4 Some simple dynamics 
Assume now there is no federal government tax but the game is played for a second period. 
In the second period the dividend has increased by factor 9 to 1+B, the effectiveness of taxes 
by factor ?7 to (1+77)-l-yl and the attachment to home by w to (l+W)8. Proceeding as before 
(assuming risk neutrality) gives a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium tax of 
t= -y2(1 + 
B)(1 + 77) + 2b(1 + w)[-yl(1 + B) - -yo (1 + 77)] (2.41) 
-y2(1 + 7)) + 46-yl(1 + w) 
which equates to a tax rise of 
t-t 
- 
0(ry2 +4J-yi)['y2(1+? 7)+2b-yr(1 +w)] -2S{4bryo'Yii(1+w)+'y2['Yi(w-77)+'yow(1 +17)]} 
t [y2(1+77)+4S71(1+w)][72+2b(-yl --yo)] 
(2.42) 
As would be expected if 0= ý7 =w then the rise in tax is equal to 0 meaning the tax rate 
remains unaltered. If 0 is subtracted from equation (2.42) then the direction shows whether 
the Nash equilibrium tax has increased by more or less than the growth in income. 
t-t-e= 26{45'yo' 1(1 +W)(6 - i) +'y2['yl(1 + O)(77 - w) +'Yo(1 +77)(O - W)]} (2.43) 
t, [72(1+77)+46ry1(1+w)][ry2 +2ä('Y1-`Yo)] 
If it-1-1- 0>0 then the tax rise between the two periods is greater than the rise in income 
resulting in an increased tax rate. There are two cases of interest. Firstly if income increases 
by the same amount as police costs (0 = 77) then the tax rate increases if 0>w otherwise it 
decreases. This is equivalent to the attachment to home measure taking on a different weight 
in the utility function and the tax rate changing accordingly. Secondly if income increases 
by the same amount as the attachment to home (0 = w) then the tax will rise faster than 
income if either 0>w and -y2 - 4J -yo >0 or 0<w and rye - 457o < 0. As the direction of the 
equilibrium tax to a change in -y' is given by the direction of 4J-yo - rye taxes will rise faster 
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than income if police costs rise by more than income and the equilibrium tax is increasing in 
'yl or the exact opposite of both statements hold jointly. Thus it is possible for the equilibrium 
tax to increase faster than income. 
The change in the domestic tax, according to its best response function, to a change in the 
foreign tax rate calculated at the equilibrium is 
at 
_ 
-y2(l+77){4S-yl(1+w)--y2[2-yl(1+0)+(1+77)(2'yo-1)]} 
at* 2{612(1 +17)(1+w)+8S2Yi(1+w)2-'Y2(1+ýl)['Yi(1+0)-(1+77)(1-'Yo)]} 
>0 
(2.44) 
Again the response of the domestic jurisdiction to a change in the foreign jurisdiction's tax 
rate at the equilibrium is greater than zero. 27 Again the maximum response remains one half 
(it can be shown in the same way as before). Therefore although the change is different (unless 
0= 77 = w) the values which it lies between remains the same. 
2.6 Empirical evidence in England and Wales 
Section four suggests tax competition for the provision of an anti-crime measure leads to 
the possibility of the rich being over or under taxed when capital and criminals are mobile, 
depending on the rich's equilibrium migration response to a change in tax. Section five, which 
has a more specific functional form, suggests tax competition will lead to higher taxes than 
optimal. Therefore the question arises: is there any evidence of tax competition occurring 
within England and Wales? Accordingly what follows is not a test of the economic model 
of crime (which, as indicated in section 2.1, has already been rigorously tested), rather the 
determinants of the extent to which crime is prevented and fought. 
We begin by looking at the structure of funding in England and Wales. Scotland and 
Northern Ireland have a different policing structure and therefore will not be analysed here. 
A crude look at the figures suggest that there is a wide distribution of tax values inspite of the 
parity the standard spending assessment creates. Then regressions will be run to investigate 
27Differentiating the objective function for the domestic government twice with re- 
spect to t gives the necessary second order condition at the equilibrium tax rate as 
-{saryI rz(I+n)(I+w)+sb272(I+w)Z-y (1+i7)IYi(1+e)-(I+77)(I-7o)]} < 0. 32S I+i7)(I+w) 45ry1(I+w)-rye 2ry1(I+0)+ 1+77 27o-I 
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whether or not interdependence between the authorities and the actual precepts they levy is 
present. 
2.6.1 Local taxation and police funding in the UK 
In the UK there is only one form of local taxation on individuals. The council tax came 
into being in April 1993 to replace the community charge. The community charge was a tax 
payable according to the number of people living in a house bearing no relation to the value 
of the property. This was seen as iniquitous as it made taxation independent of the ability to 
pay. Thus the council tax was in part a return to the domesticated rates that were collected 
before April 1990. The key difference is the exact value of a house no longer determined the 
amount payable, rather each house was put into one of eight bands with each band having 
its own tax. The link between the number of people living in the accommodation was partly 
dropped - people living alone in a property are eligible for a discount. Therefore housing 
returned to being a proxy for wealth and the subsequent ability to pay. 
A proportion of the council tax goes towards the funding of the local police force. This, 
however, is not the only source of funding available to them. Their main sources of funding are: 
specific grant, revenue support grant, national non-domesticated rates and the council tax. 
The specific grant is the grant payable by the Home Office whilst the revenue support grant 
is handled by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. National non-domesticated rates are 
set by the government, collected locally, handed over to central government who then return 
them based roughly on the proportion of the adult population living in each police authority. 
The standard spending assessment shows how this money is to be distributed amongst the 
recipients each year reflecting some formulaic notion of justice. As proportions the police grant 
is approximately equal to the sum of the revenue support grant and national non-domesticated 
rates. 
The final source of funding is the council tax. The contribution this makes to police 
authorities' budgets has increased from 10% in the mid 1990s to around 15% at the moment. 
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Each year the government sets out the total standard spending for the country detailing in the 
standard spending assessment the amount each police authority will receive. This includes a 
notional amount for council tax. This assessment means that if each police authority sticks to 
the plan, then the council tax levied for each valuation band will be the same throughout the 
country. 28 As police authorities themselves are recipients, we can calculate the precept that 
the central government thinks ought to be levied by 
S-R-B-O 
TB 
where P is the precept that ought to be levied by a police authority, S the amount designated 
by the standard spending assessment, R the total revenue support grant returned, B the 
amount of business rates returned, 0 other transfers from central government and TB the tax 
base calculated in the number of band D houses. These have been calculated on the totals of 
41 police authorities in England and Wales (the Metropolitan Police and City of London Police 
have been excluded for reasons explained later). The levels are given at the bottom of table 1. 
In 2003/04 the government changed from standard spending assessments to formula funding 
share. Although the components remained the same it is constructed slightly differently and 
this accounts for the jump in the notional precept (and in table 4 the corresponding decrease 
in the excess precept in 2003/04). 
Police authorities are not limited to this funding, rather they can then formulate their 
own budgets with any difference to be met locally. Thus 42 police authorities in England 
and Wales set the police precept which is included in the council tax. 29 Table 1 shows the 
percentage each police authority charged above the standard tax of central government for the 
past six years. This time frame is important as 1998/99 was the last year of universal capping 
by central government. Universal caps were a system whereby central government outlined 
both the standard spending assessment with its recommended spending level and the cap 
28The total standard spending also lists the amounts to be transferred to local authorities to enable them to 
carry out their other responsibilities. Therefore equality in the council tax bands will only be achieved if all 
of these budgets are stuck to by all of the authorities as well. 
29The City of London police force is excluded from the analysis due to its low resident population but high 
daytime one; the nature of policing there is different and accordingly is funded differently. 
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Table 2.1: Band D police precepts in relation to the notional precept 
1998/1999 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 
Up to 10% 14 11 6 6 2 11 
10% to 20% 13 8 8 7 1 8 
20% to 30% 7 9 6 7 7 8 
30% to 40% 1 4 6 4 5 5 
40% to 50% 5 3 4 3 4 6 
50% to 60% 1 5 6 9 2 1 
60% to 70% 1 2 5 4 12 1 
70% to 80% 1 1 5 1 
80% to 90% 3 1 
90% to 100% 
Over 100% 1 1 
Notional precept 48.36 50.30 51.73 55.21 56.88 88.10 
Data source: Finance and general statistics (CIPFA, London); Standard Spending Assessment (ODPM, Lon- 
don). 
which was the maximum permitted spending by the police authority. Only the Metropolitan 
Police authority was exempt from having a cap. Although the cap when set was not legally 
enforceable (a precepting authority could set a spending amount above that, a cap would then 
be sought by central government and Parliament would then have to vote on whether or not to 
enforce the cap), Emmerson et al. (1998) report that it acted as a cap. This can be observed 
by 23 of the authorities setting spending at the level of the cap in 1998/99,11 were less than 
0.1% under the spending cap and the remaining 6 were up to 1.6% underneath it. Of those 
four were all the Welsh police authorities underspending by 1.4%, 1.5%, 1.5% and 1.6%. 
Changes by the government meant they retained the power to cap in subsequent years but 
no longer set an explicit capping limit with the standard spending assessment. Thus in the 
following five years the police authorities were able to levy an uncapped precept giving more 
scope for tax competition between them. For the year 2004/2005 the government considered 
capping the budgets of Cumbria, Northamptonshire and West Mercia and threatened caps 
in subsequent years if the rises were considered excessive. A look at the figures show that 
taxes levied by authorities have been rising faster than recommended according to central 
government. The most obvious explanation for differences in excess precepts is that they are 
responding to different levels of crime in the jurisdictions. Figure 2.1 gives a scatter graph 
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Table 2.2: Band D police precepts 
1998/1999 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 
Mean 57.50 63.11 68.98 74.98 87.27 109.39 
Standard deviation 8.46 9.49 10.81 13.31 14.47 20.08 
Minimum 47.67 49.82 52.06 55.65 58.15 63.80 
Maximum 78.93 82.51 90.95 118.85 130.59 159.13 
Data source: Finance and general statistics (CIPFA, London). 
Figure 2.1: Band D excess precept against total crime 2002/03 
Excess 
precept 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
Total crime per thousand population 
plotting total crime per thousand population against the excess precept for 2002/03. There is 
a lack of correlation between the level of crime and the precept levied by the police authority; 
there is a product-moment correlation coefficient of -0.0201 and Spearman's coefficient of 
rank correlation of -0.0495. This lack of correlation can possibly 
be explained by the standard 
spending assessment. 
Figure 2.2 gives a scatter graph plotting total crime per thousand population against the 
standard spending amount per band D equivalent. Here the product-moment correlation 
coefficient of 0.7072 and a Spearman's rank correlation coefficient of 0.7226. It is not surprising 
there is a positive correlation between total crime and the standard spending assessment. The 
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Figure 2.2: SSA per band D equivalent against total crime 2002/03 
SSA 
Total crime per thousand population 
determinants of the standard spending assessment are similar to those that cause crime (for 
example the level of young male unemployment, the proportion of long-termed unemployed 
and proportion of striving population) and those associated with policing (the number of 
police stations, pensions costs, length of motorways). The standard spending assessment aims 
to ensure each police authority receives the necessary funding to provide a uniform service. 
Superficially the excess precept is uncorrelated with the level of crime in a jurisdiction as it 
is already accounted for in the standard spending assessment. 
Unfortunately there are two problems associated with using precepts in empirical work: 
gearing and comparing. The problem of gearing connects council tax increases to the increase 
in local expenditure. As council tax receipts form a relatively small proportion of overall police 
funding, any increase above that specified by central government has to be met locally. For 
example, suppose a government decides to increase spending by a% whilst the local authority 
prefers to increase expenditure by b%, where a<b. The proportion of the budget to be 
met by local taxes is c. To accommodate the local authorities wishes the council tax would 
have to rise by (a + 1c) %, which is greater than b. Each additional unit increase in police 
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expenditure over and above that demanded by central government increases local taxes by 
!, %. Therefore a large increase in the council tax does not necessarily translate into such an 
increase in police expenditure. (APA 1999). 
The second problem concerns comparing one jurisdiction's tax rate to another's. Of the 
eight bands, band D is used as the average. A band D house is defined as a house that would 
achieve a price of between £68,000 and £88,000 in England if sold on the open market by 
a willing vendor on Ist April 1991. The Local Finance Act of 1992 sets the ratio between 
the bands as being 6: 7: 8: 9: 11: 13: 15: 18 (from band A to band H). Therefore a house in band 
H (a value of above £320,000 on Ist April 1991) pays twice the average council tax whilst a 
house in band A (worth less than £40,000) pays two-thirds the average. As a council needs 
to raise a set sum to satisfy its budget, the composition of the property values affects the 
average band D council tax. Consider two jurisdictions each containing one household. If 
each jurisdiction needs to raise £100 and the first jurisdiction house is in band A whilst the 
second is in band H then the average council tax charged will be £150 and £50 respectively. 
Thus if comparing levels, an area where the property is valued relatively lower would be 
expected to exhibit higher average council taxes without an apparent increase in the quantity 
of services provided. 
2.6.2 Testable implications 
The preceding subsection shows there is a wide variation in the excess precepts levied by 
police authorities. The theory in section four has few testable implications as its results are 
dependent on knowing the optimal tax to levy. If taxes are greater than optimal and labour 
mobility is imperfect then one explanation is tax competition with the rich population hav- 
ing a positive equilibrium migration response to a change in taxes. This means if the other 
jurisdiction were to increase its tax rate then it would attract some of the rich population. 
Unfortunately the optimal taxes to levy, with regard to policing, are unknown. If we assume 
they are those consistent with the standard spending assessment then it would suggest there is 
a desire for increased security in England and Wales as the majority of excess precepts levied 
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in the panel are positive. Table ?? shows the excess precepts levied. As was stated previ- 
ously there is a break in 2003/04 when central funding changed from the standard spending 
assessment to the formula funding share with the majority of the excess precepts decreasing 
due to the large increase in the notional precept. Even then only 4 jurisdictions levied a tax 
below the notional tax (and one of these had a positive excess precept the following year). 
The only other negative excess precept is Northumbria in 1999/2000. However the standard 
spending assessment is associated with a consistent level of security and not necessarily the 
optimal level. As such this conclusion is dependent on the strong assumption of the standard 
spending assessment providing the optimal level of security. 
The theory from section five however is testable. The theory assumes a more specific 
functional form but it shows that at the equilibrium taxes will respond positively to any 
increase in taxes by the other police authorities. Therefore it is possible to test the best 
response functions by regressing the excess precepts of all the other jurisdictions onto the 
excess precept and seeing if it possesses a positive coefficient. 
2.6.3 The determinants of the police precept 
In empirical investigations for tax competition there are two main methods that have been 
used. Spatial autoregressive models test the equilibrium itself to estimate the spatial lag. As 
the equation to be estimated is non-linear it needs to be estimated using maximum likelihood 
(for example Anselin 1988). The second approach tests the best response functions using 
instrumental variables. It is this approach that we adopt basing the methodology on Devereux, 
Lockwood and Redoano (2002). 
The equation we wish to investigate can be written as 
Pit = Pt+ai+> ßijPjt+7Xit+Eit 
jai 
where Pit represents the precept levied by jurisdiction i in time t (i = 1, ..., 
42 and t= 
1, 
.., 
5), P the notional precept and Xit other variables that can affect the precept levied by a 
jurisdiction. As there are 42 police authorities it is not possible to calculate all 42 x 41 = 1722 
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, 
32J so it is assumed that all police authorities respond symmetrically to their appropriately 
weighted competitors' average precept. This means the equation to be estimated can be 
written as 
Pit = Pt +a+ ßEwijPjt +'} Xit + Eit 
ji 
where wij is a row stochastic spatial weight matrix. As it is possible for crime and the excess 
precept to be simultaneously determined we need to us instrumental variables for the crime 
measure. Therefore we use a three step estimation process. Firstly we regress crime using 
the square of standard spending assessment per band D equivalent, expected punishments as 
additional instruments30 and the number of dwellings on crime. This allows for any possible 
simultaneity there might be between the excess precept and crime. The fitted values are 
calculated and then used as the crime measure in X; t. The second step is to regress Pit - Pt 
on Xzt, estimating the values of Pit and use these values to calculate the average weighted 
neighbours' precept. The final step is to regress P- Pt on these and Xit. 
So far we have only mentioned the properties of wzj without mentioning how it is deter- 
mined. There is no endogenous method of determining who an appropriate neighbour of a 
jurisdiction is. We consider two different methods of determining an appropriate neighbour - 
contiguity and social and economic characteristics. Both methods have arguments supporting 
their use. Contiguity fits the theoretic model with people locating in an area for employment 
reasons and then in choosing where to live will compare the jurisdictions for the security they 
offer. Thus each police authority will compete in order to attract them. As such each juris- 
diction is competing only with its direct neighbours. Geographically based weight matricies 
are the most common form of weight matrix in spatial econometrics as they can measure 
direct spillover effects (going back to Anselin (1988)). Therefore we let w(G) be a matrix of 
geographic neighbours where the ij th entry is 0 if i does not neighbour 3 and k if i neighbours 
j, where k represents the number of non zero entries on row i. 
Another argument of the model is that crime follows from social and economic circum- 
30These have been calculated as the proportion found guilty multiplied by the average custodial sentence for 
both juveniles and adults at magistrate and Crown courts. 
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stances and therefore police forces can only be compared to other police forces with similar 
social and economic characteristics. In terms of the location decision of rich individuals, they 
will settle in the jurisdiction near their place of employment where the police force is doing 
well in comparison to others. Therefore a neighbour can be defined as any jurisdictions that 
have similar social and economic circumstances irrespective of geography; this definition goes 
back to Case et al. (1993). In 2003 for the first time the Home Office issued police perfor- 
mance monitors which aim to show the performance of each police force compared to police 
forces which have been cited by Her Majesty's Police Inspectorate (Home Office (2003)) as 
having similar social and economic characteristics. These "similar forces" have subsequently 
been changed for the figures reported in 2004. Therefore let w(r) be a matrix of similar polic- 
ing neighbours where r= 2002 or r= 2003 depending on the police standards report and 
where the ijth entry is 3 if the police consider i to be similar to j and 0 otherwise, with l 
representing the number of non zero entries on row i. From the police's viewpoint neighbours 
are not necessarily symmetric and therefore w(r) itself is not symmetric. 
Additionally CIPFA have a Nearest Neighbours Selection Model on their website31 which al- 
lows neighbours to be selected using various social and economic criteria. We assume the Welsh 
police authorities only compete with other Welsh police authorities, the English metropolitan 
police authorities compete only with other English metropolitan police authorities and En- 
glish non-metropolitan police authorities compete with other English non-metropolitan police 
authorities. Therefore the matrix w(m) represents the weight matrix when the jurisdiction 
competes only with its m closest social neighbours, with the ijth entry , 
if j is one of i's 
m closest social neighbour and 0 otherwise. All spatial weights are assumed to be fixed over 
time. 
The regressors used are the number of crimes committed per 1,000 population, the clear- 
up rate, number of population per policeman, population, area, proportion of band A houses, 
proportion of band G and band H houses, the average weighted house value, the standard 
3'http: //www. ipf. co. uk/sis/nearestneighbours/police/default. asp 
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spending assessment per band D equivalent household and the lagged excess precept. We 
have used levels. Crime and its clear up rate have been lagged by one year to reflect the 
information available when the precept is to be set. The model suggests that the standard 
spending assessment should have a negative effect on the excess precept as an increase in cen- 
tral government funding lowers the tax the jurisdictions levy. Given the relationship between 
crime and the standard spending assessment it is unknown whether the standard spending 
assessment fully allows for the level of crime or if jurisdictions still need to raise excess pre- 
cepts. The proportion of houses is included to be a proxy for wealth in the jurisdiction with 
band A representing low wealth and bands G and H higher wealth. The average weighted 
house value is the proportion of the band D police precept the average house pays. This allows 
for comparisons to be made between the jurisdictions even though they have different value 
housing stocks. It would be expected that this had a negative coefficient as jurisdictions with 
higher valued housing stocks can levy a lower tax and still raise the same sum. 
2.6.4 Data 
The source of data concerning local government statistics is CIPFA. The data on local precepts 
and the composition of houses in each authority (proportions of band A and bands G and H 
along with the average weighted house) have been constructed from Council Tax Demands 
and Precepts whilst details on the population size, area and population per policeman for the 
forthcoming year have been taken from Police Estimates. Data on crime statistics is taken 
from the Home Office publication Criminal Statistics. 
Criminal Statistics are the official measure of crime in society; these are the crimes that 
are reported and recorded. MacDonald (2002) criticises the official crime statistics due to 
discrepencies between them and the British Crime Survey (a victimisation survey). Even if 
the under-reporting of crime was systematic, there is no victimisation study in England and 
Wales that breaks down data to local authority level, only regional. Further there is no reason 
to suppose that there are significant geographic variations. The Probit estimates of factors 
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics 
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum 
deviation 
Number of crimes per 1000 population 93.1 25.2 47.6 159 
Percentage of crimes solved 29.1 8.8 14 68.6 
Population per police man 463.4 71.4 250 581 
Population 1253336 1083360 480700 7368500 
Area 358985.7 242528.7 59887 1095851 
Average weighted house 0.814 0.090 0.672 1.093 
Proportion of band A properties 0.274 0.173 0.016 0.639 
Proportion of band G and H properties 0.035 0.029 0.007 0.170 
Standard spending assessment 388.7 102.7 174.3 720.7 
Lagged excess 17.87 13.54 -0.69 73.71 
Police precept over 20.30 15.15 -24.30 73.71 
that influence people to report burglary crimes calculated by MacDonald are insignificant for 
most of England and Wales. 32 
The measures used to reflect the measure of crime in the jurisdictions are total number 
of crimes per 1,000 population and total number of property crimes per 1,000 population. 
Property crime here is defined as the aggregate of the following offences: robbery, burglary, 
theft and handling stolen goods, fraud and forgery, and criminal damage. Although robbery 
in official statistics is recorded as a violent crime, it is also a crime to gain property and is 
included to reflect this. Also available are the corresponding clear-up rates. 
2.6.5 Results 
As there is no test for choosing an appropriate weighting matrix the same model was estimated 
using all -the weight matrixes. Table 5 gives the results when total crime per 1000 population 
was used as the crime measure whilst table 6 gives the results when property crime per 1000 
population was used. The first column gives the results when horizontal tax competition 
is excluded whilst the remaining columns detail when horizontal tax competition is taken 
into account. Starting with table 5, of all the control variables used population was always 
statistically significant suggesting larger police forces have higher excess precepts. The area 
32Only two regions compared to London proved to be significant: North West England (at the 5% level) and 
East England (at the 10% level). The other seven regions were statistically insignificant. 
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covered, by contrast, was statistically insignificant (apart from when the excess precepts of the 
other jurisdictions were not taken into account). Controls for income show jurisdictions with 
a larger proportion of low value housing stock had lower excess precepts whilst those with a 
larger proportion of higher value housing stock had higher excess precepts, however the effect 
of the rich was mainly statistically insignificant. This implies relatively poorer jurisdictions 
have lower excess precepts. As expected the control for housing stock has a negative coefficient 
meaning jurisdictions with a lower value average house have a higher excess precept due to the 
manner in which the band D equivalent is constructed. Although the coefficient for population 
per policemen is always negative it is barely significant when horizontal tax competition is 
included suggesting police numbers relative to the population are also accounted for by the 
transfers from central government. Finally the percentage of crimes solved came back with a 
negative coefficient which states jurisdictions with a better detection rate have lower excess 
precepts. One possible explanation could be jurisdictions respond to a low detection rate by 
increasing the precept to be able to devote more financial resources to detection. 
Whichever weighting was used the level of crime in the jurisdiction was statistically in- 
significant in determining the excess precept. This would suggest central government transfers 
adequately control for the level of crime in a jurisdiction and jurisdictions do not have to levy 
extra taxes to account for the security situation. Given the correlation between crime and 
the standard spending assessment this result would be expected. As the model predicted the 
coefficient for the standard spending assessment per band D equivalent is negative. For each 
extra pound central government allocates to a police authority it reduces the excess precept 
by twenty to thirty pence. The lagged excess precept was also always statistically significant 
suggesting a level of persistence. 
Of the five neighbour weighting matricies used three were significant at the five percent level 
whilst the remaining two were significant at the one percent level. All of them were positive 
as the model suggested though their values ranged from 38 to 75 pence in the pound which 
in terms of the model suggests there is some risk aversion. The matricies which produced 
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the highest significance were w(2002) and w(6). The police's own initial 2002 similar forces 
suggest a response of 75 pence in the pound however when the similar forces were altered for 
the following year this decreased to 38 pence in the pound and less statistical significance. 
Although the weighting matricies were kept fixed for the fives years of the panel it will be 
interesting to see whether the change in similar forces for inspection purposes will lead to this 
weighting becoming the most significance. Table 6 presents the results when property crime is 
used as the measure of crime. As property crime is approximately 75% of total crime (Home 
Office, 2006) the results are similar to those for total crime, namely the crime level does not 
explain the excess precept, the SSA has a negative effect and there is statistical evidence of 
tax competition between the jurisdictions with similar magnitudes. There is one difference, 
though, which is the percentage of crime solved is now insignificant in half the specifications. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The model presented looks at how the tax rates levied by local government to fund their local 
police services are influenced by the movement of the rich and poor between the jurisdictions. 
The tax receipts are used to fund anti-crime measures aimed to increase the expected income 
of the rich by trying to lower the level of crime (transfers and incarceration) or the expected 
loss from crime (fines). Both the owners of capital and the potential criminals are mobile 
between the jurisdictions; their movement is dependent not only on the tax rate levied but 
also the movement of the other group. When the jurisdictions compete in taxes to maximise 
the expected income of the rich the resulting symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium is 
distorted by the equilibrium migration response of the rich to a change in the equilibrium 
tax. If the migration response is positive at the equilibrium then the equilibrium tax will 
be higher than optimal whilst if it is negative then the equilibrium tax will be lower than 
optimal. Consequently too many or too few resources can be devoted to anti-crime measures 
if their funding is devolved to local jurisdictions with too little or too much crime compared 
to the optimum. However it is possible for this distortion to also alter the choice of anti-crime 
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measure. 
The model was influenced by the precepting powers given to police authorities in England 
and Wales. Each police force is able to determine its own funding through issuing a police 
precept. These police precepts have been deviating over time from the notional precept 
central government views as being appropriate. Therefore the best response functions of a 
linear version of the model were tested using five years of data from 41 police authorities 
in England and Wales. The model states the tax will be increasing in the tax rates set by 
the other jurisdictions whilst it is decreasing in funding from the central government. The 
predictions of the model are borne out in the empirics. The results suggest the presence of 
police authorities engaging in tax competition cannot be ruled out. Further an increase in 
government funding decreases the excess precept charged by police forces. Interestingly crime 
is statistically insignificant in determining the excess precept - the implication of this is the 
standard spending assessment seems to give sufficient funding to police forces to deal with the 
crime they face. 
The policy implication of this chapter is careful consideration should be given to which 
level of government has the ability to raise taxes for policing. If it is devolved to the local 
government level then the resulting taxes can be distorted away from the optimum. The next 
chapter details one circumstance when the tax raising power can be devolved without the 
distortion occurring, however this could entail problems at the federal level. 
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Table 2.4: Excess police precepts by jurisdiction 
1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 
Avon and Somerset 10.32 15.86 17.45 26.52 23.54 32.30 
Bedfordshire 11.06 15.25 15.05 21.81 5.34 14.38 
Cambridgeshire 1.81 10.73 12.83 37.71 25.21 36.43 
Cheshire 5.98 9.33 9.45 16.66 0.00 4.92 
Cleveland 12.25 13.85 14.30 39.25 32.12 44.05 
Cumbria 27.97 32.50 35.39 43.60 42.61 57.49 
Derbyshire 15.55 19.39 20.17 35.08 23.67 30.09 
Devon and Cornwall 3.22 7.14 6.60 16.92 15.17 20.60 
Dorset 26.83 32.69 37.04 46.62 35.29 42.57 
Durham 0.10 0.92 1.22 7.56 -8.54 -1.26 
Dyfed Powys 22.69 33.68 35.69 41.22 36.01 49.86 
Essex 14.77 16.22 15.80 20.79 4.87 6.48 
Gloucestershire 18.60 26.25 26.84 37.13 54.49 63.92 
Greater Manchester 9.92 10.99 9.45 11.98 3.55 5.73 
Gwent 9.44 23.24 28.82 38.29 31.01 46.34 
Hampshire 3.61 3.35 3.83 18.27 9.19 15,57 
Hertfordshire 13.24 16.26 17.18 24.13 10.18 19.74 
Humberside 4.51 8.57 30.56 38.52 24.94 37.17 
Kent 2.18 4.00 5.05 16.76 6.85 12.87 
Lancashire 7.39 10.87 12.68 16.98 -0.53 7.91 
Leicestershire 13.49 16.07 20.31 38.33 16.67 27.32 
Lincolnshire 31.69 34.76 35.15 37.98 16.30 19.44 
Merseyside 27.14 29.58 30.16 37.88 13.44 17.38 
Metropolitan 32.21 39.22 63.64 73.71 71.03 91.29 
Norfolk 14.05 20.36 28.40 43.47 33.85 45.90 
Northamptonshire 25.78 27.92 27.79 48.37 41.99 56.64 
Northumbria -0.48 0.33 0.44 1.27 -24.30 -25.86 
North Yorkshire 1.90 5.31 7.38 31.71 67.90 78.71 
North Wales 16.03 26.76 27.51 39.65 38.84 58.78 
Nottinghamshire 11.25 13.44 14.96 28.29 21.20 27.33 
South Yorkshire 6.42 7.53 7.58 17.21 6.20 10.00 
South Wales 15.06 28.69 30.36 32.97 15.41 22.92 
Staffordshire 28.56 31.70 39.16 44.05 38.40 45.65 
Suffolk 5.86 9.38 11.93 25.20 21.25 26.91 
Surrey 24.94 27.68 27.87 39.56 46.99 54.27 
Sussex 2.89 3.80 3.92 12.96 9.64 12.33 
Thames Valley 6.23 8.61 9.28 16.61 18.14 27.72 
Warwickshire 20.88 25.84 29.96 44.90 29.20 33.76 
West Mercia 8.70 22.33 23.29 47.62 31.70 44.90 
West Midlands 0.89 3.04 2.00 5.00 -16.94 -12.71 
West Yorkshire 4.46 7.00 5.61 19.04 0.71 9.27 
Wiltshire 18.68 24.11 28.05 34.66 21.58 27.84 
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Table 2.5: Determinants of the precept above its notional value using total crime 
IV IV IV IV IV IV 
w(G) w(2002) w(2003) w(5) w(6) 
Total number of crimes 0.2169 0.0925 -0.0335 0.0761 0.0648 -0.0025 
per 1000 population (1.42) (0.61) (0.19) (0.47) (0.39) (0.02) 
Percentage of total -0.7168*** -0.5061*** -0.3229* -0.5113*** -0.4438** -0.3089* 
crime solved (4.04) (2.67) (1.78) (2.79) (2.33) (1.71) 
Population per -0.0968** -0.0567** -0.0256 -0.0496 -0.0306 -0.0204 
policeman (2.28) (2.04) (0.88) (1.57) (1.01) (0.70) 
Population 0.1383*** 0.1133*** 0.1565*** 0.1386*** 0.1508*** 0.1669*** 
(3.62) (3.25) (4.65) (4.40) (4.52) (4.99) 
Area 0.1594* 0.0616 -0.0122 0.0504 -0.0518 0.0 471 (1.81) (0.69) (0.14) (0.58) (0.66) (0.61) 
Average weighted house -1.0017*** -0.9903*** -0.9128** -0.9905*** -1.0157*** -1.0097*** (2.79) (2.68) (2.55) (2.67) (2.79) (2.74) 
Proportion of A band -0.9942*** -0.7974*** -0.6234* -0.8918** -0.8910*** -0.7422** 
properties (3.21) (2.78) (1.85) (2.53) (2.66) (2.25) 
Proportion of G and H 3.5321** 1.9478 2.1416 2.5130 2.0788 1.7581 
band properties (2.29) (1.21) (1.48) (1.46) (1.24) (1.10) 
Standard spending -0.3825*** -0.3319*** -0.2389*** -0.3054*** -0.2612*** -0.2430*** 
assessment (8.87) (7.81) (3.83) (4.82) (4.02) (4.38) 
Lagged excess precept 0.6144*** 0.5756*** 0.4374*** 0.5507*** 0.4549*** 0.4341*** 
(4.36) (4.10) (3.14) (3.85) (2.92) (3.03) 
Weighted neighbour's 0.4846** 0.7474*** 0.3833** 0.4746** 0.6813*** 
tax (2.45) (4.10) (2.14) (2.54) (3.61) 
R2 0.8546 0.8641 0.8737 0.8616 0.8644 0.8714 
Sargan test statistic 0.4662 0.2119 5.0956 2.0429 1.9246 1.9383 
LM test statistic 0.9605 0.081 0.091 0.1798 0.5041 0.8350 
Police authority effects have been included in all regressions. Figures in brackets show the robust t-statistics. 
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Coefficients for proportion 
of properties and area have been multiplied by 103 whilst those for average weighted house have been 
multiplied by 10-3. Instruments used for crime are SSA, SSA2, number of dwellings, expected punishment if 
caught for both juveniles and adults in magistrates and Crown courts. The Sargan test is distributed x2(5) 
when weighted neighbour's tax is included, X2(6) when not. The LM test statistic is for autocorrelation 
distributed X2(1). 
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Table 2.6: Determinants of the precept above its notional value using property crime 
IV IV IV IV IV IV 
w(G) w(2002) w(2003) w(5) w(6) 
Number of property crimes 0.2204 0.1115 -0.0235 0.0856 0.0811 0.0199 
per 1000 population (1.29) (0.66) (0.12) (0.48) (0.45) (0.11) 
Percentage of property -0.7135*** -0.4424** -0.2622 -0.4607** -0.3664 -0.1868 
crimes solved (3.80) (2.18) (1.31) (2.23) (1.64) (0.88) 
Population per -0.0700** -0.0573** -0.0282 -0.0507 -0.0314 -0.0213 
policeman (2.24) (2.00) (0.95) (1.59) (0.98) (0.70) 
Population 0.1440*** 0.1192*** 0.1595*** 0.1440*** 0.1565*** 0.1731*** 
(3.72) (3.31) (4.73) (4.53) (4.60) (5.08) 
Area 0.1235 0.0419 -0.0276 0.0269 -0.0370 0.0415 (1.34) (0.44) (0.31) (0.31) (0.45) (0.50) 
Average weighted house -0.9202** -0.9437** -0.8737** -0.9289** -0.9729*** -0.9889*** (2.52) (2.56) (2.42) (2.47) (2.66) (2.70) 
Proportion of A band -0.9551*** -0.7911*** -0.6322* -0.8634** -0.8857*** -0.7512** 
properties (3.06) (2.74) (1.82) (2.43) (2.61) (2.23) 
Proportion of G and H 3.6331** 2.0507 2.2530 2.5757 2.1689 1.8216 
band properties (2.29) (1.30) (1.61) (1.54) (1.31) (1.16) 
Standard spending -0.3781*** -0.3322*** -0.2413*** -0.3033*** -0.2596*** -0.2417*** 
assessment (8.58) (7.76) (3.86) (4.72) (3.84) (4.28) 
Lagged excess precept 0.5909*** 0.5607*** 0.4256*** 0.5310*** 0.4376*** 0.4177*** 
(4.17) (3.97) (3.03) (3.68) (2.75) (2.88) 
Weighted neighbour's 0.4842** 0.7588*** 0.3998** 0.4854** 0.7094*** 
tax (2.37) (4.02) (2.12) (2.41) (3.54) 
R2 0.8529 0.8619 0.8727 0.8603 0.8626 0.8700 
Sargan test statistic 0.4179 0.1287 4.9049 1.9542 1.6013 1.6230 
LM test statistic 0.7974 0.4646 0.5061 0.3188 0.6414 0.9363 
Police authority effects have been included in all regressions. Figures in brackets show the robust t-statistics. 
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Coefficients for proportion 
of properties and area have been multiplied by 103 whilst those for average weighted house have been 
multiplied by 10-3. Instruments used for crime are SSA, SSA2, number of dwellings, expected punishment if 
caught for both juveniles and adults in magistrates and Crown courts. The Sargan test is distributed x2(5) 
when weighted neighbour's tax is included, X2 (6) when not. The LM test statistic is for autocorrelation 
distributed X2(1). 
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Chapter 3 
A general model of tax competition 
and crime 
The previous chapter considered the effect tax competition has on tax rates and crime when 
the capital itself is subject to the possibility of theft. This chapter relaxes the assumption that 
the post tax income of the rich is the object of a criminal's desire to allow for other crimes 
committed against the rich. Irrespective of the type of crime committed it is assumed a 
criminal will gain a fixed amount of utility from committing a crime but loose a fixed amount 
if they are subsequently apprehended and a sanction imposed. Similarly the owner of the 
capital suffers a fixed reduction in their utility if they are subject to crime. Therefore in this 
chapter it is not the capital that is subject to crime, rather the owners of the capital. 
The chapter begins by introducing a generalised model of crime, though it is introduced 
into the same Hindriks type model as the previous chapter. The presence of a police force has 
two separate effects. The first is the direct effect it has on detection. This, in turn, influences 
the second effect, the participation in crime decision. As before both groups are mobile across 
the jurisdictions. Each individual's location decision is dependent on the movement of others, 
which are influenced by the taxes levied by the local jurisdictions to fund the police service. 
After introducing the base model, which follows a similar form to the previous chapter, the 
comparative statics are considered. The extent to which the equilibrium taxes are distorted 
depends on the actions of the federal government when they determine the sanction imposed if 
a criminal is caught and convicted. Furthermore the rich do not always benefit from becoming 
more mobile. After this the model is extended in a few ways to show how the equilibrium 
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tax rates changes depending on the assumptions underlying it. It is possible that not all the 
taxpayers are potential victims of crime or that there are two different groups of criminals 
engaging in different crimes. Finally it considers the effect of what happens when everyone 
pays tax. 
3.1 A general model 
In the previous chapter the crime considered was stealing the post tax income of a rich 
individual. Consider a more generic form of crime from which a criminal gains a fixed utility 
u if he commits the crime and is not apprehended. Let v represent the utility if he commits a 
crime but is caught (with u> v). This is a generic return from crime function as its coverage 
ranges from anti-social behaviour and shoplifting to murder and rape; each of these acts can 
be assigned a fixed level of utility depending on whether the criminal is caught. As before, 
assume a criminal is only able to attempt one crime during a time period. The expected 
utility of a criminal is thus (1 - p)u + pv where p is the probability a criminal is caught. 
A criminal has the choice of whether to commit a crime. There is a group of nl potential 
criminals, each with a parameter Ez, Ez E [e, e], that represents their taste for crime. If 
(1 - p)u + pv > Ej then the expected utility from crime exceeds the necessary return; ergo 
criminal i will commit the crime. However if (1 - p)u + pv < Ej the returns from crime are 
not sufficient to warrant committing the crime. 
It is assumed the police know the distribution of the parameter E as well as the values of 
u and v so the function q= q(p) represents the probability that any member of the group 
will attempt to participate in crime. As before the potential criminals have no taxed income. 
There are two jurisdictions in which people can live; criminals can only commit crime in 
their jurisdiction of residence. Each person has a preference for a location, represented by 
xE [0,1], with a lower value signifying a preference for the domestic jurisdiction (located 
at 0) whilst a higher value signifies a preference for the foreign jurisdiction (located at 1). 
Therefore the expected utility from living in the domestic jurisdiction, for any randomly 
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chosen individual from the group, is q[(1- p)u + pv] - dlx whilst the individual would obtain 
q* [(1 - p*)u + p*v] - dl (1 - x) from living in the foreign jurisdiction where dl is a measure of 
the group's attachment to home and an asterisk denotes the foreign jurisdiction. 
There are n2 potential victims of crime. Their utility is derived from three separate com- 
ponents: post tax income, locational preference and the expected loss from being a victim of 
crime. Each member of the group has a locational preference along the unit interval, : c; E [0,1], 
and therefore gain -d2x from living in the domestic jurisdiction but -d2(1-x) from living in 
the foreign jurisdiction (where d2 is the group's attachment to home measure). For both groups 
the locational preferences are uniformly distributed along the unit interval. Each member of 
this group receives a dividend income of 1 which can be taxed by the local government. The 
government of the domestic jurisdiction levies a lumpsum tax of t whilst the foreign jurisdic- 
tion levies V. The final component of this group's utility function is the measure representing 
being a victim of crime. As all the individuals are risk neutral the measure is the loss of utility 
from being a victim of crime, z, multiplied by the probability that they are a victim of crime, 
g(1-p)x in the domestic jurisdiction and gý1 2 xl') in the foreign jurisdiction, where xi is X2 
the proportion of potential criminals and x2 the proportion of potential victims living in the 
domestic jurisdiction. This assumes no harm occurs if a crime is attempted but the criminal 
is caught. Thus a randomly drawn member of this group will obtain 1-t- g(l ý. Z 
), rl z- d2x 
from living in the domestic jurisdiction and 1- t* - 9_1 i 
_(2 xl)z - d2(1 - x) in the foreign 
jurisdiction. 
The taxes levied are used to fund a police force which helps combat crime. This occurs in 
two ways. The first is through p; an increase in the tax, ceteris paribus, increases the funding 
available for the police and allows them to catch more criminals. The second effect occurs 
through q; given the rise in p the expected returns from crime fall, meaning the probability 
that a member of the potential criminal group actually commits a crime falls. Therefore let 
ä>0 and 22 < 0. Further assume aäp <0 and ä>0 so, in the absence of tax competition, 
an optimal tax can be found. These directions occur solely in relation to the tax, however the 
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tax base and the movement of the potential criminals also have to be considered. The total 
funds available for the police force are n2x2t in the domestic jurisdiction and n2(1-x2)t* in the 
foreign jurisdiction. Therefore in the domestic jurisdiction p increases in x2 whilst q decreases 
in x2; these directions are reversed for the foreign jurisdiction. The movement of potential 
criminals also has to be considered as the more potential criminals there are in a jurisdiction the 
less effective a unit of funding will be. This means in the domestic jurisdiction p is decreasing 
in xl whilst q increases in it (as a potential criminal has better opportunities to hide). Again 
these directions are reversed for the foreign jurisdiction. Therefore in the domestic jurisdiction 
both the probabilities p and q are functions of t, xi and x2 with p=p 
(al 
and q=q 
(2i). 
In the foreign jurisdiction the probabilities are p* =p 
((li mit*) and q* =q 
((1j). 
Each jurisdiction simultaneously determines its own tax rate. After tax rates are set both 
potential victims and potential criminals will choose where to live. After the residency decision 
criminals engage in crime. The aim of the jurisdictions' governments is to maximise the non- 
locational utility of the potential victims of crime, aware that any change in the tax rate 
will affect the location decision of the two groups. Non-locational utility is defined as utility 
excluding the locational element. This means non-locational utility is composed of post- 
tax income and the expected harm caused by crime. Jurisdictions are competing to attract 
taxpayers, the potential victims, and repel the criminals. Therefore this chapter focuses on 
the Nash equilibrium tax rates. Like the previous chapter this chapter will concentrate on 
pure strategy Nash equilibrium tax rates that lead to symmetric outcomes. 
The government of a jurisdiction does not know which of its citizens and potential mi- 
grants will commit a crime, rather it knows that each member of the potential criminal group 
will attempt to commit a criminal act with probability q. Consider the marginal individual 
located at xl (where the individual is indifferent between the jurisdiction in which he resides 
as his utility in each jurisdiction is the same after considering locational preferences). As the 
government of a jurisdiction is uncertain as to whether or not this marginal individual will 
attempt to commit a crime (as q will, in game play, take the value of zero or one), the juris- 
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diction has to consider the expected migration response. Thus the jurisdictions' governments 
will consider the marginal potential criminal to be located at x1, where 
q[(1 - p)u + pv] - dlxl = q*[(1 - p*)u + p*v] - d1(1 - x1) (3.1) 
and xl - xl(t, t*) and x2 - x2(t, t*). As in the previous chapter, the attachment to home 
measure (d1) needs to be sufficiently high in order for an interior, symmetric solution to 
exist. This is because at the equilibrium, the marginal increased expected return from crime 
(from there being an additional criminal in the jurisdiction) must be less than the marginal 
loss in utility due to residing in the jurisdiction which is preferred less. Equation (3.1) can 
be differentiated with respect to t, symmetry applied (where t= t* so xl = x2 = 2) and 
rearranged to give the equilibrium migration response of the potential criminals to a change 
in the domestic tax rate. 
äx1 
_ 
(4t [aa? ] + 1) {[(1 - p)u + pv] [-89] - q(u - v) [ä'] } (3.2) 
[ 
at 
] 
2d1 + 4t 1-u+ pv] aq -u-v 
ap l 
at at 
The interaction between the movement of the two groups, taxpayers and potential criminals, 
is demonstrated by the equilibrium migration response of taxpayers (at) being present in 
the equilibrium migration response of the potential criminals. If the equilibrium migration 
response of the potential victims is positive (so a rise in the domestic tax rate attracts potential 
victims), the equilibrium migration response of potential criminals will be negative so long 
as the return from crime is not too low (given the denominator has to be positive if there 
is to be a symmetric equilibrium). The increase in tax attracts the rich causing more funds 
to be available for policing and therefore the return from crime is lowered. Similarly the 
equilibrium marginal response for a potential victim of crime will be characterised by the 
marginal individual x2 who is indifferent between the two jurisdictions. For this individual 
1-t- 4(1 p)xlz - d2x2 =1- t* - 
q* (1 yp*)(1 - x, ) z- d2(1 - x2). (3.3) 
12 1-x2 
Again the equation can be differentiated with respect to t, symmetry applied (where t= t* 
so xl = x2 = 2) and rearranged to give the equilibrium migration response of 
the potential 
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victims to a change in the domestic tax rate. 
äx2 -1+(4t[ä ]-1){(1-p)Läi-g[äp]}z-4q(1-p)z[2 ] (3.4) 
L 
(9t J 2d + 4tz 1- p) -q 
ap 
- 4q(1 - pz a 
{( Latý Latý }) 
Again there is interaction between the equilibrium migration responses; the equilibrium mi- 
gration response of the potential criminals affects the movement of their potential victims. 
Given the denominator has to be positive if there is to be a symmetric equilibrium, if the 
equilibrium migration response of potential criminals is positive then the equilibrium migra- 
tion response of the rich is unambiguously negative. The foreign Jurisdiction offers an increase 
in post-tax income and increased security, as fewer criminals reside there. However if the 
equilibrium migration response of potential criminals is negative then the direction of the 
equilibrium migration response of the rich is ambiguous. 
Assuming n2 > ni the government of a jurisdiction, seeking re-election, will aim to max- 
imise the expected utility of the potential victims of crime (excluding their locational prefer- 
ence). Therefore the objective function for the domestic government is max 1-t- g(1-p)xi z 
with respect to t, remembering xl - xl(t, t*) and x2 - x2(t, t*). Given the symmetry in the 
model the foreign government, maximising the non-locational utility of its potential victims 
of crime, will, in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, levy the same tax rate. The pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium tax rate solves 
aq ap] [ax2] 
-1 - z(1 - p) 
[ 
at 
]+ 
qz 
[ 
at + 
2d2 
at - 
0. (3.5) 
This follows the same functional form as the previous chapter. If tax competition is absent, 
so the federal government determines the tax, the optimal tax rate solves -1- z(1- p) 
[ at] + 
qz [ a] = 0. Therefore the presence of tax competition introduces a distortion into the 
expression for the optimal tax. The tax is higher than optimal if [ at ]>0 at the equilibrium 
whilst it is lower than optimal if [ at ]<0 at the equilibrium. 
3.1.1 Comparative statics 
The properties of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium tax rate are not clearly discernable due 
to the complexity of the tax rate. Even when the probability functions take on a generic 
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linear form, for example q=a-b! -2-' and p=c+ &K-2-, the non-linearities present difficulties. X1 X1 
Therefore to demonstrate the properties of the equilibrium tax rate, a numerical example 
will be used throughout this chapter. Assume q=1-3 and p=1+ 2ýi .1 
The optimal 
tax (levied in the absence of tax competition) is s=0.167.2 As a base scenario assume 
dl = d2 = 1, u=3 and v= -3 so the equilibrium tax rate is t=0.309. 
For the optimal tax as >0 and äa2 = 0. If a decreases to 5 and 5 then the equilibrium 
tax also falls to 0.286 and 0.255 respectively; whilst the equilibrium tax also increases in a 
it is now concave. However whilst äb >0 and a62 < 03 if b increases to 4 and 2 then the 
equilibrium tax rate reduces to 0.272 and 0.246 respectively (so äh <0 and 262 > 0). The 
effect of tax competition is to alter the direction of both the first and second order conditions. 
Although the optimal tax component of (3.5) responds in the same way, the effect b has is 
outweighed by the effect it has on the equilibrium migration response of the taxpayers. If 
police expenditure per crime has no effect on the number of potential criminals, so q=1 and 
at = 0, then the underlying model remains the same with the equilibrium tax affected by the 
same distortion. Thus allowing policing to have a deterrent effect does not alter the structure 
of the equilibrium tax rate, though it does alter the equilibrium tax that is levied. 
Both as <0 and !<0, though äf2 =0 whilst aý2 < 0. As c increases to 5 and 10 the ac ac 
tax rate falls to 0.198 and 0.074. Likewise both äd>0 and 
äd2<0 and ad>0 and 228<0.4 ad2 
Again increasing d to 5 and lo increases the equilibrium tax 
to 0.312 and 0.314. Although 
the introduction of tax competition can change the effect of the parameters on the tax rate 
levied, it will not necessarily alter all of the effects of a change in the parameters. 
Another comparative static exercise of interest is how the equilibrium tax rate responds to 
an increase in the level of harm, z. It is also worth noting that z also includes the ratio of 
3x 2t if 3x 2t 11 x2t if x2t 
'Thus qI-- and p2+ 
2x1 2x1 -1 == 
0 otherwise 1 otherwise 
2In the generic form the optimal tax (the tax levied in the absence of tax competition) is s= 
+6(2bd )z+daz 
31n the general case the direction of both the first and second derivatives is ambiguous; if 1> adz then they 
are signed as in the text. 
41n the generic case äd = 1-b ä-ý Z and 
ä= -1+b(1-ý Z Although the direction is ambiguous the text 
records the direction for the values assumed. 
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potential criminals to potential victims, so an increase in z represents not only an increase in 
the harm crime causes but also an increase in the number of potential criminals relative to 
the number of potential victims. ' Reducing the value of z in units of one-fifth results in the 
equilibrium tax rate falling from 0.309 (when z= 1) to 0.286,0.255 and 0.200 (when z= 5). 
Thus the equilibrium tax is increasing and concave in z. This is the same as the optimal 
tax; as the disutility caused by crime increases, either from the increase in the number of 
potential criminals or the crime itself causes more damage, increased taxation is required as 
the marginal cost of crime has increased. 6 
The federal government retains control of the sanction imposed on a criminal if he is 
caught - it is assumed that, if caught, a criminal will be convicted. Table 3.1 gives the 
equilibrium tax rates as both the sanction, v, and the utility derived by a criminal if not 
caught, u, vary. The blank areas represent where the equilibrium tax rate does not satisfy 
the necessary second order conditions; it appears IvI >u is a necessary requirement for 
the equilibrium tax to maximise non-locational utility of the taxpayers. For a given u the 
equilibrium tax rate is decreasing in the magnitude of the sanction and, furthermore, is convex 
in v. Recall the optimal tax is t=0.167. When the sanction is low in magnitude the 
tax rate is higher than optimal whilst when the sanction is high in magnitude the tax rate 
is lower than optimal. This means it is possible for the central government to negate the 
distortionary effects tax competition can have by choosing an optimal sanction. Returning 
to equation (3.5), it is necessary that [ at 
]=0 if the optimal tax is to be levied when 
there is tax competition. Inserting the optimal tax into the equilibrium migration response 
of the potential victims to a change in the domestic tax rate yields [ at 
]= 
4Ld 
+] where 
ýr = 4tz { (1 - p) [ at 
]-q[ aP1 }- 4q(1 - p)z < 0. Thus, in order for at = 0, at 
J=0 
is required. Inserting the optimal tax rate into the equilibrium migration response of the 
potential criminals, equating to zero and rearranging yields 
5Changing the relative number of criminals can also affect the policing production functions. 
z 6For the optimal tax äz = 2b 
7>0 and 4=b<0. 
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Table 3.1: Equilibrium tax rates: changing the sanction 
V 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 -11 -12 
u1 0.276 0.167 0.101 0.056 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.299 0.222 0.167 0.125 0.093 0.067 0.046 0.028 0.013 0.000 0.000 
3 0.309 0.249 0.203 0.167 0.137 0.111 0.090 0.072 0.056 0.042 
4 0.315 0.267 0.227 0.194 0.167 0.143 0.122 0.104 0.089 
5 0.318 0.277 0.243 0.214 0.189 0.167 0.147 0.130 
6 0.320 0.285 0.255 0.229 0.206 0.185 0.167 
7 0.322 0.291 0.264 0.241 0.219 0.200 
8 0.323 0.296 0.272 0.250 0.230 
9 0.324 0.300 0.278 0.257 
10 0.325 0.303 0.282 
äp] 
_ 
(1 - p)u + pv (3.6) 
[aq] q(u - v) 
The left-hand side of the equation is negative whilst the denominator on the right-hand side 
is positive. This means the numerator on the right-hand side needs to be negative if there is 
to be av that ensures tax competition causes no distortion. The numerator is the expected 
return from committing a crime which also serves as the threshold necessary for a potential 
criminal to determine whether or not to commit a crime. In order for there to be a sanction 
which results in the optimal tax being levied after tax competition, the outside options of 
the potential criminals have to be negative. In the numerical example being used here the 
optimal sanction, from the tax competition viewpoint, is v= -2u. Although not present 
in the numerical example, a change in v will also affect q as it lowers the expected return 
from crime, ceteris paribus. However as an increase in v would increase b, this reinforces the 
reduction caused to the equilibrium tax. It is interesting to note that the optimal punishment 
is totally independent of the harm caused by crime. Also it assumes the punishment can 
be expressed in monetary terms and that, like Becker (1968), the punishment is costless for 
taxpayers. 7 
Proposition 6 The federal government is able to negate the effects of tax competition on the 
7The previous chapter showed that when the punishment is not socially costless the response of taxpayers 
is to prefer less policing in order to fund fewer prisons as the cost of imprisonment rises whilst tax competition 
introduced the same distortion into the equilibrium tax of the rich. 
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equilibrium tax rate if crime is still committed when the expected return from crime is negative 
and the sanction is socially costless. 
The final comparative statics exercise relates to the attachment to home measures. The 
greater the attachment to home, the lower the mobility of the group as the locational element 
of utility plays a greater role in the residency decision. Inserting the optimal tax into (3.4) the 
equilibrium migration response of potential victims to a change in the domestic tax is [ail] _ at 
"[5a]where 7r = 4tz {(1 - p) [aq] -q [I] 4q(l - p)z < 0. When this is substituted into 4d2+-7r > 
the equilibrium migration response of potential criminals at the equilibrium tax rate it gives 
at dj 
]_ w(2 4t[I ]) 
, where uw = 4t 
{ [(1 - p)u + pv] 
[ 
at 
]- q(u - v) [ 
aP] 1. The direction of -o x 
is ambiguous as the expected return from crime can be either positive or negative. Thus the 
equilibrium migration response of taxpayers to a change in the tax rate (at the equilibrium tax) 
is [ äi ]- 
4d2(2d1+4tß)+aýdi 
The distortion in the tax rate when compared to the optimum, 
A=d axe has the properties aaA - -2T-7r) and dA - 2r2wdl 2 at adl [4d2(2d1+4tw)+27rd1]2 öd2 [4d2(2dl+4tv)+2irdl]2' 
Taking äd first, the distortion is decreasing in d2 if zU <0 whilst it is increasing in 
d2 if uý > 0. Thus the equilibrium tax is decreasing in d2 if zJ < 0; if I<0 then a 
reduction in d2 increases 0 so a greater tax is needed for (3.5) to hold. Assume 0<0 then if 
4d2(2d1 + 4t-o) + 2'rd1 <0 the equilibrium tax will move towards the optimal tax as the rich 
become more mobile whilst if 4d2(2d1 + 4tw) + 2,7rd1 >0 the tax will be decreasing below the 
optimal tax as the rich become more mobile. Returning to the numerical example assume dl 
remains constant (with dl = 1) but d2 increases in steps of 0.2. The equilibrium tax reduces 
in value from 0.309 (when d2 = 1) to 0.305,0.301,0.297,0.293 and 0.290 (when d2 = 2) 
This runs counter to expectations and the tax competition literature which suggests capital 
becomes harder to tax as it becomes more mobile and therefore the resulting equilibrium 
taxes approach the optimal tax for the capital's owners. Although the equilibrium tax will be 
increasing in d2 if w>0, it will move away from the optimal tax if 4d2 (2d1 + 4tt) + 2ird1 >0 
with too many resources flowing towards the police. Thus if 4d2(2d1 +4tw) +2ird1 <0 and w 
possess the same direction then any decrease in d2 will move the equilibrium tax further away 
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from the optimum. When the capital owners benefit from the tax receipts an increase in their 
mobility can move the resulting equilibrium tax further from the optimum and consequently 
the taxpayers become overly secure. 
Proposition 7 The equilibrium tax rate can diverge from the optimum tax rate for the rich 
as they become more mobile. 
Likewise a-° - -2ýo 
(4d2-ý) 
Z means the equilibrium tax will be increasing in dl if adl - [4d2(2d1+4rw)+27rd1J 
2irzo(4d2 - rr) <0 or decreasing in it if the inequality does not hold. Thus as potential 
criminals become more mobile the equilibrium tax will rise if 2irw(4d2 -7r) > 0; as for d2 the 
reduction in dl increases 0 causing the equilibrium tax rate to rise. In the numerical example 
if dl increases in 0.2 steps whist d2 =1 remains constant then the equilibrium tax rate reduces 
from 0.309 (when dl = 1) to 0.303,0.299,0.296,0.294 and 0.291 (when dl = 2). As potential 
criminals are less mobile their equilibrium migration response to a change in the tax rate is 
lessened and consequently so is the equilibrium migration response of the potential victims. 
Thus the reduced mobility of potential criminals allows the equilibrium tax to be reduced 
without attracting criminals to a jurisdiction. However it is possible, if 27rw(4d2 -7) < 0, for 
the equilibrium tax rate to fall as potential criminals become more mobile. 
The base model again demonstrates that when a jurisdiction's government chooses to max- 
imise the non-locational utility of its residents, the equilibrium tax will be distorted by the 
equilibrium migration response of taxpayers. If an increase in the tax rate will attract more 
taxpayers at the equilibrium then there will be overtaxation. Conversely if it causes residents 
to leave then there will be undertaxation. This base model demonstrates two interesting fea- 
tures of tax competition when the receipts are used to increase the security of the capital's 
owners. The first is that under certain circumstances a federal government, when determining 
a sanction, has the ability to ensure tax competition does not result in non-optimal tax rates 
being levied. The second feature is that the tax rate can move away from the optimum tax as 
the capital becomes more mobile - an increase in the taxpayers' mobility can make taxpayers 
worse off. 
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3.2 Policing as a good 
In the previous section the probability of catching a criminal was a function of the total 
funding available to the police and the number of potential suspects - in essence it represented 
the detection role of the police. There are two alternatives to this. The first is to assume 
policing is a public good, so the whole police force is focused on the preventative role and 
thus their visibility reduces the opportunities available to criminals. Therefore let p= p(x2t), 
q= q(x2t), P* = P((1-x2)t*) and q* = q((1-x2)t*). For potential criminals equation (3.1) still 
represents the marginal individual who is indifferent between the two jurisdictions. Therefore 
the equilibrium migration response for a potential criminal to a change in the domestic tax 
rate can be found in the same way as before and is given by 
ax, (4t [ät ]+ 1) { [(1 - p)u + pv] [ 
ät 
- 4(u - v) [ 
äPý } 
(3.7) 
[at] 
2d1 
The direction of the equilibrium migration response remains ambiguous. However comparing 
this equilibrium migration response to the one in the base model, (3.2), the only difference 
is the denominator. The crowding effect of potential criminals in the base model decreased 
the value of the denominator and thus heightened the response to any change in the domestic 
tax rate - if those who are close to indifferent regarding their preferred location leave a 
jurisdiction then those that remain, in the base model, would have an increased probability of 
being arrested which could force them to move. In the public good model this second round 
effect disappears. 
For potential victims equation (3.3) still represents the marginal individual who is indif- 
ferent between the two jurisdictions. Thus the equilibrium migration response for a potential 
victim to a change in the domestic tax rate can be found in a similar way, meaning 
axe -2 - z(1 - p) [äg] + qz 
[äp] - 8q(1 - p)z 
[ät ] 
(3.8) C at J 4d2 + 4tz 1- p) -q ap - 8q (l - p)z {( ýatý Latj 
As usual there is interaction between the movement between the two groups. Comparing the 
public good model with the base model, (3.4), both the numerator and the denominator have 
changed. For a given t changing policing to a public good increases the denominator. The 
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change in policing also reduces the role of the equilibrium migration response of potential 
criminals in determining the equilibrium migration response of taxpayers, however it still 
enters negatively in the equilibrium migration response of taxpayers. 
The pure strategy Nash equilibrium tax rate, given the jurisdiction's objective function of 
maximising the non-locational utility of taxpayers, max 1-t- q(1 x2 )x1 z, solves 
-2 - z(1 - p) 
[ ql + qz [-] ý+ 4d2 Li = 0. (3.9) J 
This follows the same form as the base model, (3.5). The change in the coefficients stems from 
the absence of criminals from the policing production function - in the previous section p_ 
p 
(zlt) 
= p(t) at the equilibrium whereas in this model p= p(x2t) =p (it). However there is 
no difference to the overall structure with the equilibrium tax distorted from the optimal tax 
by the equilibrium migration response of the taxpayers. Returning to the numerical example 
the equilibrium tax when policing is a public good is 0.285. 
An alternative way of considering policing is that it provides a private good to the individu- 
als who pay tax - each potential victim of crime receives the same level of security irrespective 
of the total number of either potential victims or criminals. Therefore the probability func- 
tions in the domestic jurisdiction become p= p(t) and q= q(t). Equation (3.1) still represents 
the marginal potential criminal indifferent between the two jurisdictions so the equilibrium 
migration response of a potential criminal to a change in the domestic tax rate is given by 
ax, [(1 -p)u+pv] 
[ag] 
- 4(u - v) 
[äP] [(3.10) 
at 
] 
2d1 
Again the equilibrium migration response of criminals to a change in the domestic tax rate 
is ambiguous unless the expected return from crime is positive (in which case the response 
will be negative as the increase in tax reduces both the expected return from crime and the 
probability of being a criminal). Further the equilibrium migration response of potential 
victims is absent as there are no size effects to policing, so it makes no difference whether the 
tax rate attracts or repels the potential victims. Equation (3.3) still represents the marginal 
potential victim who is indifferent between the two jurisdictions so the equilibrium migration 
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response of a potential victim to a change in the domestic tax rate is 
[äx2 -1 - z(1 - p) [ä9] + qz [äP] - 4gz(1 - p) [a"] ] (3.11) at 
] 
2d2 - 4q(1 - p)z 
The direction of the equilibrium migration response of taxpayers also remains ambiguous. The 
presence of the equilibrium migration response of potential criminals remains as an increase in 
their number lowers the utility of taxpayers (due to the increase in the probability that they 
become a potential victim). In comparison with the base model, (3.4), the denominator is 
larger, as the movement of other taxpayers has no effect on security, whilst the numerator can 
be either smaller or larger (depending on the direction of the equilibrium migration response 
of potential criminals in the base model). 
The pure strategy Nash equilibrium tax rate solves 
-1 - z(1 - p) Ia 
qj + qz I 
ýp 
I+ 2d2 IJ=0. (3.12) 
This equation is the same as (3.5), however the equilibrium migration responses are different, 
(3.10) and (3.11), therefore the resulting equilibrium tax rate is different. Using the numerical 
example, the equilibrium tax if policing is a private good is 0.271. 
In the numerical examples the equilibrium tax in the base model is the highest whilst it is 
lowest when policing is a private good. However the optimal punishment remains the same 
in all three scenarios so for the optimal value of v the same tax is levied irrespective of the 
type of good policing is. However if the sanction is harsher than optimal the highest tax is 
levied when policing is a private good and the lowest tax in the base model. Therefore there 
is no uniform ordering of the tax rates depending on the type of good policing is. However 
the type that it is will influence the tax that is levied. 
3.3 Victimised groups 
So far it has been assumed that everyone can be a potential victim of crime. For certain 
classes of crime certain groups are targeted, for example racist or homophobic crime. This 
can be reflected in the model by introducing a third group of individuals of size n3 who are 
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neither potential criminals nor potential victims of crime. This group does, however, receive 
a dividend income of one (like the potential victims) and therefore has to pay tax. It is also 
assumed that their locational preferences are uniformly distributed along the unit interval. 
Let the ratio of non-potential victims to potential victims be A= so the probabilities 
can be written as p=p 
(x2týix3t) 
and q=q 
(x2r+iX3t) for the domestic jurisdiction. The 
equilibrium migration response of potential criminals can be found in the same way as before 
giving an equilibrium migration response to a change in the domestic tax rate of 
7x1 (4t [ at 
]+ 4At L äi l+1+ A) { [(1 - p)u + pv] 
ägj 
- q(u - v) [ 
äP] } 
(3.13) 
at J 2d1+4t A) f 1- u+ pv] aq -u- v`gip at at 
whilst the equilibrium migration response of the potential victims of crime to a change in the 
domestic tax rate is given by 
axe -1 + [4t(1 + A) at J- 4At 
[ 
at 
]-1- A]Az - 4q(1 - p)z [ä (3.14) 
at 2d2 + 4tzA - 4q(1 - p)z 
where A= (l - p) 
[ at j-q [2-P-]. These follow the same form as before, with [2-3] featuring in 
the same way as [ at ] in (3.13) as they both change the tax base in the same way. In [2L2- ] at 
the equilibrium migration response of this third group, if positive, increases the value of the 
numerator and therefore increases the equilibrium migration response of the potential victims. 
If it is negative, then it lowers the equilibrium migration response for potential victims. For 
the new group of individuals the equilibrium migration response will be characterised by the 
marginal individual x3 who is indifferent between the two jurisdiction, satisfying 
I-t- d3x3 =1- t* - d3(1 - x3) (3.15) 
This assumes the third group is not even indirectly affected by the crime; the presence of other 
people being subject to criminal attacks does not feature in their utility. The equilibrium 
response to a change in the domestic tax rate is 
1913 -1 
at 2d3 
(3.16) 
For once the direction of the response is unambiguous. An increase in the tax rate repels this 
group as it lowers their utility without generating any corresponding change to their level of 
security. 
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The government of a jurisdiction has an interesting choice concerning its objective function. 
If the crime is perpetrated against a minority, so n3 > n2, then the government seeking re- 
election would choose max 1-t so t=0. As the median voter gains no utility from crime 
reduction the government will not tax to fund it. This leaves the victimised minority, which 
is prepared to pay for a reduced level of crime, to suffer. This result is not due to tax 
competition - in a single jurisdiction world a government seeking re-election will not levy a 
tax if the median voter is not prepared to pay it. 
An alternative objective function could include the crime. The federal government could 
place a requirement on jurisdictional governments to include the crime when determining their 
tax rate and specify a minimum weight that has to be attached to it, -y. The objective function 
for the domestic jurisdiction is max 1-t-7 g(1.2')x 1 z. The resulting symmetric pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium tax rate solves 
ry-2-'y(1+A) 
I(1 
-p) 
Iaq] 
-q 
Cap]] 
z+2d2ly I at J =0 (3.17) 
Comparing this to the base model, (3.5), if -y =1 and A=0 then the same equilibrium 
tax results as all the taxpayers are potential victims of crime and therefore the objective 
function becomes the same as before. If the value of -y falls, so the crime has a lower weight 
in the objective function, then the equilibrium tax rate will also fall in the absence of tax 
competition. As [2-x-2] is independent of -y, if [ at ]<0 then the tax rate will fall as -y falls. If 
[2x2] >0 then the equilibrium tax can either increase or decrease in response to a decrease at 
in -y. However if the value of A increases then the equilibrium tax rate will fall in the absence 
] the effect of a change in A on the equilibrium of tax competition. However as A enters [ at 
tax is not easy to discern. 
Table 3.2 shows the equilibrium tax rate using the same numerical model as in the base 
case but allowing 'y and A to vary. The table assumes b= 2(1+a) and 
d= 2(1+A) so p and 
q are independent of A. The columns represent the proportion of potential victims as a 
percentage of the total taxpaying population. If n3 < n2 (so A<1 or (1 + A)-' > 0.5), 
so the victimised group is the majority group, then the jurisdictions' governments will set 
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Table 3.2: Equilibrium tax rates: changing the proportion of potential victims 
100 
(1+a) 
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 95 
ry 0.1 0.086 0.108 0.162 0.201 0.228 0.248 0.264 0.277 0.289 0.299 0.303 
0.2 0.143 0.160 0.190 0.215 0.236 0.252 0.267 0.279 0.290 0.299 0.304 
0.3 0.173 0.185 0.207 0.226 0.242 0.257 0.269 0.281 0.291 0.300 0.304 
0.4 0.192 0.201 0.218 0.234 0.248 0.261 0.272 0.282 0.292 0.300 0.304 
0.5 0.206 0.214 0.228 0.241 0.253 0.264 0.275 0.284 0.293 0.301 0.305 
0.6 0.217 0.224 0.236 0.247 0.258 0.266 0.277 0.286 0.294 0.301 0.305 
0.7 0.227 0.232 0.242 0.252 0.262 0.271 0.279 0.287 0.295 0.302 0.305 
0.8 0.235 0.239 0.248 0.257 0.265 0.273 0.281 0.289 0.296 0.302 0.306 
0.9 0.242 0.246 0.254 0.261 0.269 0.276 0.283 0.290 0.297 0.303 0.306 
1.0 0.248 0.252 0.259 0.265 0.272 0.279 0.285 0.291 0.298 0.303 0.306 
ry =1 according to the wishes of the median voter and no other values of -y are applicable. If 
n3 > n2 (so A>1 or (1 + A)-' < 0.5), so the victimised group is the minority group, then the 
jurisdictions' governments will use the level of !y specified by the government. The properties 
of the equilibrium tax rate are as expected. The tax rate increases in -y but decreases in 
A. As a greater weight is placed on the crime in the objective function of the jurisdiction's 
government, the greater the equilibrium tax rate to lower the crime level. Likewise the higher 
the proportion of potential victims in the population (akin to a lower value of A) the higher 
the tax rate as the movement of the third group has a reduced effect on the overall tax yield. 
In the absence of tax competition a tax will only be levied if -y > 5; 
however if "y =1 the 
optimal tax for potential victims is levied (t = 0.167). Even for low values of 'y the presence 
of tax competition causes a tax to be levied which is higher than optimal. When all taxpayers 
were potential victims of crime it was possible for there to be over taxation compared to the 
optimal. This feature does not disappear if only a minority of the population is affected by 
the crime; tax competition can result in too much security being provided. 
Proposition 8A minority subjected to crime will not necessarily loose out when police forces 
compete in taxes as long as the crime enters the local jurisdictions' objective function. 
An alternative explanation for ry is that non-potential victims also care about the level 
of crime in a jurisdiction and therefore include the level of crime in their utility function. 
95 
Table 3.3: Equilibrium tax rates: changing the proportion of potential victims 
100 
i+a) 
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 95 
y 0.1 0.137 0.157 0.194 0.220 0.240 0.256 0.269 0.281 0.291 0.300 0.304 
0.2 0.201 0.211 0.228 0.243 0.255 0.267 0.277 0.285 0.294 0.301 0.305 
0.3 0.232 0.238 0.248 0.258 0.267 0.275 0.283 0.290 0.296 0.302 0.305 
0.4 0.252 0.256 0.263 0.270 0.276 0.282 0.288 0.293 0.299 0.304 0.306 
0.5 0.267 0.269 0.275 0.279 0.284 0.288 0.293 0.297 0.301 0.305 0.307 
0.6 0.279 0.280 0.284 0.287 0.291 0.294 0.297 0.300 0.303 0.306 0.307 
0.7 0.288 0.289 0.292 0.294 0.296 0.298 0.300 0.303 0.305 0.307 0.308 
0.8 0.296 0.297 0.298 0.300 0.301 0.302 0.304 0.305 0.306 0.308 0.308 
0.9 0.303 0.304 0.304 0.305 0.305 0.306 0.307 0.307 0.308 0.308 0.309 
1.0 0.309 0.309 0.309 0.309 0.309 0.309 0.309 0.309 0.309 0.309 0.309 
Therefore the equilibrium migration response of the third group will now be characterised by 
the marginal individual x3 who is indifferent between the two jurisdictions, so 
1-t--yq 
1p xiz-d3x3=1 
-t*-', 
q (1-p )(1 -x, )z-d3(1 
-x3). (3.18) x2 1 -x2 
The equilibrium migration response of this group to a change in the domestic tax rate is 
ax3 -1 - ryz[4t + (1 + A)(1 - 4t [ ät1])]A - 4-yzq(1 - p)([ äi 
]-L i) 
(3.19) 
at 
] 
2d3 + 4At-yA 
where A= (1 - p) [ 
äq] 
-q 
ät ]. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium is the tax rate that 
solves (3.17), with (3.13), (3.14) and (3.19) being the equilibrium migration responses. Table 
3.3 gives the equilibrium tax rates for the base model, but allowing 7 and A to vary. The 
properties of the equilibrium tax are very similar to those when crime was excluded from the 
utility function. The equilibrium tax is increasing in -y but decreasing in A (apart from when 
-y =1 where the non-victims behave like victims). As the non-victims now care about the 
level of crime in the jurisdiction the equilibrium tax rates are higher than those levied when 
they did not care, for all ry and A. However this means too many resources are still devoted 
to crime reduction. 
Thus when the crime is perpetrated against a minority, even though the majority of the 
taxpaying population is not affected and will leave a jurisdiction if it levies a higher tax 
than the other, the possibility of over taxation compared to the optimal remains; victimised 
minority groups will not automatically loose out in the competition so long as the harm caused 
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by the crime is in the jurisdiction's objective function. The numerical example suggests the 
equilibrium tax is increasing in both the victimised groups size as a proportion of the taxpaying 
population and the weight attached to their suffering in the objective function. 
3.4 Two crimes 
In the previous section it was assumed there were two groups of taxpayers but only one crime. 
This section reverses these numbers so we return to there only being one group of taxpayers 
but now there are two crimes they can be the victim of. Let the first crime be denoted by' and 
the second crime by. Further, each crime is committed by a separate group of criminals, so 
there are three groups that need to be considered. Assume the crimes are sufficiently different 
in nature so there are no spillovers in policing a crime; any funds allocated to policing one 
crime has no effect on the other. Consequently the police have to determine what proportion of 
their funds to allocate to fighting each crime as well as which tax rate to levy. Let 77 denote the 
proportion of funds allocated to crime 1 whilst 1- 77 denotes the proportion allocated to crime 
2. Thus in the domestic jurisdiction the probabilities for the first crime are p=p 
(t) 
and 
q=q (''xit) whilst for the second crime , 2i = ji 
((1 
xiX2t) and 
q=q ((1_)x2t\. This section 
firstly allows the jurisdiction to compete in t with 77 determined at the federal level. This 
is then reversed so jurisdictions are free to determine their value of 77 whilst t is determined 
federally. 
Firstly assume the jurisdictions compete in taxes whilst the value of rj is determined by 
the federal government. The equilibrium migration response of the first group of criminals to 
a change in the domestic tax rate is 
ail 
- 
77(4t [']+ 1) { L(1 - j)u + P')] 
[ ä9] - q('t - v) 
[ äi] } 
(3.20) 
[at] 
2d+4t 1-'ü+ a -'ü-v 
ap 
i ýJ {ý( 7ý) at 
ý q( ) Iatý} 
whilst for the second group 
ax (1- 77)(4t [ "] + 1) {[(1- p)ü +pv) [ät] - g(ü - v) [äP] } 1 (3.21) at 2d1+4t(1-i){[(1-&i+Div] [äi] -4( - v) [O] } 
These follow the same form as before, as too does the equilibrium migration response of 
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Table 3.4: Equilibrium tax rates: two crimes, competing in t 
7l 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
1.0 0.083 0.116 0.184 0.767 0.579 0.496 0.453 0.430 0.412 0.380 0.329 
1.5 0.069 0.090 0.125 0.199 0.468 0.436 0.421 0.417 0.412 0.406 0.344 
2.0 0.043 0.053 0.076 0.108 0.172 0.302 0.358 0.382 0.409 0.438 0.367 
2.5 0.013 0.021 0.032 0.050 0.080 0.141 0.252 0.324 0.375 0.465 0.431 
3.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.017 0.047 0.117 0.242 0.323 0.444 0.441 
taxpayers to a change in the domestic tax: 
axe 77(4t [ äý 1)zA - B, z 
aý + (1 - ý1) (4t 
[ a] - 1).. zC - Dz [ 
aä. ý`ý - (3.22) 
[ 
at 
] 
2d2 + 4, qtzA -B+ 4(1 - rj)tzC -D 
where A= (1 - 
Lä fl - 4Lä 
fl, B= 44(1 - p), C= (1 - p) 
Lä fl - 4Lä and D= 44(1 - p). 
The pure strategy Nash equilibrium tax rate levied by both jurisdictions solves 
aq ap öq öp1 ä2 
-1-zr7(1-p) 
[at] 
+zi ýt -. (1-rß)(1-i) 
I 
at]+z(1-i)q 
I 
at]+2d2 at =0. 
(3.23) 
This follows the same form as previous expressions - the optimal tax plus the potentially 
distorting equilibrium migration response of taxpayers. Returning to the numerical example 
assume both crimes have similar probability functions, so q=1- 
30'2, q=1-3 12°1x21" 
+° and 2+1 O) 2t . 
The utility gained from either crime being successful is 
3 whilst the sanction for both crimes is -3. Finally the harm caused by 
both crimes is 2. 
Allowing 77 to vary between 0 and 1 in units of 0.1 gives equilibrium taxes of: 0.250,0.273, 
0.300,0.324,0.339,0.344,0.339,0.324,0.300,0.273 and 0.250. Given the symmetry between 
the crimes, the equilibrium tax rate is symmetric and decreasing around 'q = 
2. When the 
values of the other variables are changed the bell shaped curve remains, though the peak 
shifts. Table 3.4 allows the values of the equilibrium tax when z=1, v= -9 and 
z varies. 
The table also shows how the equilibrium tax is decreasing in z. The tax is also 
decreasing in 
the attachment to home measure of the criminals but increasing in the attachment 
to home 
measure of the taxpayers. Finally as the sanction becomes more severe or criminals 
derive 
less utility from a successful crime, the equilibrium tax rate falls. This assumes 77 
is fixed by 
the federal government. 
An alternative is the federal government determines the value of t but the jurisdictions are 
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able to determine their own values of 77. The equilibrium migration response of the first group 
of criminals to a change in the proportion of funds spent fighting crime is given by 
axl 
- 
(4t [ä ]+ t) 
{ [(1 +i] 
[2fl 
aT7 - -(iß - v) 
[]} 
(3.24) 
2d1 + 4nt { [(1 - p)u + pi)] 
1a, 94771 44(z: t - v) 
ILPI 
I 
Likewise the equilibrium migration response of the second group of criminals to a change in 
the proportion of funding is 
0771 
L4ý1-7)t[ä77 
2d1 + 4(1 - 77)t 
{ [(1 - p)ü + pv] 
[ä9] 
- q(ü - v) 
[]} 
-t] 
{{(i 
- )ü +Pv] 
["] 
- q(ü- v) 
[]1 
a77 a? 7 (3.25) 
The equilibrium migration response of the taxpayers to a change in the proportion of funds 
allocated to fighting crime one is given by 
raxe1 (471t 
[9ýý'] 
- t)-M - B, z 
[ý2-fl +(4(1 -r7)t 
[ä ] 
-1)iC-Dz 
[] 
L-J = (3.26) ark 2d2 + 477tzA -B+ 4(1 - 77)tzC -D 
where A= (1-P) 
[2fl 
-4 
[aP] 
,B= 44(1-P), 
C= (1- p) [- 4 [and D= 44(1- p). 
These have similar forms to the previous expressions. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium is 
given by the proportion that solves 
]+ 
2d2 
[ aX2 ]-0. 
(3.27) 
ýl 
+ t4 
["1 
- t(1 - p) 
["] 
+ 
laý 
JL 
The equilibrium migration response of taxpayers is again present when the choice regarding 
17 is left to the jurisdictions. This term again disappears when 77 is determined at the federal 
level. Therefore structurally there is little difference between whether jurisdictions compete 
in t or 77; competition between the jurisdictions will mean policing resources can potentially 
be suboptimal. 
Returning to the numerical example, the equilibrium value of 77 responds, in the majority 
of cases, in the manner expected. If there is perfect symmetry between the two crimes then 
the equilibrium allocation is undistorted with 77 = 1. If one group of criminals becomes more 
mobile relative to the other then an increased proportion of the total funds is spent fighting 
that crime. If dl =1 then increasing dl in units of 5 from dl =1 gives equilibrium values of 
0.631,0.562,0.500,0.448 and 0.406. In comparison altering the value of d2 has no effect on 
77. If the policing technologies available for each crime are different then q tends in general 
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towards the more ineffective technology. Thus if a<ä, >6 or >c then 77 < 2; 
however 
if <d then rq <2 also. Another oddity occurs if the harm done by each crime is altered. 
Increasing . causes the equilibrium value of 77 to fall (despite a>0 for the optimal allocation 
in the absence of competition). If criminals of one crime gain a greater amount of utility if 
successful relative to the other, then the resulting value of 71 tends towards the crime offering 
the greater utility for success (so increasing the value of it relative to ii results in an increase 
in the value of q). The final variable, the sanction imposed if caught, demonstrates a benign 
federal government is able to prevent any distortion from occurring; a less benign federal 
government can ensure police resources are allocated in a manner of its liking. If v is lowered 
relative to v, so the sanction becomes harsher, the value of 77 falls. Thus decreasing v in 
units of 1 from v= -1 gives equilibrium values of i of 0.968,0.653,0.500,0.401 and 0.329 
so the federal government can influence how funds are allocated when determining sanctions. 
Therefore the effect of competition between jurisdictions need not only be restricted to the 
tax rate; the allocation of funds between crimes can also be affected. 
Proposition 9 Competition between jurisdictions can also affect how the police allocate re- 
sources between crimes. 
3.5 Objective functions 
So far it has been assumed that the jurisdictions' governments aim to maximise the non- 
locational utility of their non-criminal residents. This is not the only objective the government 
could hold; in the UK police authorities are, within certain limits, able to determine taxes 
to fund the local police force and could choose instead to focus on policing objectives, for 
example maximising the arrest rate. Only a third of police authority members are elected 
politicians serving in local government and therefore authorities might not feel duty-bound 
to follow utility maximising objectives. This section presents four different objectives local 
government could hold and suggests another benefit of tax competition is the ability to limit 
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the amount of tax the jurisdictional government is able to levy. 
The first variation is for the government to minimise the damage resulting from crime, thus 
the government will set a tax that minimises g(1 )xlz given the migration response of both 
victims and criminals. The resulting pure strategy Nash equilibrium tax rate solves 
1- z(1 - p) L 
aq] 
+ qz [ar] + 2d2 I at J=0. (3.28) 
This follows the same functional form as when utility was maximised, though the direction 
of the constant has changed as the level of tax is now absent. Returning to the numerical 
example, though with v= -6 (rather than v= -3 so the optimal tax in the base model 
is undistorted), the equilibrium tax when aiming to minimise the damage caused by crime 
is t=0.192. Unsurprisingly this is higher than when the tax rate itself is included in the 
objective function (t = 0.167), however it is lower than the tax that would be levied in the 
absence of tax competition, t=0.667. Although the equilibrium tax rate is higher than 
optimal for its voters, as the government excludes the disutility from the loss of income it 
generates, their ability to move to another jurisdiction, if it offers a lower tax rate, restricts 
the ability of either jurisdiction to increase the tax. Thus the local government is unable to levy 
the tax that minimises their objective function in the absence of interjurisdiction externalities; 
the tax is competed downwards. Therefore the presence of tax competition limits the extent 
to which the local government is able to tax to meet their objectives when their preferences 
diverge from their electorate's. 
An alternative aim for a police authority could be to maximise the arrest rate (or analo- 
gously to maximise the prevention of crime). The arrest rate is the proportion of crimes so 
the objective function becomes maxp; the arrest rate is the number of arrests made divided 
by the number of crimes or qpx+qýi_p)x = p. 
The pure strategy Nash equilibrium is the tax 
rate that solves 
at]-[8x2]) =1. 
2t C 
[-aX' (3.29) 
The optimal tax in the absence of tax competition is t=0.667; the linearity of the probability 
of arrest function means the government will continue to tax until either p(t) =1 or t=1. 
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Using the same values as before the equilibrium tax rate is t=0.148. Again the ability of 
taxpayers to move jurisdictions limits the tax a jurisdiction's government can levy to fulfil its 
objective. 
Another policing related objective the government could hold is to minimise the crime rate, 
which can be defined as the number of attempted crimes. Therefore the domestic government 
chooses to min 21 and the pure strategy Nash equilibrium is the tax rate that solves 
Caq]+2([at]-[al]l (Caq]t-q1 =0. (3.30) J 
Again the optimal tax in the absence of tax competition is t=0.667 but this is now due 
to the linearity of q. Likewise the equilibrium tax rate, t=0.175, is lower than the one a 
jurisdiction's government would prefer. 
The final objective function a jurisdiction's government could have is to minimise the 
number of criminals residing in the jurisdiction. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium, when 
the government has the aim of min qxi, is the tax rate that solves 
raxll 
+ 
ragl [1 
+ 2t 
(ýaý 21 
- 
ýaxll l=0. 
(3.31) 
The story here is the same as before. The equilibrium tax rate (=0 144) is less than the 
optimal tax rate (=0 667) as the movement of taxpayers prevents the leaders of a jurisdiction 
from raising taxes too far to meet their objective. 
This section has so far assumed =122, which limits the tax to 3 at the equilibrium, 
in order to be consistent with previous sections. However the results of this section do not 
change if the distribution of s alters so =51i whilst remains unaltered. When 
the objective function is to maximise utility the equilibrium tax levied is 0.272 despite the 
optimal tax being 1. If the jurisdiction aims to maximise the arrest rate then the equilibrium 
tax becomes 0.25, which is lower than the optimal tax (for the jurisdiction's government) of 1. 
Likewise when the objective function is to minimise the crime rate the resulting equilibrium 
tax is either 0.282 or 0.560, both of which are lower than the optimal tax of 1. Finally if 
the aim of the jurisdiction is to minimise the harm resulting from crime then the equilibrium 
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tax rate can be either 0.298,0.389 or 1. Given the global optimal tax is 1 it is theoretically 
possible for tax competition to result in both jurisdictions setting their preferred tax rate. 
The question arises as to which tax rate a jurisdiction chooses when there are multiple pure 
strategy Nash equilibria. Assume there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria, t and t* with 
t< t*. Further assume that the domestic jurisdiction levies t whilst the foreign jurisdiction 
chooses I. As the jurisdictions levy different tax rates the proportion of taxpayers and 
potential criminals will also alter. The new allocation of individuals between jurisdictions will 
be the xl = x1(t, t*) and x2 = x2(t, t*) that solve (3.1) and (3.3), given t=t and t* = t*. 
Both groups will experience movement towards the jurisdiction that offers the higher utility. 
For taxpayers this means they will move to the domestic jurisdiction if the increase in post 
tax income is greater than the change in security offered whilst potential criminals will move 
towards the jurisdiction offering the greater return from crime. Firstly assume the possibility 
of a corner solution. Assume the initial response of taxpayers to the different tax rates is to 
migrate towards the domestic jurisdiction, then if 
d2 < G* -G+ [1 - q, (I - p1)xl] z (3.32) 
for all xr E [0,1] (where pl =p 
(1) 
ql =q 
(1 I, P2 =p(I -xi) x1) 
and q2 =q 
(r)) 
all 
the taxpayers will reside in the domestic jurisdiction. The attachment to home measure for 
taxpayers has to be sufficiently small in order for the last individual with locational preference 
1 to move jurisdiction. If (3.32) does not hold then some taxpayers will continue to reside 
in the foreign jurisdiction even though they could be a victim of crime with probability one 
- their preference for the foreign jurisdiction dominates the other components of utility. The 
movement of criminals is not, unfortunately, as simple. If (3.32) holds with either ql = 
q (2t) =0 or pl = p(2t) =1 then all the taxpayers will reside in the domestic jurisdiction 
free from crime, though still paying tax of t, whilst the potential criminals reside in their 
preferred jurisdiction (as they are unable to undertake crime in either jurisdiction they will 
settle according to their locational preference). Thus the domestic jurisdiction will house all 
the taxpayers and half the potential criminals (who are unable to commit crime either because 
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they will automatically be arrested or because the expected value from committing crime is 
not sufficiently high) whilst the foreign jurisdiction will house the remaining criminals unable 
to commit crime due to the lack of victims. 8 If neither ql =q (2t) =0 nor pl = p(2t) =1 but 
x2 = 1, potential criminals with xi <2 will reside in the domestic jurisdiction. They will be 
joined by those with a locational preference xi >2 if 
(1 - p)u + pv -E> dl(2xi - 1) (3.33) 
given all the taxpayers reside in the domestic jurisdiction. A potential criminal will only move 
jurisdiction if the return from crime over and above their requirement is greater than the loss 
of utility resulting from residing in the jurisdiction. 
If (3.32) does not hold for the value of xl which results after potential criminals have made 
their residency decision then not all the taxpayers will reside in the domestic jurisdiction; the 
increase in the number of potential criminals decreases the effectiveness of the police, lowers 
the level of security provided which in turn causes those with the strongest preference for the 
foreign jurisdiction to return home. Accordingly there can be an interior solution for x2 and, 
consequently, also for x1. Unless V (X1, x2) t) =V (xl) x2, t*) one jurisdiction will be closer 
to fulfilling their objective function than the other (where V(") represents the value of the 
objective function given the location decisions of both groups and the tax rates levied by the 
jurisdictions) so one pure strategy Nash equilibrium tax rate will dominate the others allowing 
the jurisdictions to coordinate and levy the same tax. 9 If V (xl, x2i t) >V (xl) x2, t*) then both 
jurisdictions will charge t if aiming to maximise V whilst if V (xl, x2i t) <V (xl, x2, t*) then 
both jurisdictions will levy P. Thus one of the pure strategy Nash equilibria tax rates will 
dominate the others allowing the jurisdictions to coordinate their tax rates and levy the same 
. x2, t*) tax. It is not necessarily the lower tax rate that will dominate. If V 
(xi) x2i G) =V (Xi' 
then it is possible for both jurisdictions to levy different tax rates achieve the same objective 
and therefore asymmetric allocations could result. Returning to the numerical example, (3.32) 
8This argument assumes there is no victimless crime and only taxpayers can be the victims of crime. 
9Although technically if no taxpayers reside in a jurisdiction then there can be no crime it is assumed this 
scenario is not seen as desirable by a jurisdiction's government. 
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holds for all values of d2 < 1.34 (setting xi = 1). Given d2 =1 all the taxpayers will move to 
the domestic jurisdiction, though crime will not be eliminated, so t=0.298 dominates t=1 
preventing the jurisdictions levying their optimal tax. 
In reality a police authority will not have one sole objective, rather their objective function 
will be a composite of different aims. However the presence of tax competition, allowing 
different jurisdictions to levy different tax rates, can limit the extent to which a police authority 
is able to tax and meet its objectives. Even if the tax rate is not explicitly included in the 
objective function the migration response of taxpayers away from higher than optimal taxes 
can limit the tax that is levied. 
3.6 Misspecification and the fear of crime 
Another variant to the model is to introduce misspecified probability functions and fear of 
crime into the model. If the potential victims of crime misspecify the probability functions, so 
their belief of the police production function is different to the actual, the functional form of 
the equilibrium tax remains unaltered. As the order of the game is the jurisdictions set their 
tax rates first, people settle in one of the jurisdictions and then crime is committed, potential 
victims will settle according to their expectation of what police expenditure can achieve and 
therefore the misspecified probability of being a victim of crime will be used. Thus the 
equilibrium tax will still be given by (3.5), though p and q are replaced by their modified 
versions in both (3.4) and (3.5) but are unaltered in (3.2). Likewise potential criminals can 
also misspecify the police production function. For the same reason as before the structure 
of the equilibrium tax remains unaltered, however both p and q in (3.2) are replaced by their 
modified forms. If potential victims are unaware of the potential criminals' misspecifiaction 
then both (3.4) and (3.5) remain unaltered so only the equilibrium migration response of 
potential criminals changes. If the potential victims are aware of the misspecification then 
the modified form of q is used in both (3.4) and (3.5). Thus misspecification has no effect on 
the structure of the equilibrium tax. 
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Following on from misspecified probability functions is the introduction of fear of crime 
into the utility functions of potential victims. The simplest way of introducing the fear of 
crime is to include it linearly, so the utility of a potential victim in the domestic jurisdiction 
becomes 1- t- 4(1.2 )x1 z- 1(1 p X' z- d2--r2 where -represents the function or value relating to 
fear. 1° If potential victims of crime, along with criminals, perfectly understand the effect of 
police expenditure on the probability of arrest and probability of participation (so p=p and 
q= cl then the effect of fear of crime is to replace z by z+z in (3.2), (3.4) and (3.5); as there 
is perfect knowledge the fear of crime just increases the harm caused by crime. It is possible 
for the probability functions to be misspecified, as in the previous paragraph, but with p and 
q taking on the misspecified form. 
However it is also possible for p and q and p and q to take different functional forms. 
Whilst ex post p and q will always take on the correct values, ex ante it is possible for them 
to be correct and p and q be wrong. The inconsistency between the two can be explained 
by there being perfect knowledge regarding the probability of being a victim of crime whilst 
the fear of crime is more subjective. The British Crime Survey (Home Office, 2006) reports 
the disparity between people's knowledge of crime in their local area and their knowledge of 
crime in general; people are better informed about local crime. Alternatively the fear of crime 
term can represent the security that is felt, which can be independent of the probability of 
being a victim of crime. Therefore the equilibrium migration response of potential victims to 
a change in the domestic tax rate is given by 
laxe -1+(4t[äi1] -1)A-B[ (3.34) 
] 
2d2 + 4tA -B . 
34) 
where A= [(1 -p) [9q] ]-q[ 
ät ]] z+ [(1 -p-p) 
[ 
at 
] 
-q 
[ ät ] ]z and B= 4q(1 - p)z + 4q(1 - p)z. 
This follows the same form as before, with the fear of crime entering in the same way as the 
actual crime measure. The functional form of the equilibrium migration response of potential 
criminals is unaltered, though the value changes as [ at ] has changed. " Therefore the pure 
10A more complex way of introducing fear of crime is to make the expression decreasing and concave in the 
probability of being a victim of crime. 
"This assumes potential criminals gain no utility from the fear of crime they can engender. 
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strategy Nash equilibrium tax is the tax rate that solves 
-1 - z(1 - p) 
f ýql 
+ qz Li- z(1 - p) 
fýq 
+ qz 
ýp 
+ 2d2 
[8x2] 
= 0(3.35) LJ 
As usual tax competition distorts the optimal tax by introducing the equilibrium migration 
response of the taxpayers into the first order condition. In the numerical example the fear 
of crime measures respond in the same way as the actual crime, for example an increase 
in z increases the equilibrium tax whilst an increase in c causes it to fall. As long as the 
jurisdictions' governments know how the probability functions are misspecified or how its 
residents fear crime, then the resulting equilibrium taxes will include them in the usual manner. 
3.7 All pay tax 
A key assumption so far has been non-taxpayers commit crime against taxpayers. This is a 
restrictive assumption that has run throughout this chapter and therefore is the last to be 
realxed. Assume the ratio of potential criminals to potential victims is B, 0= nz . 
This means 
the probability of arrest in the domestic jurisdiction becomes p-p 
(9xl2t) 
=p 
(Bt +` 
x1 
whilst the probability any potential criminal attempts to commit a crime is q=q 
(Bt +i') 
In order for them to pay tax it is assumed they also receive a dividend income of one, thus 
this section models crime in a community of similar people. The marginal potential criminal 
indifferent between the two jurisdictions is located at xl, where 
1-t+ q[(1 - p)u + pv] - dlx1 =1- t* + q* 
[(1 - p*)u + p*v] - d1(1 - x1) 
(3.36) 
with the modified forms of the probabilities used: p, p*, q and q*. The equilibrium migration 
response of a potential criminal at the equilibrium is 
ax, -1 + (4t 
[ä ]+1+ 0) { L(1 - p)u + pv] 
ägi 
- q(u - v) 
äpý } 
(3.37) 
at 
] 
2d1 + 4t 1-p )u + pv] LJ 
L9 
- q(u - v) 
[L] } 
This expression is similar to (3.2), however the addition of -1 in the numerator stems 
from 
the direct effect the tax has on their income whilst the addition of 0 signifies the effect of the 
extra tax yield from the potential criminals now paying tax. The marginal potential victim 
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indifferent between the two jurisdictions is still given by (3.3), though with the modified 
probability functions, and thus the equilibrium migration response of a potential victim to a 
change in the domestic tax rate at the equilibrium is 
axe 
- 
-1+(4t[ä ] -1-8){(1-p) [äg] -q[äý]}z-4q(1-p)zLätl] 
[ 
at 
] 
aq 
-- 
(3.38) 
2d2 + 4tz {(1 - p) ýat] q [aPýt] } 4q(1 - p)z 
The effect potential criminals paying tax has on the equilibrium migration response of potential 
victims is twofold. The first direct effect is to increase the value of the numerator as potential 
criminals paying tax adds to the potential victims' security. The second effect occurs indirectly 
through the change in the equilibrium migration response of the potential criminals. 
Assuming n2 > nl then the aim of the jurisdiction is to maximise the non-locational utility 
of its residents who are the potential victims, max 1-t- °(l -z)xl z, which means the pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium tax rate is the tax that solves 
-1 - (1 + 0) [z(1 - p) L aq] - qz [j] 
ap+2d2 [aX2] 
t= 
0. (3.39) 
This follows the usual structure with tax competition introducing a distortion depending 
on the equilibrium migration response of potential victims. To determine the effect an in- 
crease in the proportion of potential criminals (an increase in B) the equilibrium migra- 
tion response of the potential victims when the equilibrium tax is levied can be rewrit- 
ten as L2 - ývx(1+e)-x where cp = [(1 - p)u + pv] 
[al - q(u - v) 
[ap] and X= at 2d1(4d2+x)+16tcpd2' at 
= 
aä t) and (1 + 4tz {(1 - p) 
[at] 
-q 
[apý }- 4q(1 - p)z < 0. Assume that (1 + 8)aý(ýe't) 
ag(ýe, t) = 
watt) ; this is analogous to stating that an increase in 0 has no effect on the to- 
tal population, rather an increase in 0 means the proportion of potential criminals increases 
though the taxbase remains the same size. With this assumption both cp and X are indepen- 
dent of 0 and therefore ä= aal(4a2+x)+rstýd2 
If cp <0 then the equilibrium tax is increasing 
in 0 when 2d1(4d2 + X) + 16tcpd2 > 0. If co >0 then the equilibrium tax is increasing in 0 
if 2d1(4d2 + x) + 16tcpd2 < 0. Under these conditions the equilibrium migration response of 
the potential victims increases in 0 which in turn, from (3.39), requires the equilibrium tax to 
rise. 
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Table 3.5: Equilibrium tax rates: criminals pay tax 
1000 
(1+0) 
15 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 49 
z1 0.273 0.275 0.279 0.284 0.289 0.295 0.302 0.310 0.320 0.330 0.340 
2 0.274 0.282 0.292 0.302 0.313 0.324 0.336 0.349 0.362 0.376 0.388 
3 0.275 0.288 0.302 0.317 0.331 0.345 0.360 0.375 0.391 0.407 0.421 
4 0.277 0.293 0.312 0.329 0.346 0.362 0.379 0.396 0.414 0.453 0.450 
5 0.278 0.298 0.320 0.340 0.358 0.377 0.395 0.414 0.434 0.460 0.520 
6 0.279 0.303 0.327 0.349 0.370 0.390 0.410 0.431 0.458 0.538 0.611 
7 0.280 0.307 0.334 0.358 0.380 0.402 0.424 0.450 0.513 0.608 0.658 
8 0.281 0.311 0.341 0.366 0.389 0.413 0.438 0.480 0.580 0.649 0.667 
9 0.283 0.315 0.347 0.373 0.398 0.423 0.454 0.537 0.622 0.667 0.667 
10 0.284 0.319 0.352 0.380 0.407 0.434 0.482 0.584 0.652 0.667 0.667 
In the numerical example the coefficients b=2 and d=2 are replaced by b= 2(13+0) and 
d= 2(l+e) 
(so a change in B has no effect on the size of the taxbase). Similarly z is replaced 
by zO; z implicitly includes the ratio of potential criminals to potential victims and therefore 
any change in B has to be included in z for the harm to remain constant (with z= 1). 
Table 3.5 gives the equilibrium tax rates when both 0 and z vary. The columns represent 
potential criminals as a proportion of the total population. As the proportion increases so 
does the tax rate. Further, the tax rate is convex in the proportion of potential criminals. 
Thus as potential criminals become more prevalent, increasing the probability of becoming a 
victim, the tax increases to partially compensate the decrease in security it causes. The rows 
represent the harm a crime inflicts (independent of 0). As before, for the single crime model, 
the equilibrium tax increases in the harm a crime causes. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a more generalised model of crime and investigated the properties 
the pure strategy Nash equilibrium tax can have and introduced some variations to the model 
to demonstrate the effect tax competition can have on policing. In the generalised model 
of crime, where the harm caused to the victim and the payoff or sanction for the criminal, 
depending on whether they are caught, can be expressed in fixed monetary terms, the effect 
of tax competition is to introduce the same distortion to the first-order Nash condition as 
in 
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the previous chapter. The presence of the equilibrium migration response of potential victims 
causes the tax rate to be higher than optimal if the migration response of potential victims 
is positive at the equilibrium tax rate; if it is negative at the equilibrium tax rate then the 
equilibrium tax rate will be below the optimal tax rate. Thus changing the type of crime has 
no effect on the structure of the equilibrium tax. 
In models of tax competition where the tax receipts are used to provide a public good 
there is typically a race for the bottom as the capital becomes more mobile. In this model, 
where the tax receipts are used to provide security, it is possible for the tax to diverge from the 
optimum as capital becomes more mobile. Likewise it is possible for the comparative statics of 
the equilibrium tax to be different to the comparative statics of the optimal tax, for example 
in relation to the production functions of the police (either through the detection function, 
p, or the prevention function, q). However the potential distortion in taxation can, in certain 
circumstances, be prevented by the federal government if it chooses the optimal punishment. 
However this optimal punishment is only optimal in relation to tax competition and has no 
relation to the harm caused by the crime. The practicalities of using fiscal considerations 
in determining a sanction could present difficulties for a policy maker, but the policy maker 
needs to be aware that any sanction will influence the tax levied at the local level for policing. 
Despite the potential distortion to the resulting tax that tax competition can cause, it 
can bring some benefits. For example a crime which only affects a minority of the taxpaying 
population can have more resources allocated to it than would occur in the absence of tax 
competition. Further a tax can be levied if there is tax competition when none would be levied 
if tax competition was absent. Similarly the movement of the taxbase can limit the extent 
to which a police authority is able to tax to meet any objective the federal government sets, 
bringing the equilibrium tax closer to the non-locational utility maximising tax rate. However 
this benefit only occurs due to the existence of police authorities; a federal government would 
be seeking re-election and thus be focused on maximising utility. All the members of a police 
authority are appointed (with a third being appointed from local politicians) meaning there are 
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limited re-election concerns and therefore they are able to focus solely on policing objectives. 
To conclude, both the previous chapter and this demonstrate allowing local governments 
to determine taxes to provide police services can result in suboptimal taxes being levied. 
Although it is possible to mitigate the distortion through the sanction imposed if caught 
or, potentially, through the choice of the police objective function, the policy implication of 
these papers is that it is better for policing related taxes to be determined at the federal 
level. Further when there are two crimes competition between the jurisdictions can lead 
to suboptimal allocations between the crimes even when the tax rate is determined centrally. 
Therefore the federal government ought also to determine how the resources are to be allocated 
between crimes. Following this argument is not necessarily the same as arguing for a national, 
centralised police force. Although police authorities should be stripped of their precepting 
status and the ability to influence the allocation of resources, they still provide other beneficial 
functions, for example local oversight of the police force. Therefore these other functions could 
provide sufficient grounds for retaining police authorities but without their tax and allocation 
powers. When the plans to merge the smaller police forces are reintroduced, the source of 
funding for the larger police forces should also be addressed. 
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Part II 
The Ministry of Defence's naval 
procurement policy 
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Chapter 4 
The Ministry of Defence's naval 
procurement policy since 1985 
... we 
have moved on from the days where we gave the contract to the lowest compliant contractor. 
It actually makes it clear there are circumstances where you could take a short-term view and lose 
out in the long-term, both as a customer and in broader senses. 
Chief of Defence Procurement, Q117, DC, 2003. 
At the start of the 1980s competition was an anathema to the defence industries in the 
United Kingdom. As de Fraja and Hartley (1996) state the Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
awarded cost-plus or cost-based contracts without recourse to competition. This, however, 
changed after the Levene reforms which aimed to introduce competitive procurement to the 
MoD. Unfortunately when it came to warship procurement the MoD was still unable to have 
a fully competitive regime as all the major shipyards were in British Shipbuilders, the na- 
tionalised shipbuilding firm. As a monopoly British Shipbuilders allowed their yards only to 
compete in costs, not on the profit rate. Consequently they were able to maintain higher 
profits on warship contracts than the target profit allowed by government (para 5.2, NAO, 
1985). This came to an end with the privatisation of British Shipbuilders; the warship yards 
were amongst the first to be privatised given their profitability. Johnman and Murphy (2002) 
suggest that some yards were misclassified as warship yards to ensure there would be keen 
competition for MoD contracts. Being classified as a warship yard meant the yard was unable 
to receive state aid for commercial shipbuilding so it would be unable to bid competitively 
for commercial work meaning the yard's future depended on winning MoD contracts (by sub- 
mitting lower prices. ) The result of privatisation was that the MoD was finally able to obtain 
competition for surface warship contracts. 
113 
Due to the Darwinian nature of competition winning a competition ensured survival of a 
shipyard for a few more months whilst losing one could mean calling the receivers in. The 
MoD saw each contract individually rather than part of a series. Accordingly even when 
the competition became fierce and yards closed, the MoD continued to use competition to 
allocate contracts though allegations of contracts being placed with yards for political reasons 
remained. Whilst competition ensures the efficient allocation of resources it requires proper 
management to ensure there is true competition between firms and that long term efficiency 
is not jeopardised through the creation of a monopoly. As the MoD failed to manage the 
competition the state of the industrial base was a by-product of competition rather than any 
particular shape desired and molded by the MoD. If a monopoly were to be the result then the 
MoD believed it would be able to introduce competition either by using the remaining com- 
mercial shipyards or the dockyards (NAO, 1993). Competition continued unabated through 
the 1990s. By the turn of the century most of the major shipyards had survived (although 
some of them had lost the ability to undertake warship production). The turn of the century 
was also to coincide with a programme to renew the surface fleet. That there would be com- 
petition for each project as and when they came to be ordered was by accident rather than 
any MoD design. 
With a large number of orders pending the MoD started to take a longer-term view of 
procurement and the effect that a procurement decision made today will affect the procurement 
decisions that are able to be made tomorrow - in effect the trade-off between short and long 
term efficiency. Whilst it was forced into this position on the Type 45 contract (when one 
firm made an unsolicited bid to produce the whole contract in order to gain a monopoly 
in warship building), it was written more generally in the Defence Industrial Policy (MoD, 
2002). This stated that if the result of a procurement decision affects the industrial base then 
this has to be considered when awarding the contract. This applied beyond shipbuilding to 
all areas of defence procurement and meant that a firm can still win a contract even if it 
does not submit the lowest bid by highlighting the number of jobs that would be lost and 
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the loss of future competition. Intuitively the result of the policy would be that contracts 
are spread more evenly amongst the remaining yards to ensure limited competition remains. 
However if a yard knows that the policy effectively states the government will not allow a 
yard to close then it allows the firms to increase their prices and make profits that would not 
be available to them under normal competition. Whether or not this conjecture is valid does 
not, (un)fortunately, remain to be seen as problems on the carrier contract have left the MoD 
desiring the industry to restructure itself so that it combines and works in partnership with 
one another (and in partnership with the MoD. ) This would leave the MoD to deal with a 
single entity whose members would ensure that each firm survives. The practical effect, if the 
scheme is successful, is to return the MoD to deal with a monopoly again. 
The aim of this chapter is to argue that the MoD does need to consider the effects its current 
warship procurement decisions have on future decisions. It expands the preceding discussion 
by detailing how the MoD has viewed future competition for its naval procurement programme 
and the consequence of these views. The argument is the MoD has placed insufficient emphasis 
on future competition since the 1980s but has not had to pay any increased costs as a result 
due to the manner in which British Shipbuilders was privatised and, latterly, to the end of the 
Cold War and the resulting reduction in the naval procurement programme. However given 
the forward naval procurement programme and the shipyards that have survived it is likely 
the MoD will have to pay more in the future. Therefore this chapter is also an introduction to 
the next chapter which argues that the government can maintain competition and limit the 
rents firms are able to earn by taking a more proactive role in the market rather than relying 
on conventional competition. 
4.1 Up to 1990 
After the Second World War the Warship Group (those involved in the construction of naval 
ships in the UK) consisted of twelve shipyards. This situation remained, with all the shipyards 
competing against one another for government contracts, until the Geddes commission of 
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1965/66 (Geddes, 1966). This was the first official post-war inquiry into the shipbuilding 
industry, both commercial and naval. The report's main recommendation was that shipyards 
ought to group together to create fewer new firms, each with the same configuration and 
roughly the same size so as to be able to compete against one another. When focusing on the 
the role of naval procurement it suggested contracts were distributed too thinly with twelve 
yards present. Consequently the yards undertook a mixture of naval and commercial work 
ensuring their inability to be efficient in either market. Furthermore the yards had become 
over-reliant on naval orders and other complicated ships which inhibited them building the 
other types of ships then in demand by commercial shipowners. The solution proposed was 
to concentrate production of surface warships in just three specialist warship yards whilst 
continuing production of nuclear submarines at the two yards then producing them (Vickers 
and, to a lesser extent, Cammell Laird). Geddes argued the reduction in the number of firms 
would not lead to a loss of competition in. naval procurement. The main factor that would 
limit the yards' ability to undertake work was insufficient fitting out labour but by specialising 
in naval work efficiency would increase. Additionally all the remaining firms should be able 
to bid for contracts if labour could be transferred within the group or by the use of casuals 
at peak production times. Furthermore the MoD should be able to use the Royal Dockyards 
as a comparison by which to compare costs from the remaining firms. Geddes viewed three 
firms as being optimal; although full competition could be maintained with four, five or six 
firms this would result in the yards having to mix naval and commercial work which would 
continue to ensure the yards were inefficient in both markets. 
By 1972 Hogwood (1979) reports there were three specialist builders in the naval sector 
(Vickers, Yarrow and Vosper Thornycroft) and three non-specialists (Cammell Laird, Swan 
Hunter and Scott Lithgow). The Booz-Allen report into the British shipbuilding industry 
reinforced the Geddes report by recommending the policy of a small number of dedicated 
warship yards, as part of larger groupings, be continued. Although these groupings of yards 
were able to compete for and win naval contracts, the downturn in the commercial market 
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in the 1970s left the industry facing an uncertain future yet again. The response of the 
government was to nationalise the major yards in England and Scotland in summer 1977 to 
form British Shipbuilders. The consequence of the MoD having to purchase its warships from 
the monopoly of British Shipuilders was demonstrated by a National Audit Office (NAO) 
report which stated that warship competitions were limited to the cost of production as 
British Shipbuilders ordered the shipyards to maintain a common high rate of profit at around 
11%, 2% higher than the target profit allowed for by the profit formula for non-competitive 
government contracts (para 5.2, NAO, 1985). Although there was limited cost competition for 
surface ships the government was reliant on a domestic monopoly for its purchase of nuclear 
submarines. Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd was, by this time, the sole producer and 
managed to exploit its position to obtain favourable contract terms. The average variation 
in estimates for build hours between Vickers and the MoD, according to a NAO sample, 
was 21%, with a 43% difference in the worst case. Furthermore the MoD's estimates were 
"more accurate but negotiations generally led to a considerable move towards the contractor's 
estimates" (para 5.6, NAO, 1985). Only for the contract for a Type 42 where there was already 
knowledge from other shipyards as to the number of man hours necessary was the actual close 
to the contractual. The construction of nuclear submarines clearly demonstrated the problems 
(both in terms of price and power) that the MoD would face in surface shipbuilding if ever a 
proper monopoly occurred there (as British Shipbuilders at least allowed cost competition). 
In 1979 a new government was elected which aimed to introduce a new way of business 
for defence procurement. Despite the MoD purchasing a third of the output of British yards 
in 1981 the lack of competition was lamented as competition was viewed to encourage lower 
prices, greater efficiencies, innovation and higher quality and whilst the government were not 
prepared to pay an undue premium for maintaining competition it would do so if it could (p46, 
MoD, 1981). Lower prices were not the only aim of privatisation; the government also wished 
to lower the risk attached to projects. A warship can roughly be separated into two parts: a 
hull and the systems. Whilst the shipbuilders built the hull, a platform for the systems, the 
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system houses designed the systems for the ship and as separate firms were contracted for each 
task the risks of integrating them, in financial, time and quality terms, fell on the MoD. The 
MoD were hoping that there would be vertical integration after privatisation with systems 
houses purchasing shipyards so future procurements could be offered to prime contractors 
with the risk passed onto them (Q2657, PAC, 1985). The government had been elected with 
a manifesto commitment to privatise British Shipbuilders and the Minister of State at the 
DTI in 1983 maintained that this "offered the best way to secure jobs and achieve maximum 
efficiency" (Hansard, 1358,46). The first yard to be privatised was Scott Lithgow, previously 
a warship yard but instead having an expensive involvement in the offshore market at that 
time, in order to help stem British Shipbuilders' financial loss. Scott Lithgow alone lost around 
£75m out of British Shipbuilders total loss of £160.9m in 1983/84 (Hansard, 998,64). The 
warship yards were next to be privatised as they were attractive, having made a profit of 
£43.8m in the same year; during the early 1980s the warship yards consistently made a profit 
of £40m to £50m a year. Unfortunately these profits, essentially a transfer from the MoD's 
to the DTI's budget, were not due to greater efficiency. According to the Chairman and Chief 
Executive of British Shipbuilders the warship yards were less efficient than the commercial 
yards. The reasons given were warship builders were less exposed to commercial realities and 
consequently did not acknowledge the need to reform combined with them possessing less 
sophisticated manufacturing processes due to less knowledge being transferred amongst the 
warship yards (Q2660, PAC, 1985). The announcement of the privatisation of the warship 
yards was made on the 25th July 1985. There was, however, some controversy as to which were 
warship yards. Those that qualified for privatisation by the 31st March 1986 as warship yards 
were: Vickers, Yarrow, Vosper Thornycroft, Hall Russell, Brooke Marine, Cammell Laird and 
Swan Hunter. Being classified as a warship yard, for the smaller and mixed yards', was more 
a hinderance than a help. Although it meant they were able to compete for profitable naval 
contracts it forbid them for state funding when competing for orders in the civilian market 
lA mixed yard is one that undertakes both merchant and warship building, for example Cammell Laird and 
Swan Hunter. 
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Table 4.1: The rate of profit and employment in warship yards in the 1980s 
Profit rate 
1979/80 1984/85 Late 1980s 1979/80 
Employment 
1984/85 Late 1980s 
Brooke Marine 14.3 (7.7) 785 635 
Cammell Laird (21.0) (19.5) 3617 2037 
Hall Russell 3.6 0.4 832 782 
Swan Hunter (17.5) 10.8 4.0 9787 7189 2750 
Vosper Thornycroft 27.9 12.6 12.5 5210 4360 1900 
VSEL 7.9 7.3 3.8 13513 12448 14900 
Yarrow Shipbuilders 12.8 8.3 8.7 5359 5427 4000 
All warship yards 3.2 7.0 5.1 39103 32878 23550 
Employment data taken from and profit rate constructed from Annex B, TIC, 1989. 
under European rules (intervention funding of 9% was only available to non-warship yards). 
The consequence was that they would be unlikely to win merchant ships without the state aid 
and therefore were reliant on winning MoD contracts (forcing them to submit keen prices). 
Johnman and Murphy suggest the classification was given to these seven yards "in order to 
increase competition in the [warship] sector with the aim of driving down prices" (p217,2002). 
Table 4.1 shows the profit rate and employment levels of the yards just after British Ship- 
builders was established (1979/80), just prior to privatisation (1984/85) and after privatisation 
(the late 1980s). The figures suggest the profit rate fell over the decade (suggesting increased 
competition) as did employment figures (from fewer orders and, possibly, an increase in ef- 
ficiency). Privatisation meant it was for the market to determine the appropriate price of a 
yard, taking future prospects for the industry into account. It should be noted that there 
are difficulties in determining the exact price of sale for each yard as each contract placed a 
liability on the government for future redundancies but also offered profit sharing on future 
orders. 2 However using the ratio of sale price to profit as a measure of confidence in the future 
VSEL has the highest measure (4.20) followed by Yarrows (3.99), Vosper Thornycroft (1.55), 
Swan Hunter (0.37), Brooke Marine (-0.05) and finally Hall Russell (-160). 
3 VSEL's low ratio 
2Figures for sale prices have been taken from written answers in various volumes of Hansard. 
3The minus for Brooke Marine comes from it having made a loss in 1984/85 of £1.7m. In contrast the 
minus for Hall Russell reflects the payment made by the government to the new owners of the yard (however 
it was maintained that the £16m payment was less than the costs of closure). 
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(given its monopoly for nuclear submarines) can be explained by two factors: Cammell Laird 
and Trident. Cammell Laird was in the same position as Swan Hunter; being follow-on yards 
their futures were less secure than those of the First of Class (FOC) yards4 (as they could 
compete for fewer contracts and, when doing so, would be not as far down the learning curve) 
and this is reflected in the relatively low price for Swan Hunter. Cammell Laird was thought to 
be even more difficult than Swan Hunter to sell, not only had it made consistent losses it also 
had difficult labour relations, and therefore was sold in a joint package with VSEL, depressing 
the price for VSEL. VSEL's privatisation occurred at the same time as the first Trident sub- 
marine was ordered and its price was part of the privatisation deal. This price competition led 
to a reduction of £25m for the first submarine (Q2386, PAC, 1986), though no provision was 
made for future orders even though no competitive pressures could be brought to bear in the 
nuclear submarine sector. The MoD argued by achieving a low price on the FOC this could be 
used as the starting point for negotiations for subsequent vessels. This lower price, combined 
with a profit sharing agreement of up to £40m, meant the MoD believed its position over the 
medium term was secure. However this can also be viewed as an example of the MoD's short 
termism; the MoD, despite being in a position to achieve long term savings given concerns 
over the cost of the nuclear submarine programme, chose to get a one-off reduction in price 
with no commitment that these prices could be achieved on subsequent vessels. 
Whilst the government was promoting the competition policy espoused in its 1984 State- 
ment on Defence Estimates, 5 the Secretary of State for Defence stated that he had "a com- 
petition for the two Type 22s now" (Q63, DC, 1984). This was supposed to be the start 
of genuine competition between the yards for MoD orders, the tenders for the vessels in a 
previous round of the competition having expired. By ordering two ships the MoD wished 
to benefit from a batch order lowering the unit cost but with three yards competing for the 
'A First of Class yard is one that is able to design and build a vessel whilst a follow on yard is one that can 
only build the second vessel in a class onwards. 
5 "Wherever possible, however, contracts are placed following competitive tendering and the Ministry wel- 
comes the fact that both specialist and non-specialist shipbuilders have competed keenly for recent orders; we 
are endeavouring to extend the scope for this" (p23, MoD, 1984). 
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order (Vosper Thornycroft, Cammell Laird and Swan Hunter) the sign that this was not to 
be came when the Minister of State for Defence Procurement stated that "one or two yards 
will be disappointed" going on to mention that the decision "would have many implications 
for naval capacity" (Hansard, 1179,68), a reference to Cammell Laird's need to win the order 
otherwise it would go out of business, and a subsequent statement that price and time would 
be the primary considerations but "other relevant factors" would also be taken into account 
(Hansard, 257w, 71). In January 1985 the MoD finally announced it was going to procure 
one from Cammell Laird and the other from Swan Hunter Shipbuilders despite the cheapest 
procurement strategy being to purchase both from the same shipyard (Hansard, 21,72). A 
simultaneous announcement that Swan Hunter had been chosen to produce a Type 23 subject 
to contract negotiations (and economies of production were expected) suggests they were the 
preferred shipyard and ought to have been awarded both Type 22s. By splitting the contract 
the government was paying a premium of "roughly 5 per cent of the contract price or 2.5 
per cent of the total estimated cost of the ships, including bought-in equipment and weapons 
systems" (Q2736, PAC, 1985. ) However this was justified as the process of competition after 
the initial tenders reduced the total price to below the lowest initial tender. The National 
Audit Office states the "decision took account of the wider relevant factors involved and of- 
fered the prospect of survival of CL [Cammell Laird] as a major warshipbuilder" (para 4.10, 
NAO, 1985). Although the aim was to ensure sufficient capacity to allow future competition 
Cammell Laird closed, for the first time, in 1993. 
Despite this example of the MoD considering the effect a procurement decision can have 
on subsequent competitions it is the only example for naval procurement in the 1980s. This 
would seem to give weight to the alternative theories that Cammell Laird was not awarded 
the contract for the benefits it could bring to future competition, rather it was due to the 
Secretary of State for Defence's fondness for Liverpool or to ease tensions after the inner city 
riots. After the yards had been privatised price competition returned as the sole mechanism 
by which MoD contracts were awarded with the MoD not being "in the business of providing 
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orders for any particular yard" (Hansard, 914,89). Consequently, and as predicted, Brooke 
Marine and Hall Russell did not remain in the warship sector for long; Brooke Marine sold 
its warship design rights in 1987 whilst Hall Russell had to call in the receivers in November 
1988. Their absence from the sector caused little comment due to the excess capacity that 
remained. 
In the 1987 Royal Navy debate, Members of Parliament complained that yards were running 
out of work. This had come about for two reasons. The first was the excess capacity that 
had been created by privatisation left the yards dependent on MoD orders; if all the yards 
were to have work then each yard would have to have a lower volume of work but the MoD 
felt no obligation to match its orders to shipyard capacity (Hansard, 447w, 91). The second 
reason was the government had committed itself to a destroyer and frigate fleet of about 50 
in its 1981 White Paper `The Way Forward' (MoD, 1981). This commitment was subject to 
much comment in the late 1980s as `about 50' could mean anything between 45 and 54 and 
had implications for the ordering rate. If the government were to maintain a destroyer and 
frigate fleet of 50 and each ship lasts 18 years then 2.8 ships need to be ordered each year 
(Q474, DC, 1988a). The MoD suggest the life of a ship is 22 years, implying an ordering rate 
of 2.3 (Hansard, 1244,128). However these figures combined with the `about 50' figure gives 
an ordering rate of between 2.0 and 3.0. A Defence Committee report into the surface fleet 
(DC, 1988a) bemoaned the lack of orders, with the government increasing the life of ships and 
not replacing them. In evidence to the committee the shipbuilders argued there were too few 
orders which, when placed, occurred erratically and that the government had not tackled the 
problem of excess capacity. VSEL pursued this point to suggest the MoD had an undeclared, 
and prehaps unintended, policy of maintaining the current industrial structure which resulted 
in increased costs (through yards being underloaded). The MoD disagreed with this view 
suggesting in the future the number of yards would diminish leaving them to face a quasi- 
monopolistic sector but that a competitive sector was the current situation (Q320 and Q321, 
DC, 1988b). 
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Any suggestion that the industrial structure was determined by the MoD would be dispelled 
in the 1990s - future competition was subsumed by short term procurement decisions. However 
despite predicting an industrial structure which could be detrimental to its interests the MoD 
took no actions to avoid it. This can be explained either by the MoD's belief that it could 
protect its interests in these circumstances or that there would be sufficient competition for 
the reduced number of orders. If the former was the case it questions the need for competition 
with under loaded firms and suggests the MoD should have sought to fully load the most 
efficient firms. If the latter case held then the MoD need not consider future competition as 
the market would adjust to the reduced orders. Although the market would adjust it would 
not necessarily do so in a way that the MoD's interests would be protected and therefore the 
likelihood of the MoD intervening in the market ought to have remained; instead the MoD just 
relied on the market. The MoD was not prepared to take action to avoid a quasi-monopoly; 
indeed it is possible to argue the MoD encouraged it. 
4.2 1990 to 1995 
The remainder of the 1980s was, in terms of naval procurement, occupied with arguments 
over the award of the Auxiliary Oil Replenishment vessel (detailed at the end of this section) 
and continued concern at the MoD's ordering pattern. By the end of the 1980s the world 
was changing and the end of the Cold War meant the navy was seeking a new structure. 
The MoD published an outline of its future plans in `Options for Change' in 1990. For the 
Royal Navy this meant reducing the destroyer and frigate fleet from around 50 to around 
40, the number of conventional submarines from 27 to 16 and keeping the number of nuclear 
submarines unchanged at 4. These changes were also to have effects at the industrial level. 
Despite stating it was likely to be ordering two destroyers/frigates each year (Q364, DC, 1991) 
the MoD admitted it did not know what the precise impact on industry would be of Options 
for Change with its smaller orders and shorter production runs. Concerned about competition 
for orders in the future the MoD said (p34, MoD, 1991): 
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From the customer's point of view there is a balance to be struck between the 
economies of scale that should follow from reduced duplication of research and devel- 
opment and production capacity; and the continuing need for vigorous competition 
in both domestic and international markets to promote efficiency and downward 
pressure on prices. 
How this balance was to be struck was not detailed but the capacity that was maintained 
throughout the late 1980s, despite the reduced number of orders, could no longer remain, 
though the government was not keen on being seen to be behind a programme to reduce 
capacity. When the Minister for Industry and Enterprise remarked that the relaxation in 
tension would have a consequent effect on warship yards and "what has happened to Cam- 
mell Laird is an instance of that" this was subsequently clarified by inserting a note stating 
that Cammell Laird was running out of orders before the MoD announced any changes to 
its procurement programme due to the peace dividend (Q138, TIC, 1990); the problems at 
Cammell Laird were of their own making and were not caused by the MoD. This stance could 
not continue and led the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Policy) to comment, "if I was in 
the shipbuilding industry, I would not regard the prognosis as frightfully good" (Q357, DC, 
1991). 
Despite its aim of balancing the competing interests of reduced costs against the bene- 
fits a greater number of firms could bring the MoD continued to pursue competition as its 
procurement mechanism with the consequence that little weight was placed on the effect a 
procurement decision would have on the industrial structure. The procurement of the Land- 
ing Platform for Helicopters (LPH) in 1993 was to demonstrate that price remained the main 
criterion by which competitions were judged and that the short term would dominate the long 
term. After an unsuccessful attempt to procure the Aviation Support Ship in the late 1980s 
the MoD used the information gained to develop the specifications for the LPH. Although 
seven firms expressed an interest in tendering by the deadline in October 1992 only two firms 
had submitted a bid, VSEL and Swan Hunter. Winning the procurement was important to 
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both firms: Swan Hunter had recently lost out to Yarrows in the competition to build a batch 
of 3 Type 23s and the future of the shipyard depended on winning the contract whilst VSEL 
wanted to re-enter the surface warship building industry (since Options for Change devastated 
its business plan with the cuts in the submarine programme) and realised "although this was 
a one boat programme the elimination of Swan Hunters would leave VSEL as the only UK 
Yard capable of building big ships for the MoD" (appendix 3, PAC, 1994). Despite bidding 
for the prime contractor role VSEL intended to subcontract Kvaerner Govan to build the ship 
hull. At this stage VSEL submitted the lower bid by £9 million. As the bids were refined 
and final bids submitted on 22 April 1993 the price difference increased to £71 million; Swan 
Hunter's bid increased by £36 million whilst VSEL reduced their bid. The NAO reports that 
Swan Hunter's bid increased largely as a result of the need to comply with the specification of 
the MoD. VSEL were able to reduce their bid due to obtaining a better price from Kvaerner 
Govan (reported to be £6 million by Burton (1994)) and from covering an estimated £20 to 
£25 million from their reserves in order to re-enter the warship market as a prime contractor 
(NAO, 4.48,1993). The Chief of Defence Procurement stated that there was no evidence 
that VSEL's bid was a result of predatory pricing (as they believed it was possible for the 
ship to be built for £139.5 million), rather only small contingencies had been built into the 
bid and therefore should any of the risk of the contract materialise then these would have 
to be realised from the reserves (Q2, Q3 and Q15, PAC, 1994). VSEL announced after the 
bidding competition they had submitted a "marginally priced tender" with the belief winning 
"enhanced prospects in the market ... 
for Royal Navy [ships]" (appendix 5, PAC, 1994). 
The final bids were received on 22 April and were immediately evaluated (between 23 April 
and 25 April) in order for a recommendation to be put to the Equipment Approval Committee 
the following week. The MoD argued that the difference in price for otherwise similar bids 
meant the decision to award the contract to VSEL was straightforward. As the MoD was 
aware of the situation faced by Swan Hunter "although the outcome of the competition was 
not due to be announced so quickly, the Department considered that any undue delay in 
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the award of the contract could result in Swan Hunter going into receivership and that, in 
consequence, the benefits of competition would be lost" (NAO, 3,1993). The announcement 
was made to the House of Commons on 11 May 1993. Swan Hunter went into receivership 
on 13 May 1993. The MoD were aware of the consequences of their choice as they hastily 
calculated the additional costs to be incurred on other projects at Swan Hunter were they 
to go into receivership. However the additional costs for the three Type 23 frigates and an 
Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment Vessel were less than the difference in bids for the LPH (NAO, 
4.65,1993). The attitude of the MoD between current procurement decisions and future 
competition was given in paragraphs 4.67 to 4.69 of the National Audit Office's report (1993): 
4.67 Much has been said about the prospects for future competition should Swan 
Hunter cease shipbuilding, given the Government's current policy of building war- 
ships only in the United Kingdom. The Department has been monitoring the situ- 
ation for several years and in January 1993 considered that, if Swan Hunter were to 
close, VSEL might be left with a United Kingdom monopoly for "big ships". The 
Department also recognised that, whilst the retention of a competitive industrial 
base required keeping a high level of industrial capacity, the cost of maintaining this 
capacity - which may be passed on to the Department in prices quoted in competi- 
tions - had been more than outweighed by savings from competition. Overall, the 
Department concluded that these problems could only be addressed in the context 
of individual procurements and not as part of a wider strategy. 
4.68 In considering the potential impact of awarding the LPH contract to VSEL 
the Department reviewed the implications for future competition, particularly the 
prospect of running competitions for the larger warships currently in the programme 
such as the two Landing Platform Dock Replacements. For these vessels, should 
Swan Hunter cease to trade and with the closure of Cammell Laird, the only military 
shipbuilder in the United Kingdom large enough to accommodate them is VSEL and 
then only if the company modernises some facilities at Barrow. This would leave 
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Kvaerner Govan as the only yard currently involved in the building of large warships. 
However, there are other possibilities, for example if Harland and Wolff re-enter the 
naval market or other contenders emerge. If no other contenders emerge, Swan 
Hunter's close, and Kvaener Govan continue to team with VSEL, the Department 
could be faced by a monopoly supplier. 
4.69 In light of the above, the Department did not attempt to quantify the additional 
costs arising from a possible loss of competition, for example, on the two Landing 
Platform Dock Replacement vessels. Whilst more might have been done, the Na- 
tional Audit Office recognise the difficulties inherent in making reliable estimates of 
the costs that might arise from the loss of competition. 
Paragraph 4.67 sums up the lack of a coherent policy for warship building in the MoD in 
the early 1990s. Despite stating the government had a policy only to build hulls in the UK 
at a similar time the Minister of State for Defence Procurement declared forbidding prime 
contractors from exploiting foreign construction of hulls would be "excessively protectionist" 
(Hansard, 315,224). Given the MoD was unable to articulate a policy for current procurement 
the lack of a policy concerning the preservation of future competition was hardly surprising. 
The paragraph contains the inherent contradiction between successful current and future 
procurement; despite the success competitive procurement had brought in reducing costs and 
competition continuing to be the main mechanism of procurement the MoD would not follow 
a strategy to take actions, where necessary, to preserve competition. This was the justification 
of awarding the contract for the LPH to VSEL; it was not part of a long term strategy for 
warship building rather an individual procurement decision taken to minimise the current 
procurement cost and ignoring the effects on the industrial structure. The First Sea Lord 
was later to remark that the LPH was purchased at a "remarkable price" and that "no one 
else in the world could have got an LPH at that price" (Q564, DC, 2005). Whether any 
other country in the world would have lacked a naval industrial strategy which meant firms 
had to bid for their survival is another matter. It was the lack of an industrial strategy 
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combined with the lack of orders that allowed the MoD to gain power from the industry as 
firms had to bid low in order to win a contract and survive. However this power could only be 
exercised when the contracts were awarded - after the contract had been awarded the MoD 
was committed to that one firm and needed them to complete the vessel. The yards, knowing 
this, would recoup any potential losses associated with the bid price by renegotiating the 
contract, after specification changes from the MoD, to ensure a realistic price for the vessel 
(Q75, SCEC, 1998). Paragraph 4.69's assertion that there are difficulties in estimating the 
costs arising from the loss of competition but that the MoD did not even attempt to quantify 
them underlines the importance attached to the present by the MoD and the disregard placed 
on the future. 
The possibility of Harland and Wolff or other commercial shipyards re-entering the war- 
ship building industry, suggested in paragraph 4.68, is surprising given the experience of the 
Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment Vessel (AOR). Six firms were invited to tender for producing 
either one or both AORs in October 1984 but only two responded; Harland and Wolff and 
Swan Hunter. Both bids were higher than the target price of the MoD (£122 million) and 
therefore both were asked to revise their bids. Whilst the revised bid of Swan Hunter remained 
above the target price, Harland and Wolff reduced their bid for the first ship to the target 
price and the second to £106.5 million. In April 1986 the MoD announced that Harland and 
Wolff were to build the first AOR (AOR 1) with Swan Hunter given preferential treatment in 
bidding for the second AOR (AOR 2) providing it was built to the same design and cost as 
the AOR from Harland and Wolff. AOR 1 was procured under the first whole ship contract 
so Harland and Wolff were responsible not only for the design and manufacture of the hull 
but also the procurement and integration of the weapons systems (whole ship procurement 
was a forerunner of prime contracting). As it was a First of Class a separate contract (valued 
at £1 million) was awarded to produce the plans so another shipyard would be able to build 
subsequent ships. 
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For Harland and Wolff winning the contract was easier than fulfilling its terms. Whilst 
production was taking place in 1988 the government announced the yard was to be privatised. 
The process caused uncertainties for the firm and the prospect of closure if no new orders 
were found lowered the morale of the workforce (5.28, NAO, 1992). Given the circumstances 
a very substantial proportion of its designers and design engineers chose to resign (Q29, PAC, 
1993). As part of the privatisation, which occurred in September 1989, the government agreed 
to pay the new owners £35.35 million towards the expected costs of completing the AOR 1 
and a further £18.07 million to ensure the Northern Ireland Department, the previous owners 
of Harland and Wolff, had no further commitments to the AOR 1 (Q18 and Q10, PAC, 1991). 
A further problem was the specification for the ship itself. Although an auxiliary ship it had 
to meet not only civil standards but naval standards as well due to it carrying vertical launch 
Sea Wolf missiles and also possessing a helicopter maintenance facility. As Harland and Wolff 
had not had much recent experience of warship building the NAO (5.33,1992) suggested the 
wrong type of contract (a design and build contract) was signed as it meant the design was still 
evolving at the same time as production. This caused problems when it came to production. 
These factors combined meant that by April 1992 AOR 1 was running 32 months behind 
its planned build of 48 months. Furthermore Harland and Wolff were estimated to have spent 
£172 million by January 1992. The overall estimated cost to the MoD was around £140 
million (excluding the £53 million paid by the Northern Ireland Department). The problems 
in production were so severe that the MoD stopped making payments to Harland and Wolff 
twice (April 1990 to May 1990 and May 1991 to December 1992). In June 1992 AOR 1 made 
its first sea trials, though Harland and Wolff subcontracted Cammell Laird to complete the 
ship following the sea trials. Although the cost of the ship remained unaltered after this point 
the in-service date of the vessel slipped further to June 1994. 
To complicate matters the contract for AOR 2 was signed with Swan Hunter in December 
1987. Due to the problems encountered by Harland and Wolff the MoD were unable to 
hold Swan Hunter to building it for £106.5 million. Swan Hunter refused to accept a price 
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below £121.4 million (appendix 1, PAC, 1993). Although the Chief of Defence Procurement 
recommended a new competition be held as the MoD possessed no reliable information on the 
true costs of building the ship the Defence Secretary ordered a contract be signed with Swan 
Hunter (due to concerns about employment in the region (Q6, PAC, 1993)). Swan Hunter 
encountered difficulties as the plans supposed to be supplied by the lead yard were either 
delayed or of poor quality (5.29, NAO, 1992). As such Swan Hunter claimed damages against 
the MoD which offered an 18 week delay for the in-service date to complete the designs to their 
own specification and estimated to pay total compensation of around £16 million (Q166, PAC, 
1993). The ship finally entered service in July 1993, nearly a year before AOR 1 despite being 
begun twenty months later. The experience of the AORs demonstrated the irreversibility of 
leaving the warship sector - although some firms did leave only to reenter the market later, 
for example Cammell Laird and Swan Hunter, they had difficulties in completing contracts 
due to the gap in production and fell out of favour with the MoD. Consequently the MoD 
needs to ensure firms remain in the sector as once they are gone it is very difficult for them 
to reenter and be competitive (in terms of price, time and quality). These difficulties also act 
as barriers to entry for new firms seeking naval contracts 
The reduction in the number of yards caused problems in the procurement of the Landing 
Platform Docks (LPDs) later in the 1990s. The government started to examine the provision 
for future amphibious capability in 1985 (Hansard, 162w, 74); despite `The Way Forward' 
suggesting there was no need for replacement the Falklands conflict proved otherwise. As 
HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid were expected to reach the end of their useful lives in the 
mid 1990s the MoD thought in 1988 that they had plenty of time in which to reach a decision 
(Q198, DC, 1988). Not much happened apart from studies until the mid 1990s; the project 
definition was approved in 1991 but rewritten and reapproved in 1994. Despite aiming to award 
the contract in December 1995 the MoD were admitting defeat in obtaining a competition 
for construction; no potential prime contractor was able to secure a partner, either Harland 
and Wolff, Yarrows or Vosper Thornycroft, to build the hull (Q2007, DC, 1996). The only 
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option was to negotiate a NAPNOC contract with VSEL. NAPNOC stands for no acceptable 
price, no contract'. These contracts were introduced by the MoD in 1992 to replicate market 
conditions when no competition could be held. Although the profit and level of information 
sharing was specified by the 1968 agreement, NAPNOC aims to price the contract before work 
starts and price according to what could be obtained if there were a market (NAO, 1.9,2001b). 
A NAO report into NAPNOC written in 2001 suggested that the outcomes were mixed with 
variations in both price and time (s8 and s17, NAO, 2001b). For the LPD having to deal with 
an effective monopoly for the project caused problems; VSEL's original bid was £589m, much 
higher than the MoD's estimate (para 2.31, NAO, 1996), and the press reported VSEL were 
not fussed as to whether or not they won the contract due to the other orders it had on its 
book at the time (Q2008, DC, 1996). Despite the MoD denying the latter negotiations took 
much longer than expected; 14 months were attributed to refining the project definition to 
make it affordable and 12 to the extended tendering process (Project sheet, NAO, 1996). 6 The 
final contract price was £449m, though this included £20m of additional costs for changes to 
the original specification (all remaining figures in this section from Project sheet, NAO, 1996). 
Although some of the reductions were achieved by reducing the attributable overheads (though 
these could probably be charged elsewhere), reduced profit for VSEL and using a mix of naval 
and merchant standards, others came from increasing the risk to the MoD (the guarantee was 
reduced from two years to one and limiting the Equated damages to £9m). The lengthened 
negotiations also caused the MoD to incur run-on costs of £24m. The procurement of the 
LPDs was made harder by the MoD having to deal with an effective monopoly; as no other 
firm could undertake the project the MoD was forced to continue its protracted negotiations 
with VSEL. As it held little power the result was to increase the MoD's exposure to costs and 
risk. The procurement also highlighted the problem that the MoD, if faced with a monopoly, 
can only purchase the ships that the shipyard is willing to build. 
6By 1996 the first LPD was running 41 months late with the other delays being 4 months due to budgetary 
concerns and 11 months due to extending the build programme. 
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4.3 1995 
The issue of future competition had to be considered by all branches of government when 
VSEL received two take-over bids in late 1994. Due to the end of the Cold War the MoD 
altered its programme for submarines by cancelling all its plans for conventionally-powered 
submarines (3.45, MMC, 1995a). Although VSEL had reentered the surface warship market 
with the LPH it had not diversified sufficiently or won export orders and consequently thought 
it would be best placed to do so as part of a larger defence organisation which possessed 
greater financial resources and the ability to sell overseas (3.76,5.1 and 5.3, MMC, 1995a). In 
1993 British Aerospace (BAe) and GEC Marconi held joint discussions about merging their 
sea systems businesses with VSEL's but did not proceed due to fears it would not receive 
regulatory approval following the loss of competition it would cause (3.99, MMC, 1995b); in 
hindsight they need not have been concerned. Subsequent to these discussions both BAe and 
GEC Marconi, who already owned Yarrows, made separate bids for VSEL and both bids were 
referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) to investigate the effect they 
would have on competition in the defence equipment market. The methodology employed 
by the MMC was to consider the effect of a merger with each company on the projects 
that the MoD were committed to (the final batch of Type 23s, the Batch 2 Trafalgar class 
submarines (B2TC), the Landing Platform Dock and the Common New Generation Frigate 
(CNGF) - later to become the Type 45) and see how it would affect the industrial structure. 
Other projects were considered speculative (even if they were to proceed the manner in which 
they were undertaken was still to be determined) and not a good basis on which to make a 
recommendation. It is interesting to note the MMC felt able to quantify the effects that a loss 
of competition would entail for future procurement, unlike the MoD as expressed in paragraph 
4.69 of the NAO's LPH report (1993). 
The MMC had little problem with the proposed acquisition by BAe. BAe wished to ac- 
quire VSEL to establish itself as a viable prime contractor in the naval market. Although BAe 
had won the prime contractor competition for an Ocean Survey Vessel despite not owning a 
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shipyard (and subcontracting the hull to be built by Appledore in the same way as VSEL sub- 
contracted the hull of the LPH to be built by Kvaener Govan) it believed its credibility in the 
naval market depended on its practical experience of shipbuilding and having to subcontract 
hulls presented difficulties in winning contracts (5.37, MMC, 1995b). By purchasing VSEL 
both GEC Marconi and BAe would own shipyards meaning the two main systems houses 
would own shipyards and be able to engage in effective competition with one another (finally 
achieving competition between vertically integrated firms that was envisaged at the time of 
privatisation). One reservation the MMC held was that if BAe acquired VSEL it could with- 
draw their bid for the final batch of Type 23s and submit a lower one to ensure it won the 
contest and in doing so effectively close Yarrow leaving Yarrow only able to build the Type 
45 FOC. BAe's response was to say that they had never had any intention of engaging in 
predatory pricing as it "would be a commercially irrational strategy in view of the specula- 
tive, long-term and uncertain nature of any advantage which might be achieved" (5.43, MMC, 
1995b). 
The MMC did, however, have a problem with the proposed acquisition by GEC Marconi. 
In a majority opinion the MMC ruled it to be against the public interest. The acquisition 
would reduce the number of potential prime contractors for future projects and place others 
at a disadvantage as they would be competing against a major integrated systems firm (1.8, 
MMC, 1995a). The effects of this would be noticeable on two projects: the B2TC and CNGF. 
Both VSEL (in conjunction with Loral ASIC) and GEC Marconi (with Rolls Royce, British 
Maritime Technology and AMEC) were bidding for the contract. Even if GEC Marconi main- 
tained the two separate bid teams the MMC were not convinced that effective competition 
could be retained as senior management would still have to agree the terms of the contract 
which would give them a monopoly (2.43, MMC, 1995a). The loss of competition would also 
damage the MoD when it came to procure the CNGF. Although the government was commit- 
ted to building the FOC at Yarrow batches of follow-on ships would be open to competition 
from the remaining shipyards. By acquiring VSEL the only competitor GEC Marconi would 
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face was Vosper Thornycroft. However due to its size Vosper Thornycroft was only able to 
produce one CNGF every 16 months which, combined with the procurement timetable of the 
MoD, meant they would only be able to produce half the total order leaving GEC Marconi 
with a guaranteed monopoly on half the ships unless the MoD's plan was changed (2.48, 
MMC, 1995a). The result of the loss of competition would be higher prices both directly as 
a result fewer firms competing for the contract and indirectly as firms would be more secure 
of gaining future work there would be less effort directed towards increasing efficiency (1.8, 
MMC, 1995a). The MMC also raised fears that there would be problems in the subcontractors 
market with the possibility that GEC Marconi would favour its own subsidiaries (1.10, MMC, 
1995a). 
The view of the MoD towards who it would favour succeeding in acquiring VSEL was 
one of indifference; although acquisition by GEC Marconi would reduce competition it would 
not eliminate it and, given that competition would be reduced anyway due to overcapacity 
and insufficient orders, there was no reason for the MoD to object (6.71, MMC, 1995a). 
Furthermore the MoD, through being a government department, was able to protect itself from 
exploitation when competition was imperfect and was able to apply competitive disciplines 
in negotiating the contract and verify costs after production (6.26, MMC, 1995a). 7 As such 
even if a monopoly were to occur it would not affect the value of the contracts placed - GEC 
Marconi winning would not affect the ability of the MoD to achieve value for money (D6, 
MMC, 1995a). Given what its sole source contracting techniques (NAPNOC) could achieve 
the MoD also considered it possible to obtain better value for money by having one well-loaded 
source as opposed to two competing underloaded sources due to the reduction in fixed costs 
and that this gave rise to a "practical view of competition" (6.27, MMC, 1995a). The costs of 
maintaining competition in a declining market were therefore considered to be hard to justify 
(6.71, MMC, 1995a). 
7As mentioned previously a NAO report into non-competitive procurement by the MoD descried the out- 
comes as being mixed (NAO, 2001b). The MoD has always held a greater belief in its ability to price contracts 
than evidence suggests it should have. 
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The MoD's position was accepted in a minority opinion by two of the six members of the 
MMC committee. The dissenting opinion argued that the MoD was a monopsony with con- 
siderable power that can create competition if it does not exist (this option being described 
by the Treasury as being "at best unproven, if not optimistic" (6.93, MMC, 1995a)) or impose 
competitive pressures when none would otherwise occur (D6, MMC, 1995a). The dissenting 
opinion suggested that these pressures could be: threat of foreign competition (though else- 
where in the report the MoD rules this out due to a lack of reciprocity, concerns over future 
support for the ships, problems with intellectual property rights, security concerns, possible 
increased training costs (6.73, MMC, 1995a)); auditing costs after the project has been com- 
pleted (but this does not create the incentive to increase efficiency in production); threat of 
withdrawing contracts from those firms that perform poorly (but if the MoD is already faced 
with a domestic duopoly then it is difficult to allow the creation of a monopoly and impossible 
to close the remaining monopoly); benchmarking costs against other firms (obtaining like for 
like price quotes is very difficult in the defence sector); and policing subcontract competitions 
(which defeats the purpose of prime contracting which is to place more control in the hands 
of industry). With regards to the B2TC contract by not maintaining competition as the MoD 
desired GEC Marconi would be risking its relationship with the MoD and would "amount to 
little less than commercial lunacy" (D7, MMC, 1995a) but as it would hold the monopoly the 
government would be reliant upon it. With regards to the CNGF although it has a monopoly 
for half the ships due to the excess capacity in the combined firm it would bid competitively 
for all of the batches (D23, MMC, 1995a). 
Accordingly the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry had to decide whether or not 
to allow the bids to proceed. The decision was announced on 23 May 1995 that both bids 
had been allowed to proceed. As "the MMC obviously reached a narrow decision" on an 
acquisition by GEC Marconi and the MoD believed "it could handle the competitive issues 
involved in the process" the Secretary of State felt empowered to overturn the majority MMC 
decision (Hansard, 725 and 726,260). GEC Marconi won the competition for VSEL meaning 
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the only competition it faced for naval contracts, given it already owned Yarrows, was Vosper 
Thornycroft. The MoD's indifference was surprising as it had the opportunity to have two 
major vertically integrated defence firms able to compete for naval contracts, an original aim 
of the privatisation of British Shipbuilders, yet expressed no desire for this outcome. Vosper 
Thornycroft would only be able to provide competition for small ships, and even then only if 
the batches were not too large. 
Whilst the MMC was deliberating the government announced an update to its procurement 
policy in the 1995 Royal Navy debate. Although the government congratulated itself on 
the benefits increased competition had brought it went on to announce an evolution of its 
procurement principles was needed to reflect the change in circumstances (the permanent end 
of the Cold War and consequential reduction in the equipment programme). The six principles 
outlined were: retention of capability to build hulls, work to be undertaken in the private 
sector, value for money, security of supply, awareness of the impact decisions have on other 
military technology and pursuit of collaboration with Europe (Hansard, 1154 to 1156,254). 
The description of value for money for the first time acknowledged the effect decisions can 
have on future competition committing the MoD to give "due consideration to the possible 
consequences of any procurement decision for the defence industrial base" (Hansard, 1156, 
254). The opposition replied that this amounted to the MoD recognising "there might be a 
need for something called an industrial policy" (Hansard, 1164,254). 
The absence of one was the noteable feature of the evidence submitted to the joint defence 
and trade and industry committees' inquiry into defence procurement and industrial policy 
(which also occurred in 1995). Whilst the Defence Manufacturers Association described the 
procurement policy as "verging on the hostile to the indigenous industrial base" (Ev 3, DC, 
1995) and went on to say the "uncompromising pursuit of competition largely excludes concern 
for the social and long term economic or political penalties occasioned by an unstructured 
rundown of the national UK defence industrial base" (Ev 4, DC, 1995) the more common 
reaction from industry was industrial considerations were opaque so that when they came 
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to the fore it meant ad hoc decisions were being taken. Further there was a feeling the 
MoD had no accountability for the defence industrial base and had no desire to take on the 
responsibility. GEC Marconi referred to the MoD's benign neglect and reliance on market 
forces but warned "where there is a single customer, capacity greater than demand, and only 
2 or 3 suppliers, there is not competition in the true sense" (Ev34, DC, 1995. ) The MoD took 
a "pragmatic" view which meant that it was for industry to respond to the reduced naval 
orders by restructuring rather than the MoD allocating orders to obtain a desirable industrial 
structure (Q341, DC, 1995). Given the loss of Swan Hunter it would be "a matter of concern" 
to the MoD if a duopoly became a monopoly (Q345, DC, 1995) but it re-iterated that it was 
able to maintain competition with only two firms present (a view first expressed in 1985). 
The committee accepted the arguments put forward by both VSEL, that the Trident pro- 
gramme was a success despite being undertaken by a monopoly, and the MoD, that one well 
loaded source is better than competition between two under loaded sources. Accordingly 
they recommended that rationalisation in the defence industry should not be discouraged 
by fears of losing competition and that a monopoly could be appropriate for certain sectors 
of the defence base (para 79, DC, 1995). Another inquiry followed in 1998 which reported 
the industrial considerations involved in a procurement decision were now being considered 
but industry still felt too little weight was attached to them. The MoD countered that the 
effects of procurement decisions are important for long-term value for money and that they 
had issued formal guidance to staff requiring them to assess industrial consequences of any 
procurement decision and to consult the DTI if a procurement contract for production was 
worth over £15m (Q165, Ev38 and Ev46, DC, 1998). Contemporaneously the Select Com- 
mittee on the European Communities called for state aid for commercial contracts be opened 
up to all shipyards. In evidence industry stated that bids for procurement contracts were 
entered knowing that the vessel could not be built for that price but instead the firms would 
rely on changes to the contract to renegotiate a more realistic contract (Q75, SCEC, 1998). 
The reduction in the number of shipyards meant the government had to support those that 
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remained in any way it could if there was to be competition for the MoD's naval procurement 
programme. 
The government presented the defence procurement debate in October 2000 as being a 
renewed halcyon period for the shipbuilding industry with "the largest programme of warship 
construction that this country has ever seen in years" (Hansard, 419,355). An alternative 
view is these were the first major warship orders since the change of government in 1997 with 
the MoD having little control over where to place the orders. The six roll-on roll-off (ro-ro) 
ferries had to be procured outside article 296 as they were designated commercial vessels not 
to enter any war zones. ' Although the MoD could not limit the competition to UK yards they 
asked those planning to build overseas demonstrate they could not use UK yards and be as 
competitive. The winner was Andrew Weir Shipping who were awarded a £950m contract to 
build and operate the six vessels for 25 years. They chose Flensburger in Germany to be the 
lead yard and build four whilst Harland and Wolff were to build two. These being non-war 
vessels meant Harland and Wolff were able to build them, though not without commercial 
problems. Whilst the MoD were constrained by the European Union's competition rules in 
their procuring of the ro-ros, when awarding the contract for the two alternate landing ships 
logistic (ALSL) the constraint was the MoD's own future programme. Although Swan Hunter 
won the competition to be the lead yard and build the first two a further contract for another 
two vessels was to be negotiated with BAe Systems to be built at Govan. The government 
explained the two extra were to be built at Govan to shorten their in-service date though 
this ignored the learning curve effect that could be exploited at Swan Hunter. It also ignored 
the time slippage on the Type 45 project (detailed in the next section) which meant 
Govan 
was running out of work causing redundancies and uncertainty over the future of the yard. 
Although the next construction at the yard was to be the Type 45s delays meant the yard 
was to face a gap in production which the ALSLs would partially solve - although there 
would be an eight month gap in steelwork this was sufficient from the firms' viewpoint. 
If 
8Article 296 of the European Union Treaty (previously article 223) gives member states the power 
to specify 
domestic, non-competitive production of certain goods of which war equipment is one. 
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Govan had not been awarded the two ALSLs then there is the possibility the yard would 
have irreversibly closed, with the loss of a shipyard capable of constructing large ships. The 
reduction in the number of yards meant the MoD was restricted in achieving value for money 
as it was forced to consider the forward programme. The lack of attention previously given to 
the naval industrial base was, by the turn of the century, finally starting to affect the MoD. 
4.4 Type 45 Destroyer 
In January 1988 the government announced its participation in the NATO Frigate for the 1990s 
(NFR 90). This was a collaborative procurement project with Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Spain and the US. The UK withdrew from the project in 1989 as the joint 
procurement was causing difficulties: different countries had different budgets and therefore 
could afford different ships whilst there were also disagreements over which AWW system to 
use, the choices being between a US system and a European system (Q35, DC, 1999). As the 
partner countries were unable to agree upon a specification the project failed and countries 
were still left with a requirement to procure an appropriate warship. The UK and France, 
later joined by Italy, decided they had similar requirements and decided to jointly design and 
procure a warship whilst Germany, Spain and the Netherlands did likewise. The UK had 
plans for 12 ships, France for 4 and Italy for 6. 
Memoranda of Understanding between the British, French and Italian governments were 
signed in July 1994 and March 1996 on two programmes: Horizon and PAAMS. These two 
programmes were to combine to form the Common New Generation Frigate; PAAMS was 
the principal anti air missile system and Horizon the ship and its other systems. The Royal 
Navy planned for the new ship to replace the Type 42 destroyers. In April 1999 the Horizon 
programme was terminated after the end of phase one (project definition and initial design 
phase) due to cost-effectiveness concerns, delays to the in-service date and the lack of a 
prime contractor (Q19, PAC, 2001). The budgetary concerns stemmed from each country's 
requirements being built into the one design and inefficiencies in undertaking the contract 
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(Q4, DC, 1999) whilst the timetable concerns arose from the in-service date of the FOC 
being delayed by 33 months at the time of the cancellation of Horizon (though 30 months 
were attributed to delays in PAAMS which affected Horizon due to the alignment of the 
programmes (p. 66, NAO, 1999)). The lack of a prime contractor was caused by the complex 
industrial structure of the company created to administer the project, Horizon International 
Joint Venture, which was a consortium of the French DCN, the Italian Orizzonte and the 
British firms GEC Marconi, BAeSEMA and Vosper Thornycroft (though the last two were 
involved to a much lesser extent). GEC Marconi's offer to be the lead company (p. 55, DC, 
1999) was rejected by both the French and Italians (p. 59, DC, 1999). Consequently the lack of 
a prime contractor able to bear the risk meant an appropriate contract, both in terms of price 
and performance, could not be offered to all the countries involved. Although the Horizon 
project came to a close it was agreed the PAAMS programme would continue. The British 
government, still needing a replacement for the Type 42, established a programme for a new 
warship giving rise to the Type 45 destroyer programme. 
The MoD announced Marconi Electronic Systems (MES) as the prime contractor for the 
Type 45 in November 1999 having already given a commitment that Yarrow would build the 
UK's FOC. After the merger of MES with BAe (to form BAe Systems) the prime contrac- 
torship passed to BAe Systems Electronics. The Chief of Defence Procurement (CDP) stated 
there were three places able to build the Type 45: Yarrow, Barrow and Vosper Thornycroft 
(Q45, DC, 1999). With the first two now in the same company competition was effectively 
limited to BAe Systems at Yarrow and Vosper Thornycroft. For once concerns over future 
competition arose, though only for the remainder of the class and not for naval procurement 
in general. The MoD chose to order its ships in batches and expected the price to decrease 
with each batch due to the learning curve; there was a 36% decrease in the price of a platform 
for the last Type 23 when compared to the first (4.67, MMC, 1995b). However the price would 
only decrease if there was an effective competition for all the batches; there were three or four 
firms competing to produce the last four batches though only Yarrows and Swan Hunter won 
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(and both had had a one ship contract towards the start of the programme, Yarrow producing 
the FOC and Swan Hunter the second). A similar learning curve was also evident in the 
procurement of the Sandown minehunter (with Vosper Thornycroft winning both follow-on 
batches competing against Yarrows who produced the FOC, the unit price of the first follow 
on batch was 13% lower than the FOC (4.67, MMC, 1995b)). The identity of the winner of 
a procurement competition to produce a batch of ships was not viewed by the MoD as being 
important so long as another firm would be able to bid competitively against it for the next 
batch. Even though Vosper Thornycroft had not produced a steel-hulled warship since for the 
MoD since the early 1980s the MoD was relying on them to provide the competition. However 
the CDP felt under no compulsion to give Vosper Thornycroft orders in order to sustain the 
yard (Q50, DC, 1999): 
I agree that it is a proposition [the yard closing if it is not awarded work] but it is 
one that was put to me about the last Type 23 order which Vospers did not win. 
I cannot remember an occasion when somebody faced with perhaps not securing 
an order did not make some very pressing industrial points about the cataclysmic 
consequences that would occur if we failed to give them the order. 
The MoD proposed to ensure competition would be possible on follow-on batch orders by 
giving Vosper Thornycroft a contract for a steel-hulled trimaran and ensuring Vosper Thorny- 
croft played a role in the design team for the Type 45 to ensure they would be able to build 
it (Q257 and Q262, DC, 2000). They also expressed interest in Vosper Thornycroft being 
allowed to build some of the blocks of the vessel and then ship them to Yarrow on barges so 
they would not only have experience of the design but also of the manufacture (Q262, DC, 
2000). 
After the initial design work BAe Systems Marine and Vosper Thornycroft formed an 
`Alliance' to jointly bid for the production contract with both being involved in the design 
and production. In July 2000 it was announced that the `Alliance' was to be awarded a 
production contract for three ships; effectively each company was to produce one and a half 
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ships (with BAe Systems joining the third ship). This would mean both companies had 
knowledge of production and would be able to compete against one another to produce the 
remaining nine ships, offered in batches of three. 
In December 2000 BAe Systems made an unsolicited offer to manufacture all twelve ships at 
a cheaper per unit cost. It was an interesting offer given BAe's submission to the MMC when it 
attempted to purchase VSEL in 1995, namely that predatory pricing would be a speculative 
and irrational strategy. In the words of the then Chief of Defence Procurement the offer 
"attached certain conditions about other programmes in order to generate cost savings ... if 
virtually all warship building activities for ever and a day went into BAe Systems Marine, 
everything would be great for us in the long term" (Ev5, DC, 2002). As a result of this offer 
and an inability for the two firms to agree terms on risk-sharing and price the MoD asked 
the RAND corporation to act as consultants and to assess the procurement options open to 
them. The decision to call in consultants highlights the lack of a coherent naval procurement 
programme which took into account the industrial structure - that the MoD foresaw the 
monopoly the proposal entailed but was unable to internally undertake the analysis itself 
(harking back to para 4.69 of the NAO LPH report (1993)) and reject it for going against 
its procurement philosophy and, in all likelihood, increase the costs of future programmes. 
However the unsolicited bid meant the question of the warship industrial structure was finally 
being asked by the MoD and others. 
Whilst RAND undertook their study of the proposal itself, despite its superficial attractive- 
ness, came under criticism. In a Westminster Hall debate it was attacked as "low commerce" 
(Hansard, 261wh, 363) as the procrastination caused by the unsolicited offer meant Vosper 
Thornycroft was running out of work placing their ability to remain in business and partic- 
ipate, should the original plan resume, in danger - it had previously subcontracted work on 
two survey vessels to Appledore in the expectation of commencing work on the Type 45s. 
The criticism was not directed at BAe Systems, as they were pursuing a commercially sensi- 
ble policy of "seeking to develop a long-term warship building strategy in partnership" with 
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the government, where partnership was defined as BAe Systems being awarded the work on 
all the Type 45s, Astute submarines and possibly 2 oilers (BAe Systems company brief as 
reported in Hansard, 265wh, 363), but at the government. The government was risking fu- 
ture competition for short term gain jeopardising its commitment to competition in defence 
procurement. As this was a debate on shipbuilding on the South Coast there was pressure 
on the MoD to reject the proposal and return to the split production originally envisaged 
to ensure Vosper Thornycroft's survival. In his reply to the debate the Under Secretary of 
State for Defence repeated the familiar statements that MoD's orders alone would not be able 
to sustain all the shipyards, the MoD's interest in maintaining a competitive shipbuilding 
industry and the MoD's primary procurement concern being to purchase the best equipment 
at the best price (Hansard, 274wh and 275wh, 363). It is the word "however" which linked 
the last two statements that suggests short term views could still take precedence despite the 
original procurement strategy for the Type 45s taking a longer term view (through the life of 
the programme). The gap in production led to Vosper Thornycroft building three River class 
vessels for the MoD, though rather than the MoD buying them the vessels are leased under a 
service contract with Vosper Thornycroft retaining ownership of the vessels. 
The focus of the RAND study (Birkler et al 2002) was to compare the additional costs 
associated with having two firms undertake the production against the benefits of competition 
that two firms can bring. The quantitative work was concerned with the Type 45 project. 
As a result of the research the procurement strategy was changed to a modular system. 
Vosper Thornycroft is to produce two of the six blocks (blocks E and F) and the masts whilst 
BAe Systems will produce the remaining blocks and assemble them. Although this strategy 
ensures both BAe Systems and Vosper Thornycroft are present in the industry throughout 
this decade, though the authors mention a concern that block production might not be able 
to keep Vosper Thornycroft with the facilities to build complete ships in the future (some 
skills for some blocks might be lost). In considering the long term effects of this decision 
on the market structure Birkler et al (2002, Appendix B) calculate competition for ship and 
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missile production programmes reduces costs by about seven percent. They add that an 
uncompetitive industry has a higher rate of price escalation (estimated to be 1.7 per cent 
above consumer price index). When the future was undiscounted the implication of having 
only one firm in the industry was higher project costs from 2021 onwards (at this point the 
benefits of there being only one firm are outweighed by the lack of competition). When the 
future was discounted at a rate of four per cent (approximately the government's discount 
factor) the break even point was extended to 2026. 
Accordingly the MoD rejected BAe's sole source offer and announced that the construction 
of the first three ships was to be shared between the two companies as it "looked a good 
way of keeping two companies in the warship building business" (Q9, DC, 2003), however 
this commitment to future competition was tempered by the CDP finding it difficult to ratio- 
nalise forgoing competition today in order to have competition tomorrow (Q13, DC, 2003). 
BAe Systems responded by announcing 1150 redundancies. In response to this the Scottish 
Executive established the Clyde Shipyards Task Force to examine the future of the industry 
and how to deal with the unemployment generated. Recommendations 7 and 8 suggested 
the government continue to consider industrial factors in procurement which led the MoD to 
reply that this was "consistent with current government policy" (Ev9, SAC, 2002) but that 
competition would remain at the heart of the procurement policy and that "the MoD order 
book alone cannot be expected to sustain the UK shipbuilding industry" (Ev4, SAC, 2002). 
However the MoD accounts for 85% of the shipbuilding industry and evidence given by BAe 
Systems stated they had no interest in competing for commercial contracts as they did not 
offer a sufficiently high return (Q94, SAC, 2002). Although the MoD might not have wanted 
to be responsible for the industry in reality it had no choice. Vosper Thornycroft were more 
positive and confirmed their plan to move from Southampton to Portsmouth by leasing a 
shipyard for 100 years. The MoD has subsequently increased the order to six ships, to be 
built by the alliance, but has ruled out procuring four of the remaining six. The MoD was to 
later state that the procurement strategy "replaces competition for the later batches of that 
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class with a strategy which allows competition for further programmes" (Q141, SAC, 2002). 
The delivery of the FOC has already been delayed to May 2009; the delays are expected to 
cost the MoD an additional £10 million per vessel a year (Q42, PAC, 2000). The procurement 
difficulties encountered in the Type 45 procurement exemplify why the MoD needs to have 
a defence industrial structure that it can support through its procurement programme. The 
lack of one meant a quick and coherent response to the unsolicited bid was unavailable causing 
further delays to the programme itself with alleged security implications for the UK. 
4.5 Future Aircraft Carrier 
By the turn of the millennium the MoD was faced with the prospect of monopolies in various 
sectors of the defence industry as a result of its policy of unfettered competition. Furthermore 
in most areas that monopoly would be BAe Systems. If the MoD were to continue to use 
competition as the mechanism of placing procurement contracts then the rules of competition 
would have to be altered to allow for future competition. In 2002 the MoD published the 
Defence Industrial Policy (MoD, 2002) which was the first document published that referred to 
the effect current competition can have on future competition. It altered defence procurement 
in two ways. The first was to define what a British company is for the purposes of the domestic 
defence industry. It redefined a British company from a definition based on the ownership 
of the company to a definition based on where the jobs, investment, skills, technology and 
property rights reside. Therefore if a French state owned firm has a subsidiary in the UK then 
that subsidiary would be treated as a British firm when awarding contracts. The second was 
to list factors that should be considered when making procurement decisions, meaning price 
was no longer to be the sole determinant. While the list included value for money (with whole 
life costs and risk being considered) and the maintenance of certain resources for national 
security reasons it also included long-term value for money which was described as (Table 1, 
MoD, 2002): 
Long-term value for money is wider than that for individual projects. Competition is 
145 
MoD's primary means of achieving value for money, and any decision which would 
impact on the ability to compete future requirements - for example, by creating 
a monopoly at prime or even sub-contractor levels - needs to be considered very 
carefully. 
The document goes on to state that procurement decisions can no longer be viewed as iso- 
lated events, rather a decision on one project can affect the performance of others. Whilst 
acknowledging the link between competition and potential industrial consolidation the policy 
fails to recognise that these considerations need to be taken into account for all projects; when 
the time is reached where one contract can create a monopoly the MoD is unlikely to be able 
to use competition as a mechanism to award contracts again. Either the contract is placed 
following competition where a monopoly awaits or the contract is placed non-competitively to 
preserve competition with subsequent contracts, most likely if the potential monopoly remains 
the most efficient, placed similarly giving the firms, assured of their future existence, no in- 
centives to submit competitive prices. 9 Thus for the policy to be effective future competition 
has to be considered with all contracts, not just those with immediate effects. However the 
policy of not intervening directly in the market to determine a desirable industrial structure 
remained with the objective being for industry to restructure itself around MoD requirements. 
Although formal guidance was issued, again, to staff stating the need for industrial con- 
siderations to be part of the assessment process industry still complained that no specific 
weights were to be given to these considerations when making the final decision. The problem 
associated with the lack of weighting guidance came to the fore when the MoD had to choose, 
on behalf of the Royal Air Force, between BAe System's Hawk and the Italian company Fin- 
meccanica's Aermacchi. BAe Systems claimed MoD officials proposed purchasing the Italian 
plane on cost grounds but had to be overruled by a ministerial directive (Q2, DC, 2004) whilst 
the Chief of Defence Procurement denied recommending a specific aircraft (Q114, DC, 2004). 
9An alternative procurement strategy to competition to deal with these problems is outlined in the next 
chapter. 
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Ultimately it was the Hawk that was purchased; although half the Cabinet, according to press 
reports, preferred the Aermacchi as it was cheaper the other half argued the Defence Industrial 
Policy should be adhered to and the unemployment consequences of not awarding the contract 
to BAe Systems more than recouped the extra cost. The purchase of the Hawk was the first 
test of the Defence Industrial Strategy, that factors other than life-cost could determine the 
procurement decision. It was against this document that the CVF was procured. 
The Strategic Defence Review announced the MoD's plans to replace their three Invincible 
class aircraft carriers with two new larger vessels in the second decade of the new millennium. 
The Future Aircraft Carriers (CVF which stands for Carrier, Vehicular, Future) were set 
provisional in-service dates of 2012 and 2015. In 1999 six firms were invited to bid to become 
prime contractor with only two responding: Thomson-CSF (now Thales UK) and BAe Land 
and Sea Systems (now BAe Systems). The procurement process was altered at the request of 
the firms during the course of 2002 to reduce the level of risk associated with the project. In 
November 2002 designs were submitted with the MoD planning to announce a single preferred 
contractor at the start of 2003. 
Thales is a French company with the French government possessing a 32% share in it. 
In 2000 the company, then Thomson-CSF, acquired Racal Electronics plc and the remaining 
shares in Shorts Missile Systems and Pilkington Optronics. This expansion into the UK market 
followed the merger of British Aerospace and Marconi Electronic Systems and was encouraged 
by the Ministry of Defence as it created a second major defence firm in the UK, one which is 
able to compete with BAe Systems for prime contractor status in defence electronics projects. 
Although Lockheed Martin were also able to compete they had no manufacturing capability 
in the UK (Q292, DC, 2000). To welcome Thales the deputy CDP was seconded from the 
MoD to the company for two years with the aim to inform Thomson-CSF of how the MoD 
carries out procurement and to ensure any concerns about security could be dealt with (Q291, 
DC, 2000). In the summer of 2002 Thales warned that it would review its strategy if it did 
not win some of the major forthcoming projects as it had won none in the previous two years; 
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the CVF was one of the projects being alluded to. 
Whilst the government were welcoming to Thales its relationship with BAe Systems was 
souring. This was due, in part, to two other projects which were causing problems. The 
Astute Class submarine was designed to replace the Swiftsure and Trafalgar class. Originally 
the order for 3 submarines was placed with GEC Marconi (with Britiah Aerospace providing 
the competition), however the programme was running behind schedule and over budget. 
Currently the programme is running 43 months behind schedule with cost increases of about 
£680 million (around 35%). The Nimrod MRA4 is a maritime patrol aircraft which was due to 
be in service by April 2003 but due to delays is now expected to be in service by September 2009 
(a delay of 77 months). Whilst the number ordered fell from 21 to 18 (this being announced 
simultaneously with the reduction in the order for Type 45s) the total cost increase was around 
£780 million (around 28%). Discussions between the MoD and BAe Systems as to who was 
liable for the delays and costs continued as the government was deciding which firm was to 
be the prime contractor for the CVF. The outcome, announced in February 2003, was for 
the government to increase its funding by about £270 million for the Nimrod MRA4 and by 
about £430 million for the Astute. Meanwhile BAe Systems had to fund £760 million of the 
costs, of which roughly £250 million was attributed to the Astute. 
Shortly before the announcement for the prime contractor of the CVF the Defence Secretary 
stated that BAe Systems could no longer be regarded as a British company since "the majority 
of shares are no longer owned in the UK" (The Independent, 16/01/03). As this was offered 
as an answer to a question concerning whether BAe Systems would have a political advantage 
over Thales the interpretation given to this remark was a prediction that Thales would win 
the contract. The following week BAe Systems made 700 people redundant at Barrow, 265 
amongst the Clyde shipyards and a further 80 in other divisions due to a shortage of work 
in the order book. However BAe Systems denied it being a signal regarding future trends in 
employment in the shipyards if they did not win the prime contractor status as the lead-in 
time for production for the CVF would be too long to alter the situation. Simultaneously 
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the fact that Thales was subject to legal proceedings for copyright infringements by a South 
African firm which was claiming damages after Thales was subject to allegations of bribery 
were levied in the press. 
On the 30th January 2003 the Secretary of State for Defence announced to the House of 
Commons that the procurement would be undertaken by a partnering approach with BAe 
Systems, Thales UK and the Ministry of Defence as partners. Although BAe Systems was 
designated the prime contractor as the links between the shipyards and BAe were to be 
exploited in production, the design of Thales was preferred - this was not overly surprising 
given the preponderance of ex-MoD naval designers reported to be on the Thales bid team. 
Accordingly the MoD expected Thales to receive around a third of the contract which was then 
estimated to cost £2.9 billion. The consensus on the decision at the time was the government 
had split the contract as it was unable to weather the political consequences of making a 
decision; if Thales did not possess the French connection then they would have won the prime 
contractorship. The procurement minister stated: "We want to get the best possible carriers 
for the best possible value and on time. This solution gives us the best chance of getting those 
things. " (The Independent, 31/01/03) 
Partnering is a concept that has been imported from the construction and energy sectors 
where, although no precise definition exists, it is taken to mean the principal and agent 
collaborating to achieve a goal to the benefit of both. The concept first appeared in the 
Treasury's 1995 document on procurement and has been refined several times by the MoD 
since. 10 The perceived benefits from partnering are: a focus on achieving value for money 
rather than the lowest cost, increased opportunities for innovation, a fair division of the risk 
(pain/gain shares), a move from the adversarial nature of competition to a more constructive 
relationship reducing disputes and litigation, a greater flow of information between the MoD 
and industry, increased stability through the use of longer contracts and better long-term value 
for money (MoD, 1998). Further a NAO report into partnering in the construction industry 
10The three documents are: MoD Guidelines for Industry Number 4- Partnering between MoD and Suppliers 
(1996), Partnering Agreements between the MoD and its Suppliers (1998) and Smarter Partnering (2002). 
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reports that project (one-off) partnering generates savings of between 2 and 10 percent whilst 
strategic (long-term) partnering saves up to 30 percent (para 2.3, NAO, 2001a). The NAO 
state value for money should be achieved if: the partners are appointed by competition, 
targets are set for continuous improvements, appropriate incentive structures are set and 
open book accounting is undertaken. In the same way the MoD enthusiastically embraced 
competition in the 1980s and 1990s it has done so again with partnering in the 2000s. A 
recent NAO investigation into the MoD's project control (NAO, 2005) received a presentation 
where the MoD set out the benefits of partnership (trust, understanding, flexibility, value 
orientated, joint-team approach, innovative, can-do and collective focus on price, time and 
capability) whilst the disadvantages of competition, or arms length procurement, were the 
diametric opposite (respectively distrust, secrecy, frustration, win/lose deals, antagonism, time 
slippage and financial loss). 11 However by placing trust as a benefit of partnership suggests 
a misunderstanding of the technique as the collaboration can only be successful if there is 
trust between the parties to enable them to work together effectively and engage in open 
book accounting. Despite the evangelical rhetoric about partnering from the MoD, without 
the required trust underneath partnering is doomed to fail. In a review on the literature 
on partnering in the construction industry, Fisher and Green (2001) point out that despite 
partnering being used by the construction sector for ten years there are no verifiable benefits 
in published papers attributed to it, although managers have been reported to praise it. 
Other problems with partnering include a too cosy relationship between the two parties which 
prevents value for money being achieved (by anti-competitive behaviour) and exploitation of 
the gains by only one of the partners. Given the reduced number of shipyards able to complete 
naval contracts competition was becoming increasingly difficult to undertake thus partnering 
offered a new procurement mechanism which reflected the lack of competition the MoD had 
managed to maintain. 
"Slide 31, www. naodefencevfm. org/downloads/fist_nao_presentation_jul_04. pdf). 
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The MoD has interpreted partnering as a new way of doing business but does not seem to 
have given an explanation as to why this approach is now preferred. Whilst the move away 
from the adversarial relations with industry in the past is an improvement the government, 
unlike construction clients, never used litigation for poor performance preferring to place 
liquidated damages clauses in contracts instead. The other advantages cited by the MoD 
were also already in place: by this stage it had already been established the focus should 
be on value for money over the life of the project rather than the initial procurement price, 
the culture of procurement had changed with the introduction of Integrated Project Teams 
as the organisational boundaries between the MoD and industry became blurred with both 
working as a team on projects to make efficiencies and increase communication and the MoD 
did not enforce contracts when the initial risk judgements were wrong preferring to renegotiate 
contracts to share the risk. One advantage, paradoxically, of partnering was to enable the 
MoD to regain from the firms some of the power it had lost over the years as the MoD was 
now involved in the planning and development of industry's responses to its needs whilst still 
being able to transfer the responsibility of manufacture; it could respond sooner to problems 
and find resolutions rather than letting the project go wrong and then having to renegotiate 
the whole contract. Given the increase in the forward programme withholding contracts will 
no longer be possible meaning the MoD has no route through which it can regain power from 
the firms. 
The MoD's optimism surrounding the award of the CVF contract proved to be misplaced 
within days. Although the Thales design was preferred BAe Systems stated it was responsible 
for running the design team. (In the bids BAe Systems had proposed building the ships 
in three sections whilst the Thales design called for five). Further BAe Systems reportedly 
divided the project into six parts with Thales only appearing in the design category as one 
of the firms involved with the design. As this was not a third of the project the explanation 
given was that Thales would only manage a third of the project and not receive a third of 
the work (The Observer, 02/02/03). An alternative theory as to why Thales was awarded 
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one third of the work was the French are looking to build one new aircraft carrier so if the 
two countries were to collaborate by juste retour British firms would receive two thirds of the 
work whilst French firms receive one third. 12 A Memorandum of Understanding was signed 
between the two governments in March 2005 to work together to see if there are any benefits 
from cooperation. 
By the end of the year the problems of the partnership approach were apparent for all 
to see. The press reported the cost had increased to £4 billion so the MoD demanded it be 
reduced. This was achieved by reducing the weight of the ship from its original 65,000 tonnes 
by 10,000 tonnes, reducing the number of aircraft to be carried by 15 to 35 and reducing the 
ships length from 295 meters to 265 meters. Even these changes to the specification still left 
the cost at over £3.5 billion. The arguments concerning the design of the ship and associated 
cost suggested the April 2004 date for agreeing the final design and budget of the ship was 
unlikely to be met. This date was important; in evidence to the Defence Select Committee 
in 2001 the Chief of Defence Procurement stated the MoD was going to stick to its timetable 
in order for the 2012 in-service date to be met (Q53, DC, 2001). Although the timetable was 
slipping the MoD offered the excuse that more design work was being done up front so time 
should be regained later in construction (by December 2005 the design was 60% complete 
(Q534, DC, 2005)). 
Whilst discussions about the CVF continued there was continued speculation about possible 
mergers in the defence industry. BAe Systems was looking to expand and gain influence in the 
US. At the same time there were also thoughts of European mergers involving BAe Systems, 
Thales and EADS. A possible merger between Thales and BAe Systems was rejected by both 
in June 2003 at informal talks with BAe Systems preferring to merge with a US company 
(Boeing, Lockheed Martin or General Dynamics were all mentioned at one time or another). 
It looked as though Boeing was the most likely firm for it to merge with when its chief 
executive Philip Conduit stated in summer 2003 they might be interested in BAe Systems. 
12With the introduction of OCCAR juste retour no longer applies on individual procurement rather across 
a range of procurement projects of the signatory countries. 
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However in the spring of 2004 Boeing had a new chief executive after an 'ethics' scandal. 
Harry Stonecipher, the new chief executive of Boeing, stated he was "not interested in being 
in submarines or shipbuilding" (The Independent, 02/03/04) - the view was that BAe Systems 
was now too vertically integrated to be of interest, despite vertical integration being one of 
the aims for privatising British Shipbuilders originally. 
Following this BAe Systems announced it was seeking offers for its warship yards. Although 
it never formally placed them for sale General Dynamics were reported to be interested in 
purchasing Barrow. However due to the national champions argument it is doubtful whether 
the government would allow them to be sold to a foreign company. This would have left 
Vosper Thornycroft as the company most likely to purchase them. This was in April 2004, 
the same month the final decisions regarding the CVFs were due to be taken. By this stage 
the discussions had broken down. The MoD ended the partnership between Thales and BAe 
Systems and instead instigated an alliance involving BAe Systems, Thales and the MoD (in 
essence a more contractual relationship between the parties than occurs under a partnership). 13 
Concerned by BAe Systems' lack of commitment to the industry the government announced 
that it was considering a long term strategy for distributing its contracts for ships (not only 
for the CVFs but also for planned auxiliary support ships). In October 2004 the government 
held a meeting with the shipbuilders at which they proposed the firms worked together rather 
than in competition with one another. The proposed idea was for the work to be distributed 
between yards in a manner that ensured their survival. The firms involved in the discussion 
are BAE Sytems, Babcock (owners of the Rosyth shipyard), Rolls Royce, Vosper Thornycroft, 
Swan Hunter and DML (owned by Haliburton KBR (51%), Balfour Beatty (24.5%) and The 
Weir Group (24.5%) and which owns Devonport Dockyard and Appledore shipyards). The 
talks are currently in difficulty as they cannot agree how to value assets going into this new 
partnership, whilst BAe Systems refuse to include its submarine business. 
13The MoD's share of the project was 10% (Q96, DC, 2004). 
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When the Geddes commission was investigating British shipbuilding in the 1960s there was 
the prospect of new aircraft carriers being ordered. The committee warned (para 309,1966): 
If an aircraft carrier were to be ordered, it would have to be the subject of special 
arrangements ... We do not believe that it is in the best long-term interest of the 
industry as a whole for the possibility of such an order to be a factor influencing the 
industry's organisation. 
This warning, that the 1960s aircraft carrier ought to be procured by special arrangements, 
seems not to have been heeded 40 years later as proposals for the future structure of the 
industry have been determined by the need to procure the CVF with other considerations 
subsumed. There are, however, two possible explanations for the MoD wishing to create a 
monopoly besides the advantages it would bring to the CVF project. The first is the MoD has 
a long-stated policy of not interfering in the defence industrial structure and if, as currently 
proposed, it manages its demand to create a more continuous even-sized stream of orders 
then the creation of a monopoly leaves industry to restructure itself to meet the MoD's new 
procurement strategy. The other explanation follows the first by viewing it as an expansion 
of partnering into strategic alliancing; given that the MoD wishes to pursue its alliancing 
approach, which implies a closer long-term relationship with industry, if industry consolidates 
itself then the MoD has one clear partner with which it can collaborate. The MoD's desire 
for a monopoly suggests it has forgotten its experience with British Shipbuilders (the higher 
costs) and also the more recent experience of procuring the LPDs (where the MoD lacked 
negotiating power as it was dealing with a monopoly). 
The role of physical integrator, a firm responsible for overseeing the project, was won by 
KBR, a subsidiary of Haliburton KBR. Although there was an expectation that KBR would 
prefer to assemble the ships at its Nigg yard, which is used primarily for oil platforms, this 
would have caused problems for the Chancellor whose constituency is next to Babcock's Rosyth 
shipyard whilst a further political concern was the firm's connections to the US government. 
Neither BAe Systems nor Vosper Thornycroft bid for the position. It is interesting to note 
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that KBR bid to become the physical integrator and share in the project risk when it has 
little control of the production itself. 
In December 2005 the MoD published the Defence Industrial Strategy, a follow-up to the 
Defence Industrial Policy. Whilst the philosophy behind procurement remained unaltered - 
fewer platforms but increased incremental procurement, more partnerships between the MoD 
and industry, and greater acceptance of domestic monopolies but continuing the MoD's re- 
luctance to intervene in the industrial restructuring - the application to shipbuilding led to 
new policies. The aim of the document was to specify which areas of the defence base had 
strategic importance (and therefore gain support from the state to ensure sufficient investment 
from the global defence industry) and which would be left to the market. The UK's shipyards 
were not classified as being of sufficient strategic importance; the hulls of less complex and 
follow-on vessels could be built overseas as the skills involved were not necessary for the UK's 
defence, rather the design skills and ability to manufacture and integrate the systems for the 
FOC were what mattered and needed to be maintained. The document admits "procurement 
strategies and commercial arrangements have not adequately incentivised or enabled ratio- 
nalisation and efficiency improvements" (para B2.47, MoD, 2005) but goes on to state "we 
will not micromanage industry's restructuring but it must be customer focused" (para B2.51, 
MoD, 2005). In essence the MoD aims to give a minimum level of orders to certain firms 
in order to maintain the FOC skills but will not maintain capacity beyond this. However 
the reluctance to intervene in the industry means the inefficiencies, which the privatisation of 
British Shipbuilders was supposed to solve, are likely to remain in the future as all competi- 
tion for the core workload will disappear. Yet again, despite acknowledging historic failings, 
the MoD is refusing to intervene in the industry so that its interests can be protected, rather 
it will merely state an objective and hop industry responds. Given the focus on the core 
future competition will be reduced. Despite not intervening in the market to ensure future 
competition, the MoD's position after the privatisation of British Shipbuilders was protected 
by the misclassification of yards and the end of the Cold War. However as the number of 
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orders is expected to increase, combined with little prospect of new firms entering the market, 
the MoD is unlikely to be able to protect its position and will lose further negotiating power 
which cannot be compensated for through the use of alliances or partnerships. 
The implication of this was announced the day before the strategy was published. In a 
statement about the CVF programme the MoD gave more details about the alliance and 
how the ships were to be constructed. The alliance between the MoD, BAe Systems, Thales 
and KBR was joined by Vosper Thornycroft and Babcock (the owners of Rosyth). Vosper 
Thornycroft was allocated the building work for block 2, BAe's Barrow block 3, BAe's Govan 
block 4 and Rosyth was allocated block 1 and final assembly. Together these blocks account 
for 60% of the total project. The remaining 40% was to be allocated by competition to 
other yards and firms beyond shipbuilding. The omission of Swan Hunter from the alliance 
suggested the government was starting to narrow its focus onto the yards it considers to have a 
future and want to work together - Vosper Thornycroft and BAe's yards - and that allocating 
work to Swan Hunter would just increase overheads and perpetuate the over capacity without 
any benefit for the future programme. The implication of the statement means there will 
only be two domestic shipyards able to fulfill the MoD's forward naval programme. Although 
foreign build is now a possibility the likelihood of it occurring is small given the likely domestic 
reaction, suggesting the MoD will face a duopoly or monopoly going forward. Whether the 
lack of competition present in the future will be detrimental to the MoD obtaining value for 
money remains to be seen. However the MoD got to this situation due to it not being prepared 
to intervene in the industry and obtain a structure that would protect its interests. It never 
paid sufficient attention to where competition for its future programme would come from. 
4.6 Competition and price 
The preceding sections argue that until recently the MoD maintained a blase attitude towards 
future competition with the result the number of warship yards has reduced to a duopoly. 
The effect that this should have on prices charged to the MoD is unclear. Economics suggests 
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that as the number of firms decreases the price should increase as each firm gains more 
power reducing the alternatives available to, ergo the power of, the MoD. However the more 
shipyards there are, for a given procurement programme, the fewer ships are produced in 
each yard leading to increased overhead costs raising the overall contract price. Furthermore 
with the size of the Royal Navy decreasing (reducing the potential size of future procurement 
programmes) firms could be engaging in a longer term view and pricing low now knowing their 
market power will increase over time as excess capacity leaves the industry. The argument 
put forward by the MoD states there has been no loss of future competition as firms leaving 
the industry have only taken away excess capacity. Thus the reduction in the number of yards 
has been beneficial on the prices paid for ships. Therefore the question arises as to whether 
there is any evidence to support this claim. 
One way to test whether the reduction in the number of shipyards has affected the price 
of contracts is to look at the bids themselves from the various companies for the different 
projects offered by the MoD. A panel can be constructed detailing the bid price, project 
specific factors (eg the size of the vessel), firm specific factors (eg the amount of work the firm 
already had) and common factors (eg the price of steel), along with measures based on the 
number of firms. A fixed effects model can then be run to see if the number of firms remaining 
in the industry influences the bids of the firms. The problem with this methodology is the 
government does not release details of bids it receives for contracts; the data is unavailable. 
The government does however provide aggregate data stating how much it has spent on ship 
hulls every year. Using this time series could cause problems. As the amount spent on ship 
hulls in any one year is determined by contracts signed during that year or years prior to it the 
regressors should be lagged but as projects overlap and their associated contracts were signed 
in different years determining appropriate lags is problematic. Another problem is that it is 
unclear what proportion of the total amount spent can be allocated to any individual project 
which restricts the use of project specific variables. Despite these problems it is the best data 
available to be tested. 
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The amount spent on ship hulls and machinery, a subcategory of sea systems procurement, 
is listed in the Defence Estimates (up until 1996) and then in Defence Statistics (from 1997 
onwards). As the MoD procures different numbers and different types of vessels each year the 
most appropriate way to compare them is by using gross tonnage. Even though the order and 
delivery dates for a ship are on record along with the size of a vessel the problem of allocating 
how much work was done on a vessel in any particular year remains. After the order has 
been placed and the contract signed shipyards do not start the work immediately rather they 
finalise plans and prepare before the first steel is cut. For the second to tenth Type 23s this 
gap was on average 11 months, varying from 5 to 20 months (calculated from data on page 
49, DC, 1990). Even after production has started the work is not uniform - there are peak 
years of expenditure for a project which detail when the expenditure will be highest but the 
relative height is not given, neither is a breakdown between the hull and its systems. As 
these are unknowns the amount of tonnage constructed on a project in a year is estimated to 
be the total final tonnage divided by the difference between the order date and the delivery 
date. The total amount constructed in any year is the sum of work on individual projects 
during that year. Although this uniform approach gives disproportionate weight to the tails 
on any individual project (the start and end years) it is the only consistent way the tonnage 
constructed in any year can be calculated. Furthermore as projects overlap through the years 
the effect should average out. If pt is the deflated amount spent on hulls in year t whilst xt is 
the amount constructed then the dependent variable is the real price of ship hulls per tonne, 
Pt. Figure 1 shows the real price of ship hulls per tonne between financial years 1978 and 2000. 
The price increases from 1978, the first year after nationalisation, through to the early 1980s 
as contracts were signed with a monopoly which forbade its firms from competing in profit. 
Although the price did decrease in the late 1980s (after privatisation) the price only dropped 
substantially a few years after the end of the Cold War (in 1993, which also conincided with 
the LPH contract). The price has remained roughly constant since then, apart from 1996 and 
1997 when the MoD ordered the LPDs just before the end of the 1996 financial year (hence 
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Figure 4.1: Real price of ship hulls per tonne 
L 
there is an increase in x without many payments attached). 
Anton and Yao (1990) survey empirical investigations into the role of competition in defence 
procurement. The studies examine the introduction of competition in production after the 
design and initial production stage which, in essence, equates to whether the government 
should sole or dual source. Whilst competition brings downwards pressure on prices it does 
so at the up front costs of establishing competition, both physical, technology transfer and 
the initial units on steep learning curves. All the investigations are into the learning curve 
and how the slope changes dependent on whether there is competition or not. The equation 
estimated is c= axb where c is the cost for unit x given x -1 units have already been produced, 
a the cost of the first unit and b the slope of the learning curve. The prices obtained under 
competition are compared to the estimated prices under the initial sole source and the savings 
calculated. All of the procurement projects studied are in the fields of missiles, bombs and 
electronics. As Anton and Yao point out there are some problems with this technique, for 
example the price not being decomposed into fixed and variable costs, too few observations 
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restricting the number of explanatory variables that can be used, sample selection problems 
and lack of strategic pricing in the model. Furthermore the model tests whether the price 
would have been lower by continuing with the sole source rather than introducing competition 
from a second source. Even if the data was available it would not be an appropriate model 
to test as the aim of this chapter is to test whether the reduction in the number of shipyards 
has had any effect on the price charged to the MoD, not where to introduce competition in 
the procurement cycle as this, in some form or other, occurs at all stages (either directly or 
through NAPNOC. ) 
Johnman and Murphy (2002) demonstrate that shipyards in the UK historically underin- 
vested in capital projects - although they would reduce costs when business was good they still 
had to be financed when business was bad, unlike labour which could be made unemployed. 
Consequently owners of shipyards had no incentive to invest when the yards with the most 
modern equipment were the first to experience difficulty when the downturn returned to the 
shipbuilding industry. From an economics viewpoint this means a static cost minimisation 
approach is not an appropriate way to model the cost component of prices. Unfortunately 
it seems there is no appropriate model which covers all the time periods due to the unique 
features of the shipbuilding industry. Accordingly there is no theoretic model, rather the 
relationships are constructed in a more informal manner. 
It is assumed the firms in the industry have symmetric cost structures so if each firm has 
fixed real overheads of k then if nt firms are in the industry total fixed costs charged to the 
government are knt. As such the fixed costs per tonne, Lt, captures the effect the number 
of firms has on overheads and that any reduction in the number of firms ought to reduce the 
cost to government. Let the period a contract is signed in be denoted 7- (where T< t) and 
xt, T the quantity produced in period t that was ordered in period T. 
The number of firms 
can also, conceivably, have an effect on the level of profit per tonne made by firms, irt(n7). 
The level of profit is determined by competition at the start of the project with the same 
rate being paid throughout and therefore it is the number of firms present when the project 
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began that is important. However this gives rise to the complication that in any period t the 
appropriate number of firms can take different values. This is resolved by using proportions of 
the tonnage produced during year t that started when there was one firm present, two firms 
present etcetera. If the years in which the number of firms changes are -Ti where i=0, ... ,j 
then the variables used are ETi+l -"t for i=0, ... ,j-1. 
Thus if the number of firms 
in the industry changes only once then the profit component in the price per tonne before 
the price change is represented by Ft = al and after the number of firms has changed by 
Tl 2ýt 'T 2 xt 'T 7rt = al ETO Xt 
+ a2 ETl Xt 
(where al and a2 are constants for a specific number of firms. ) 
As overheads are being estimated by another variable this should capture the effect a reduced 
number of firms has on profits. As basic economics suggests the level of profit per tonne would 
be decreasing in the number of firms the coefficients should be increasing in magnitude as the 
number of firms reduces. The question of which is the appropriate number of shipyards to use 
remains. 
Intuitively it is clear that the appropriate number of yards for determining overheads is 
different to the appropriate number of yards for determining profits as the former includes all 
yards supported by government whereas the latter requires the number of independent yards 
in operation. For example when British Shipbuilders had the monopoly the rate of profit 
could not be the subject of competition although the government had to pay the overheads of 
all the yards undertaking its work. Even with this distinction the more fundamental question 
remains as to what extent the government funded the overheads and which yards provided 
competition. The answer to the former is assumed to be that the government funds all the 
warship yards overheads. As described previously the focus of the shipyards has increasingly 
being on warship orders due to their inability to compete in the merchant shipbuilding sector 
whilst the level of warship exports during the period was an average of only £85.3m. Given the 
business strategies pursued by the yards their overheads have to be recovered from the MoD in 
one way or another. The answer to the second question is not clear either. In different sectors 
there were different levels of competition; whilst a monopoly existed for nuclear submarines 
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three firms competed for FOC frigate work whilst most were able to undertake follow-on 
orders. Thus for individual projects it is possible to identify the competitors, see table 4.4 
in the MMC report (1995a), however it is difficult to construct a time series from this. It is 
also difficult to determine the extent of competition the firms were able to provide anyway. 
Whilst Hall Russell and Brooke Marine could never be effective competition for the larger 
yards there was also difficulties for the larger yards competing with one another due to their 
movements along the learning curve for specific projects and competing firms having to judge 
what corresponding adjustments to make. 
Taking these considerations into account the number of firms for overheads is taken to 
be the total number of yards whilst for profits it is the number of independent yards with 
three different groupings of yards being used. All warship yards consists of the seven yards 
privatised in the mid 1980s (YSL, VSEL, VT, SH, CL, BM and HR); effective warship yards 
consists of the larger yards (YSL, VSEL, VT, SH and CL) whilst pure warship yards consists 
of the FOC capable yards (YSL, VSEL and VT). In addition the overheads of Govan were 
included after it was acquired by BAe Systems. For any year the maximum number of yards 
was used, so if a yard closed during the course of the year it would be included in that years 
figures. Although ships for the MoD have been built at Appledore and Harland and Wolff 
these shipyards have not been included as they have never been dependent on MoD orders 
and therefore their overheads have never been fully charged to the MoD. Additionally Harland 
and Wolff have only provided true competition once (for the AORl) which, due to problems 
encountered in fulfilling the contract, confirmed their status as a merchant shipbuilder. Scott 
Lithgow is excluded as their experience in the offshore sector prior to privatisation effectively 
put them out of the warship building sector despite their attempts to reenter it. 
This means the equation to be estimated is 
Ti+l 
A=cý+knt+ßZ 
xt`T +'YZt+Et (4.1) 
xt Xt xt Ti 
for all i=0, ... ,j -1 where Et is the error term and Zt a vector of other explanatory variables. 
These other explanatory variables are given in table 4.2 but include exports, the amount of 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics 
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum 
deviation 
Pure warship yards overheads 129.3 27.8 97.2 214.9 
Effective warship yards overheads 187.0 36.9 97.2 237.0 
All warship yards overheads 224.0 66.2 97.2 331.8 
Percentage started pre 1978 31.6 36.5 0.0 100.0 
Percentage started by British Shipbuilders 11.0 23.8 0.0 82.8 
Total tonnage produced in the year 27011 5942 17015 38970 
Total tonnage remaining 76796 24630 46680 139225 
Index of real steel price 134.3 21.6 97.4 184.2 
Real weekly pay 348.1 31.0 302.4 409.8 
Base interest rate 9.8 3.5 5.5 17 
Real value of warship exports 85.3 103.5 0.0 318.6 
Percentage first of class 26.8 14.9 6.5 50.3 
Percentage first third of class 28.6 14.0 0.0 47.7 
Percentage second third of class 23.2 14.4 2.2 49.1 
Real warship hull costs per tonne 34816 10519 12402 48297 
work in yards, the percentage of FOCs, the price of iron and steel, interest rates for capital 
costs and weekly wages. A Wu Hausman test was conducted to check if the overheads measure 
was endogenous as the number of firms present can be just as much a function of price as 
price is of the the number of firms. As this suggested the overheads were endogenous the 
regressions were run using two stage least squares. 
The years tested were the financial years 1978/79 to 2000/01 as 1978/79 was the first full 
year under British Shipbuilders and 2000/01 is the last year data is available for. Descriptive 
statistics are given in table 4.2. The data for expenditure on warship hulls, exports and 
the dates used to calculate construction times were taken from the Statement on Defence 
Estimates (up to 1996) and then Defence Statistics (after 1996). Details on tonnage were 
taken from the Royal Navy's website and, for older ships, from references in Hansard. The 
index of iron and steel prices came from Eurostat Iron and Steel Statistics, base interest rates 
from the Halifax website and weekly pay (including overtime) from the New Earnings Survey 
for a full time manual male employed in the building and repairing of ships sector. Price 
variables have been made real by deflating by GDP. 
Table 4.3 gives the results when no other explanatory variables are used apart from over- 
163 
Table 4.3: Determinants of warship costs per tonne 
Pure Effective Effective Effective All All 
Constant -3378.8 -7349.7 -6918.7 -6231.2 -4797.8 -2638.4 (0.31) (1.11) (0.82) (0.82) (0.79) (0.19) 
Overheads 107.5* 149.3*** 153.2*** 162.7*** 134.4*** 136.7*** 
(1.86) (3.77) (4.44) (4.33) (4.24) (4.15) 
Pre nationalisation 254.7*** 164.6*** 153.8 132.5** 77.1* 50.6 
(3.26) (4.31) (1.49) (2.52) (1.86) (0.34) 
British Shipbuilders 366.9*** 207.0*** 194.0* 164.8*** 93.7* 64.4 
(6.86) (5.64) (1.77) (3.34) (1.79) (0.40) 
7 yards 54.3 29.8 
(0.97) (0.21) 
6 yards 881.1*** 864.4** 
(2.98) (2.69) 
5 yards 158.3*** 146.3 127.5*** 158.4** 123.8 
(5.47) (1.35) (3.02) (2.60) (0.61) 
4 yards -13.5 -29.6 
(0.11) (0.18) 
3 yards 228.4*** -106.2 
(3.93) (0.93) 
R2 0.7475 0.8993 0.8973 0.8965 0.9127 0.9117 
Figures in brackets show the robust t-statistics. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level 
and * at the 10% level. The R2 coefficient is for generalised R2. 
heads and the number of firms in the industry. The number of firms includes production 
awarded before the industry was nationalised, during the warship part of British Shipbuilders 
existence and post privatisation with the smallest post privatisation number being excluded 
for the profit element. All three configurations of warship yards are included. Column 1 
reports the regression when the pure warship yards was used (the three core FOC yards). 
Columns 2 to 4 uses the enlarged group of effective warship yards in three different combi- 
nations. In column 2 Cammell Laird is included only until the time of its first receivership 
whilst column 3 includes its return after receivership. Column 4 includes Cammell Laird only 
once but delays Swan Hunter for three years as it took time to convince the MoD the yard 
was sufficiently financially secure to be awarded a contract. Columns 5 and 6 include all the 
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warship yards; in 5 Cammell Laird has been included only once whilst 6 includes it twice. 
The testable implications of the arguments put forward by the MoD are the measure for over- 
heads should be statistically significant with a positive sign, so that as the number of firms 
decreases the price also decreases for a given tonnage. Secondly the effect of the number of 
warship yards after privatisation should be statistically of the same value as the number of 
yards has affected only the amount of overheads levied on the MoD and has had no affect on 
the competition for contracts (if the reduced number of competing yards has not given them 
the ability to price higher). On the former assertion the level of overheads is statistically 
significant suggesting the MoD has benefitted from having to support fewer yards. On the 
latter the answer is not so clear. The typical story is the coefficient per percentage point of 
tonnage increased after the creation of British Shipbuilders but reduced after privatisation to 
a level below that obtained in the pre British Shipbuilders era. However under all warship 
yards there is a statistical increase after privatisation. This result, though, occurs due to Hall 
Russell and Brooke Marine essentially acting as year specific variables (the proportion of ships 
ordered in one year) rather than a reflection of the number of yards. For the other groupings 
of yards there does appear to have been a reduction in profit after privatisation. Furthermore 
as the number of yards reduce the coefficients tend to decrease (or become statistically in- 
significant) rather than increase, given the increase in power gained. This can be explained 
by the decrease in orders in the 1990s and the need for firms to win contracts in order to sur- 
vive; although each remaining firm had more pricing power the lack of orders from the MoD 
meant the firms were unable to exploit their power. Therefore the MoD gained not only from 
reduced overheads but also from the increased competition for the reduced number of orders - 
the MoD exercised its power through not acting and withholding contracts from competition. 
An alternative explanation is the MoD were able to restrict rents when competition was low or 
absent; however this explanation counters the evidence suggesting the ferocity of competition 
in the 1990s (for example the LPH) and the NAO report on NAPNOC (NAO, 2001. ) It also 
counters evidence Vosper Thornycroft gave to a Parliamentary inquiry into shipbuilding that 
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warship contracts were increasingly difficult to obtain and consequently only lower financial 
returns could be earned (67, SCEC, 1998). The CDP stated that the MoD held the power as 
it also held the money (Q15, PAC, 2002) though this suggests not spending the money was 
more powerful. However it has to be remembered that industry still retained power as the 
MoD never fully enforced contracts that were unfavourable to industry as it would jeopardise 
their other projects (Q42, DC, 2004). 
Table 4.4 gives the results when explanatory variables are included. For all columns the 
effective warship group is used with Cammell Laird being included only once. Column 1 
repeats column 2 of table 1 in order for comparisons to be made. Column 2 gives the results 
when variables to represent the learning curve are introduced. The learning curve states that 
the more that has been produced, the less each subsequent unit should cost. The variables 
tested are the percentage of tonnage produced in a year that are first of class, in the next 
third of class and in the middle third of the class. If a class consists of fewer than four vessels 
the first is the FOC, the second comes in the first third and the third in the second third. 
Although this groups vessels which are different numbers it would be expected that the later 
ships in the class should be associated with a lower price than earlier ships in the class. This, 
however, is not borne out by the regression which suggests there is no statistically significant 
learning curve effect on prices. Since this disagrees with the arguments used by the MoD two 
further measures of the learning curve were used. The first was to use the proportion of ships 
by tonnage that were first of class, second of class, third of class and so on. This increased the 
number of exogenous variables considerably in relation to there being only 23 observations and 
none of the coefficients was statistically significant. In order to gain more degrees of freedom 
the final measure used was a specific learning curve where if the ships were ranked by class so 
the FOC would be r=1 then the cost of the vessel should be arb where a is the notional first 
of class cost and b the learning curve coefficient. Accordingly for a given period t the variable 
used was the position on the learning curve, with predetermined slopes, weighted by tonnage 
or y`? r° for each period t. The values chosen for b were -0.05, -0.10, -0.15 and -0.20. 
All 
xt 
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were statistically insignificant. Throughout overheads and industry structure measures were 
significant. There are three possible reasons why no learning curve is present in the data 
contrary to the arguments of the MoD. The first is that each individual project is subject 
to its own learning curve slope and not a common slope, which is what the methodology 
assumes. The second explanation is the savings in price were not due to the learning curve 
but by the need to submit lower bids in a period when the sector was contracting in order 
to have the possibility of remaining in business. The third explanation for the absence of the 
learning curve is that learning by doing is inhibited by the short production run (the largest 
class included is the Type 23 which consisted of 16 vessels) spread over a large number of 
years (financial years 1984/85 to 2000/01) which allows scope for design evolution further 
constraining the potential to learn; the last of class is never expected to be the same as the 
first of class vessel. 
Column 3 includes size effects. The expectation would be the greater the loading of the 
yards the lower the cost would be whilst the more work yards have remaining the lower the 
cost as firms would have no need to delay projects in order to remain in business or, as 
documented in Johnman and Murphy (2002), workers working more slowly on the last ship in 
the yard so they can do overtime before being made redundant when the yard closes. Neither 
of these propositions are borne out by the date, both are statistically insignificant. Once the 
overheads have been paid, which are statistically significant, the actual volume of work has 
no effect on the price; loading affects the price only as far as recouping overheads and does 
not introduce economies of scale. Also insignificant are the variables in column 4 used to 
reflect costs incurred by yards: wages, capital costs (base interest rates) and raw materials 
(an index of iron and steel prices). As the variables used are contemporaneous it is assumed 
that yards' expectations of their costs are accurate. However these representative costs faced 
by the yards do not explain the prices paid by the MoD. Column 5 includes what has been 
said repeatedly to be the savior of the sector: exports. Exports are assumed to benefit the 
price paid by the government in two ways. The first is that it helps to recoup overheads and 
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thus lowers the proportion charged to the MoD and secondly it employs a yard even when 
there is no MoD work ensuring it is able to compete in the next MoD competition and bring 
further competitive pressures to the price finally charged. The lack of statistical significance 
for exports suggests that it brings no direct benefit to the MoD in terms of the price it has 
to pay for its domestic warships. Exports lack of effect on prices could be due either to the 
level of exports never being sufficiently large to sustain yards in the absence of MoD orders or 
yards viewing the winning of exports as being unlikely and therefore not factoring them into 
prices when competing for MoD contracts. The final column, 6, includes a variety of these 
measures to see what effect they can have in combination. The only variables which remain 
statistically significant are the measure for overheads and some for the industrial structure. 
The statistical significance of the overhead measure and the industrial structure measures 
remain when the regression included a time-trend (not reported). The time trend could have, 
for example, represented an increase in the cost of technology over time. This empirical anal- 
ysis supports the preceding arguments in three ways. Firstly the significance of the overhead 
measure supports the MoD argument that it has benefitted from a reduced number of firms 
as it has not had to pay for under loaded firms. Secondly the coefficients for the industrial 
structure also support the MoD's view that privatisation decreased costs - for a given pro- 
portion of tonnage the cost increased after nationalisation but reduced to a lower level after 
privatisation. Thirdly the contention that the MoD's unfettered pursuit of competition has 
not brought about any adverse consequences in terms of ship hull prices appears to be borne 
out by the data. However the fact that the price decreases with the number of yards, as 
shown in table 4.3, suggests this is due less to the MoD's industrial policy (where the benefits 
of reduced overheads should be compared to the increased profit paid to the remaining firms) 
and more to the lack of orders in the 1990s and firms bidding for contracts just to survive. 
The data tested here finishes in financial year 2000 and therefore finishes just as the number 
of naval orders is increasing (Type 45s, CVFs and the Future Surface Combatants). It will 
be interesting to see in the future whether the remaining firms will be able to exploit their 
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power, and thus negate the benefits of reduced overheads, or whether the optimal number of 
firms remain (whereby the overheads equal the marginal increase in costs due to the reduced 
number of firms). 
4.7 Conclusion 
The privatisation of the naval shipyards in the mid 1980s furthered the MoD's aim to introduce 
competition into defence procurement as it transferred hull production away from a domestic 
monopoly to a domestic oligopoly. This alteration to the industrial structure enabled the 
MoD to have competition for hull construction contracts and meant it was prepared, for the 
most part, to leave any industrial questions to the market with market forces determining 
the industrial structure. After 1985/86 contracts were awarded solely on the criteria of value 
for money; at first this was just defined by price but later expanded to include quality, time 
and life-costs. The industrial restructuring consequences of the distribution of contracts was 
never a prominent factor with the MoD making no effort to create and maintain an industrial 
structure able to deliver value for money in the long term. Even the resolution of the Cold 
War was not sufficient reason for the MoD to alter its procurement policy. Despite the decline 
in orders at the start of the 1990s the MoD continued to maintain it was for industry to 
restructure itself whilst the MoD would contract with what remained. 
The ships procured during the 1980s and 1990s demonstrate not only the preeminence 
of the short term, for example the LPH contract, but also a disregard as to how future 
competition could be achieved. The LPDs showed that if there was no competition for a 
vessel the MoD would have even less bargaining power and be reliant on offering a sufficiently 
attractive package (in terms of price, risk, time and quality) to the shipyard to build it, not 
the other way round that would be expected in a normal buyer-seller relationship. However 
there was never any realistic prospect of bringing competitive forces to bear unless there 
was another firm competing for the contract. The AORs showed the difficulties in non-naval 
shipyards constructing naval ships whilst the other accountancy based routes (for example 
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post contract auditing or pre contract benchmarking) have not been successful for the MoD 
historically. Finally given the political, as well as defence, consequences of the hull being 
built abroad the rational response should have been for the MoD to intervene and ensure 
the market maintained sufficient competition, rather than rely on the market to maintain the 
competition itself. However the MoD's unflinching support of the market meant the future 
industrial structure, and the problems of dealing with a monopoly, was never given much 
attention. 
The fierce competition for contracts led to some firms leaving the industry whilst those that 
remained faced difficulties throughout the 1990s. The empirics suggest the MoD's assurances 
that the loss of yards was beneficial due to the reduced overheads charged to it have proved 
valid. However the lack of power brought to bear by the firms as the sector consolidated 
suggests the MoD was able to retain power after privatisation; at first this was due to the 
excess capacity after privatisation and subsequently by the MoD not procuring vessels after 
the Cold War ended. This meant the remaining firms had to submit ever keener prices in 
order to survive and thus were unable to use their increased pricing power. Therefore with 
an increase in the naval procurement programme it will be interesting to see if sufficient firms 
remain to protect the MoD's financial, and other, interests or whether the lack of attention 
given to future competition will result in higher costs for the procurement programme. 
However the problems that were encountered on the Type 45s and, more recently, the CVFs 
have led the MoD to question their commitment to competition as a procurement mechanism. 
The lack of an immediate response to BAe Systems' offer to be the sole builder of the Type 
45s shows the lack of a naval policy (in terms of procurement and industrial structure. ) That 
they required RAND to undertake a study into this and procurement issues relating to the 
CVF suggests that the MoD had, and has, no naval procurement policy at all, rather it has 
subcontracted policy making to RAND. At least the BAe Systems proposal for the Type 45s 
led the MoD to consider future competition and this has subsequently been reinforced by the 
Defence Industrial Policy and the Defence Industrial Strategy. 
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The most recent proposal from the MoD is for the remaining industry to group together 
and restructure itself without MoD involvement. The MoD will then work in partnership with 
the remaining industry. However a partnership with industry can only work if both parties are 
working to achieve the same objective and can trust one another to achieve it. Further it also 
requires the industry to restructure itself. It is difficult to see this mechanism being effective; 
not only is there a lack of trust between industry and the government there is also a lack of 
trust amongst the firms preventing restructuring (combined with commercial considerations, 
for example pricing assets). The MoD refuses to accept its role as the principal purchaser of 
goods from the industry and to ensure it restructures in a way that protects the MoD interests. 
The MoD's procrastination and reluctance in becoming involved in the industrial base needs to 
end otherwise what remains of the industry will configure to the MoD's detriment. The next 
chapter proposes an alternate procurement mechanism, namely directed buys. This system 
should ensure that the power can return to the MoD and that their interests can be protected. 
However it also requires the MoD to accept its responsibility with regards to the industrial 
base and decide how many firms should remain. 
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Table 4.4: Determinants of warship costs per tonne 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant -7349.7 -3676.1 -4862.2 -26924.9 -8963.9 -35269.6 (1.11) (0.22) (0.32) (0.72) (1.17) (0.75) 
Overheads 149.3*** 153.3*** 152.3*** 145.8*** 158.1*** 141.4*** 
(3.77) (3.65) (3.32) (3.35) (3.85) (3.12) 
Pre nationalisation 164.6*** 151.2** 207.9*** 224.5 162.1*** 243.3 
(4.31) (2.29) (3.10) (1.32) (3.80) (1.25) 
British Shipbuilders 207.0*** 186.4** 228.6*** 248.2** 203.3*** 279.2* 
(5.64) (2.40) (4.76) (2.51) (5.77) (2.04) 
5 yards 158.3*** 150.0*** 182.6*** 176.9*** 157.3*** 184.7** 
(5.47) (3.75) (4.24) (2.94) (5.22) (2.61) 
First of class -92.5 -86.5 
(0.40) (0.37) 
First third of class 12.2 99.3 
(0.09) (0.63) 
Second third of class -51.0 58.4 
(0.30) (0.31) 
Total tonnage produced -0.39 
(0.70) 
Total tonnage remaining 0.06 
(0.90) 
Steel price -72.0 -155.8 
(0.38) (0.66) 
Wages 62.2 104.1 
(0.84) (1.16) 
Interest rates 569.8 663.4 
(1.41) (1.18) 
Exports 1.8 18.4 
(0.17) (1.17) 
R2 0.8993 0.9022 0.9028 0.9142 0.8946 0.9298 
The figures in brackets show the robust t-statistics. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 
5% level 
and * at the 10% level. The R2 coefficient is for generalised R2. 
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Chapter 5 
An alternative procurement 
mechanism for the future 
Defence spending in the United Kingdom has declined from around five percent in the mid 
1980s to around two and a half percent currently. Running parallel to this decrease is the 
increase in the use of competition in awarding defence contracts. In 1979/80 14% of contracts 
placed (both by number and by value) were as a result of competition; by 2001/02 they ac- 
counted for 35% of contracts by number but 61% by value (DASA, 2003). Smith (1990) points 
out the increased use of competition in procurement led to more firms receiving contracts. 
However since the end of the Cold War there has been a wave of consolidation in the defence 
sector in response to the peace dividend and the associated reduction in national defence 
budgets. At first there was vertical integration with the prime contractors taking control but 
the current focus is on horizontal integration at both the prime and subcontractor level. This 
means in the last decade there has been a reduction in the number of independent firms able 
to compete for MoD contracts. 
Economic theory suggests competition for procurement contracts is desirable as it should 
ensure an efficient allocation of resources. The theory continues by suggesting suppliers of a 
good have to adapt to the prevailing market conditions; the consolidation forced by the peace 
dividend should have reallocated capital and labour more efficiently. If the circumstances 
change, then the market should readjust with new firms being created if necessary (for example 
the presence of supernormal profits). However unlike most economic goods there are market 
entry problems for firms wishing to produce defence goods. The government, typically the sole 
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Table 5.1: Firms paid over £100m by the Ministry of Defence in 2002/03 
Over £500 million BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd NETMA 
BAE Systems Electronics Ltd 
£250 to £500 mAWE Management Ltd Devonport Royal Dockyards Ltd 
Defence Science & Technology General Dynamics Ltd 
Laboratory MBDA UK Ltd 
£100 to £250 m ABRO 
Alenia Marconi Systems Ltd 
Annington Receivables Ltd 
Babcock Support Services Ltd 
BAE Systems PLC 
BFS Group Ltd 
Data taken from Table 1.6, Defence Statistics 2003 
British Telecommunictions PLC 
DARA 
EDS Defence Ltd 
Fleet Support Ltd 
Fujitsu Services Ltd 
IBM United Kingdom Holdings Ltd 
QinetiQ Ltd 
Rolls Royce PLC 
Westland Group 
Interserve(Defence) Ltd 
Lockheed Martin Corp 
Other UK Departments 
Royal Ordnance PLC 
Serco Group PLC 
buyer of output, is only prepared to contract with certain firms for national security reasons. 
Also the value of a defence firm lies in its designers and engineers who have assimilated human 
capital throughout their working lives in the sector. A firm establishing a new team with no 
experience would be viewed by the government as having very little possibility of succeeding 
and there would be additional concerns over whether the firm possessed the necessary financial 
security. Consequently a new firm would be unlikely to win any contracts. 
This market entry problem means there is a problem if the MoD adopts a laissez faire 
approach to the defence industrial structure as the industry could be unable to respond. 
This, though, is not the only reason why a government might desire to take a more active 
involvement in the shape of the defence industrial base. Other reasons are split between 
the defence argument (mobilisation base, strategic needs, knowledge spillovers etcetera) and 
the political argument (national sentiment, technological spillovers and employment). Whilst 
these suggest the need for a large domestic defence industrial base there are countervailing 
arguments in favour of a smaller industry, principally the limited funds available to defence 
from the national budget alongside demands for value for money from each expenditure. The 
maintenance of defence firms requires the procuring agency to procure from each meaning 
economies of scale in production can be left unrealised and duplication occurring with repeat 
costs. 
The combined result of these factors is a requirement on the MoD to take an active role 
in 
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the defence industrial base. This is not a problem unique to the MoD - the US's Department 
of Defense (DoD) now reviews proposed consolidations to preserve essential competition for 
innovation and cost discipline. Kovacic and Smallwood (1994) suggest competition is more 
necessary for innovation than cost discipline as the US military rely on highly technologically 
innovative equipment; cost is a secondary concern to performance. Their analysis suggests 
the DoD ought to be more active in overviewing proposed mergers and acquisitions in order 
to maintain competition in all areas and at all levels. Latterly the DoD has accepted this 
argument with the `Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress 2001' stating the over- 
sight given to any proposed merger has to be greater now than in the past. However it also 
acknowledges the monopsonistic position of the military as the purchasing decisions it makes 
can dictate the shape of the market. In July 2000 the DoD changed its procurement practices 
so that the impact a purchasing decision has on future competition has to be considered. This 
reinforced the view that competition is vital in the defence sector and should be preserved. 
The previous chapter demonstrated the MoD pursued a similar policy response to the DoD 
in the shipbuilding sector; the market was left to decide its own structure before the MoD 
decided it had to intervene and consider the effect actions would have on future competition (as 
stated in the Defence Industrial Policy 2002 and Defence Industrial Strategy 2005). However 
the laissez faire approach extended to all defence markets, not just shipbuilding, and has 
meant the MoD has fewer options when it comes to procurement. Table 5.1 shows all the 
firms receiving contracts over £100 million in 2002/03. Altogether there are 27 firms receiving 
contracts over £100 million however this suggests a greater degree of competition than is truly 
present. 
BAe Systems is the parent company of BAe Systems (Operations) Ltd, BAe Systems 
Electronics Ltd and Royal Ordnance PLC (all of which it wholly owns). In addition to this it 
has various joint ventures on the list. MBDA UK Ltd is owned by BAe Systems (37.5%), EADS 
(37.5%) and Finmeccanica (25%) whilst BAe Systems (50%) and Finmeccanica (50%) jointly 
own Alenia Marconi Systems Ltd. Fleet Support Ltd is a joint venture between BAe Systems 
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(50%) and Vosper Thornycroft (50%) who have three wholly owned subsidiaries receiving lower 
value contracts (between £25 and £50 million). Payments to NETMA represent payments 
towards the Typhoon (previously called the Eurofighter). As each partner country in the 
project receives the value of work roughly in proportion to the proportion of aircraft they are 
buying these can be viewed as payments towards BAe Systems (for the airframe) and Rolls 
Royce (for the engines). AWE Management Ltd is an equal joint venture between British 
Nuclear Fuels, Serco and Lockheed Martin (with the latter two also appearing separately). 
The Westland Group PLC is part of AugustaWestland, which in turn is equally jointly owned 
by Finmeccanica and GKN. Devonport Royal Dockyards Ltd is also a joint venture between 
Halliburtons (51%), Balfour Beatty (24.5%) and the Weir Group (24.5%). Finally the Defence 
Science and Technology Laboratory, ABRO and DARA are all parts of the Ministry of Defence 
itself. 
Therefore including these ownership structures suggests there is less competition than just 
the number of firms receiving contracts would suggest. However the structure of firms receiving 
payments of a lower value also distort the level of competition when their various subsidiaries 
win contracts separately. An example of this is Thales whose various firms were paid at least 
£230 during this period yet no single part was paid more than £100m. Although the MoD only 
releases how much an organisation was paid in bands, for example £50 - 100m, it is possible 
to estimate how much independent firms, for example BAe Systems or Thales, earned. If the 
mid point of each band is used combined with splitting payments for joint ventures according 
to a firm's share in the project, only 3 firms were paid over £500m, 6 firms £250 - 500m and 
a further 18 firms £100 - 250m. 
The argument of this chapter does not concern the oversight of consolidation, as this has 
already occurred, rather it focuses on how contracts ought to be distributed amongst the 
remaining firms. It is assumed that only two firms remain with different costs and that the 
MoD can either continue with competition as usual, with the possibility of a monopoly, or 
alternatively intervene in the market and distribute the contracts between the two firms so 
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that there can always be competition between them if needed. The first approach offers short 
term efficiency whilst the second offers long term efficiency. The question that arises is which 
offers the greater efficiency overall, short run or long run? 
The model is based on a need for the government to intervene in the market and determine 
the market structure. Given that only two firms remain, it is possible for the lower cost firm 
to win a monopoly in the first period due to their cost advantage. Therefore if the government 
wants a second firm to remain in the industry to limit the rents available to the other firm in 
the second period, the government has to intervene in the market to ensure the higher cost 
firm has work and can survive. In order to achieve this it has to offer each firm a contract 
for which the dominant strategy is to accept. In essence this requires the other firm to accept 
a contract if the former strays from the equilibrium path. The punishment of no work, and 
consequent closure of the firm, provides sufficient incentive on the equilibrium path for each 
firm to accept the contract (if they are designed correctly). Thus the government has to design 
contracts acceptable to both firms if both firms are to survive. This chapter suggests this is 
possible and that the loss of short term efficiency involved is more than compensated for by 
the gain in long term efficiency. 
Section 1 reviews the existing literature whilst section 2 introduces the basic model. Some 
extensions are also presented in section 3 with fixed costs introduced in section 4 and capacity 
constraints in sections 5. Section 6 discusses the allocation of rent before section 7 concludes. 
5.1 Existing literature 
The literature on procurement in general is vast. However there are distinct areas relevant to 
this paper, namely relating procurement to the industrial structure, split award contracts and 
dynamic issues. The literature relating procurement to market structure is small, but there 
has been particular mention of it in relation to defence. 
Kovacic and Smallwood (1994) suggest two ways in which the horizontal integration occur- 
ring in the United States military aircraft sector can be controlled by the government. Firstly 
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the legal system grants the right to the government to approve or reject proposed mergers in 
an industrial sector. Secondly the government controls the distribution of contracts between 
the firms and is in a position to determine the optimal market structure accordingly. They 
assume competition is a desirable feature to be maintained in relevant product markets as it 
fosters not only design competition but also price competition. Therefore the optimal market 
structure ought to maintain as many rivalries as possible. Anton and Yao (1990) provide 
a survey of empirical research into defence procurement. After competition for production 
has taken place savings are observed in all bar one of the studies. However when start-up 
costs are excluded savings cannot be guaranteed as a consequence of competition suggesting 
competition is a measure that ought to be used with caution. The criticisms the authors level 
at the studies mean forecasting when to employ competition in production is unlikely to be 
reliable. As such competition will not always ensure lower prices. 
There is also some theoretical literature linking procurement to the market structure. The 
first strand considers whether contracts should be split or not. Anton and Yao (1989) compare 
split award contracts with winner takes all contracts when the market consists of two firms 
possessing complete information. Their positive analysis suggests split awards being Pareto 
optimal from the viewpoint of firms, with each firm earning a profit equal to their efficiency 
gain relative to the sole source cost of their opponent. Although the firms will coordinate their 
split where the project costs are lowest, the procuring agent has to pay rents to both firms. 
As such the power lies with the firms and not with the agent. They extend their analysis 
(1992) to consider the same problem in the presence of imperfect knowledge. Asymmetric 
information with regards to costs makes it harder for firms to coordinate their bids so a split 
award contract can be Pareto improving for both firms and the government in comparison 
with a sole sourcing contract. Unfortunately their analysis does not extend to providing an 
optimal purchasing system and views only a static problem; after repetitions each firm will 
gain knowledge of its competitors costs, lessening the asymmetries and making coordination 
in split award contracts more likely. Thus returning to the complete information case any aim 
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of maintaining competition through the use of split award competitions comes at a cost to 
the procuring agent. 
A second strand considers whether a monopoly or duopoly is preferable. Auriol and Laffont 
(1992) use a Baron-Myerson type model to compare the optimal industry structure dependent 
upon when the cost characteristics are learnt. A regulator exists whose aim is to maximise a 
utilitarian social welfare function in the presence of information asymmetries. Their general 
result is duopoly is preferable when the industrial structure is determined before the costs are 
known whereas a monopoly is preferable after the costs have been discovered. Under duopoly 
there is the replication expense of fixed costs, though they identify two ways this is beneficial. 
The first is the sampling effect; in duopoly there is a higher probability of obtaining a draw of 
a low cost firm than in monopoly. The yardstick effect, the second, operates by limiting the 
scope for information rents as the competition allows correlation of efficiency parameters. The 
final benefit of a duopoly occurs when production costs are convex. If the efficiency parameters 
are not too different in magnitude then the optimal contract is a split award contract with the 
split determined according to the marginal costs of production. In comparison McGuire and 
Riordan (1995) find that single provision of a good is appropriate if the social cost of profit 
is positive but small. Further, information asymmetries bias the optimal market structure in 
favour of a single provider as the economies of scale increase. Thus the cost function faced by 
firms in each industry seem to favour a different optimal market structure. 
In Dana and Spier (1994) the government auctions the production right to two firms with 
the market structure determined by their bids, however the government retains the right to 
produce if firm costs' are too high (and thus maximise utilitarian welfare). Under complete 
information any increase in the private sector production costs moves the market structure 
away from a monopoly towards a duopoly. Under incomplete information a similar increase 
moves the market structure away from a duopoly towards either a monopoly or government 
production. As monopoly rights are valuable to the firms they are prepared to bid more in 
order to win them in order to differentiate themselves from their opponents. Riordan and 
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Sappington (1987) look at how a monopoly franchise ought to be awarded. An increase in 
the number of firms bidding has no effect on the overall market price or quantity whist the 
franchise fee is non-decreasing in the number of bidders. They assume the marginal costs of 
production are sufficiently high relative to the fixed costs so only one award will be made, 
even if the firm turns out to be a high cost type. 
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) look at how auctions operate when the identity 
of the buyer of an indivisible object affects the other bidders. This manifests itself as an 
externality between bidders; if the sum of the externalities associated with any sale is larger 
than all the valuations associated with it the seller is better off not selling the object at all 
(though revenue is still received). Also differing from standard auctions is that the seller can 
obtain surplus from all bidders even if they do not win the object. The application of their 
paper is how Ukraine and the world should deal with the nuclear weapons they inherited from 
the Soviet Union, namely the international community should pay Ukraine to dismantle their 
nuclear weaponary. Although the MoD has to sell the procurement contract any externalities 
it creates, for example a monopoly, needs to be considered. 
There are some papers which consider how a project should be procured when it is necessary 
for information to be ascertained before production takes place. Rob (1986) looks at how 
learning buys can affect the optimal procurement contract. Firms are able to make draws 
from a cost function with full memory at a fixed cost but the technology associated with 
any draw is partially transferable between firms. The government faces the choice of how 
to split the contract to procure a given quantity. The advantages of possible lower draws 
(through increased investment by firms knowing they will produce more of the good) has to 
be balanced against the advantages of a larger proportion being awarded competitively with 
less uncertainty. With a small number of bidders it is more likely a time sequential split award 
contract will be awarded to lessen monopoly rents. The split here is to lower production costs 
for one project and not a series of projects (similar to the RAND analysis of the Type 45). 
Anton and Yao (1987) investigate how learning by doing affects second sourcing contracts. 
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They assume the government needs to procure a fixed quantity. Initially they procure some of 
the good from a developer with the remainder being auctioned through a sealed bid auction 
(after information regarding costs has been ascertained); if an auction is not feasible an old 
system can be purchased for a known price. The government, in determining what proportion 
to offer for initial development and what contracts to offer, has to trade-off the benefits of 
more competitive bidding in the auction against truthful revelation by the developer. As such 
it might be more profitable for a developer to misrepresent initial costs knowing they will 
not subsequently gain the opportunity to bid for the remainder of the production. This can 
be overcome through the use of a cut-off mechanism; when reported development costs are 
sufficiently low a sealed bid auction is held for the remaining production whilst if high costs 
are reported the old system is purchased. However the threat of the cut-off has to be credible 
if it is to work. 
These two papers think about the dynamics of a single project whereas all the papers 
before it are concerned with a single, static project. However as mentioned by Kovacic and 
Smallwood (1994) the government can determine the market for many periods ahead through 
their actions in any one period. Consequently if a single source contract is entered into one 
period then there might not be another firm present in the next period for dual sourcing to be 
possible. This can result not only in increased prices charged to the government but also in 
increased production costs for the firms. The final group of papers considers the dynamics of 
procurement. Luton and McAfee (1986) assume there are two projects to be auctioned in two 
periods. At the start of each period the firms obtain a cost draw from a common distribution, 
in period 2 each firm's cost is its lowest draw. The winner of the first auction has an advantage 
going into the second as it knows it was the lowest cost producer in the first period. As such it 
is optimal for the government to discriminate between against the incumbent firm in order to 
minimise total government expenditure: the rival wins in the second period if it beats the first 
period price of the incumbent. Therefore it is possible the high cost firm will produce in the 
second period (though this is balanced against the first firm having to bid more aggressively in 
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the second period). Their analysis assumes the number of bidders is the same in both periods. 
Lewis and Yildirim (2002) model how to manage dynamic competition where there is 
learning by doing. They assume the presence of two firms each facing the same cost structure: 
c(xi, ci) = c(xi) + ci where xi represents how much firm i has previously produced and ci 
is an idiosyncratic error (drawn from a common distribution and changing each period) - 
there are no fixed costs. The paper proves the existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium. 
The government making the procuring decision has to choose at what speed to realise the 
learning by doing effect. As b approaches one the expected probability that either firm is 
chosen to produce approaches one half; in the infinite horizon model the gains from learning 
by doing are bounded below so both firms should eventually reach the horizon meaning in 
each period the government chooses the firm with the lowest idiosyncratic cost. However as 
the future becomes relatively less important the opportunity of market tipping (monopoly) 
occurs. The size of the experience effect determines this; if it is sufficiently large then this 
offsets the benefits of maintaining competition. However even after tipping has occurred from 
the assumption regarding no fixed costs they assume the uncompetitive firm remains in the 
market so as to limit the rent available to its competitor. 
The paper of most relevance is Klotz and Chatterjee (1995) as this is premised on actions 
taken in the first period directly affecting the actions that can be take in the second period. 
They model two firms competing for two repeated procurement project from the government. 
The firms costs are composed of random draws from identical cost distributions combined 
with, in the second period, learning by doing (dependent on the amount produced in the 
first period. ) As there is a fixed cost of entry to the auction for the procurement contract 
the government guarantees each firm a fixed proportion of the contract so the fixed costs 
can be recovered before auctioning the remainder of the contract. The government's policy 
variable is the amount of the contract that should be auctioned - it has to be sufficient for 
the firms to recover their entry costs but not too large so one firm moves down the learning 
curve restricting the effectiveness of the second period competition. The paper concludes that 
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there are benefits to dual sourcing to counteract the problems winner takes all contracts can 
induce in the first period (for example the movement down the learning curve. ) This paper 
differs from Klotz and Chatterjee by using a different procurement mechanism and assuming 
non-identical costs for the two firms. 
5.2 The model 
Assume the government has a project that takes two periods to complete (with the project 
having the same size in both periods). The government values the completed project at w. 
This does not necessarily reflect the social valuation of the project as it could, for example, 
suggest the maximum price the government is willing to pay a domestic firm to undertake the 
production (and hence w would equal the non-domestic cheapest price plus any associated 
costs from not procuring nationally). For some reason the firms who undertake the project 
are unable to commit to their actions in the second period at the start of the first period; the 
firms might not know what the costs in the second period will be or alternatively the firms 
might not be willing to enter into long-term agreements so as to retain flexibility in future 
periods. Equally the problem could be the government is unable to enter into a long-term 
agreement with firms so as not to bind the hands of its successors or does not know what 
the second period project will encompass. Due to problems with commitment in the second 
period it means the government is unable to write a complete contract to cover both periods 
at the start of the project. At the start of the second period the project has a scrap value of 
u and a second period completion value of v where u+v=w. Furthermore it is assumed the 
discount factor equals one. 
The government is unable to undertake the project itself. There are two firms remaining 
in the industry. If either firm receives no production contracts in any period then the firm 
leaves the industry. One possible explanation is with no work to do the skilled employees will 
leave the company and find employment elsewhere leaving the firm void of skills for future 
work. It is assumed that firms have constant average and marginal costs of production. It 
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Figure 5.1: Dual sourcing possibilities 
iA RiR bi wins 
Pi monopoly 
RAA 
duopoly i monopoly 
jAjRiR 
j wins 
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bi wins duopoly 
RAAj wins 
j monopoly duopoly j monopoly 
i wins jRiRbi wins i monopoly 
j wins AAj wins 
duopoly i monopoly duopoly 
jRiRbi wins 
If It duopoly 
AAj wins 
j monopoly duopoly j monopoly 
is also assumed that firm one is more efficient than firm two so firm one's costs are 01 whilst 
firm two's are , 
ß, with a<0. Furthermore it is assumed that neither firm faces any capacity 
constraints and that the project itself is perfectly divisible. Finally the government is unable 
to exploit its position meaning the total price of the contracts offered to a firm over the two 
periods has to at least equal the costs incurred by the firm. 
Figure 5.1 represents the sequence of moves in the first period. At the start of the period 
the government offers firm ia contract which specifies the split of the contract the government 
wishes it to produce and the price the government is willing to pay for it. Firm i can either 
accept (A) or reject (R) the contract. If firm i accepts the contract then firm j is offered 
its own contract for the remaining proportion of the first period project and the price the 
government is willing to pay. It too then chooses whether to accept or reject. If it chooses 
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to accept then both firms produce according to their contracts and the first period ends. If 
either firm rejects their contract then the contract which they rejected is offered to the other 
on the same terms (for the same proportion and the same price). They then choose whether 
to accept or reject. If they both reject the same contract then the government auctions the 
contract (represented by b in figure 5.1). The government runs the auction by starting with 
its valuation and decreasing the price until one firm says they will not be willing to produce 
that proportion of the contract for a price below it. The other firm then wins the auction to 
produce that proportion at that price. If both firms report the same price then, as a tie-break, 
the firm with the lowest cost is awarded the contract. This auction avoids a probabilistic and 
inefficient outcome. As figure 5.1 shows at the end of the first period it is possible for either 
firm to have a monopoly or for both firms to remain in business. 
The sequence of moves in the second period depends on the number of firms remaining in 
the industry after the first period. If both firms survived then the second period proceeds 
in the same way as the first provided both firms accepted their first period contracts (as 
described in the previous paragraph). If one or both firms rejected their first period contract 
the government will offer their second period contract to the other firm. If only one firm 
remains, either i or J, then the government and the firm have to negotiate directly with one 
another to determine the price of producing the whole of the second period. As such the 
distribution of the contracts in the first period has a direct effect on the procurement options 
in the second period. Let 01 represent the proportion of work firm two undertakes in period 
one and 02 its proportion in period two. Firm one's proportion of the work is I- 01 and I- 02 
in period one and two respectively. Assume firm two's contract is resolved first each period, 
though on the equilibrium path it makes no difference to the outcome. 
The aim of the government is to complete the project at the lowest possible total cost. One 
rule the government has to follow to ensure consistency for the industry is if the government 
has offered a contract with a certain proportion in the first period at a certain price, then if 
the firm accepts that contract it will be offered at least as much in quantity terms to produce 
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in the following period. Therefore deciding on the value of 01 will impact not only on the 
first period price but also on the second. As the government sets the rules for the game 
and responds to the actions of the firms, the players of the game are the two firms. In each 
period each firm has to choose a price at which they will accept their portion of the contract 
and a price at which they will undertake the remaining portion. Therefore each firm has an 
acceptance function pt(0, n) - R, where i=1,2, t=1,2 and n represents the number of 
firms in the industry in period t. The acceptance function expresses the unit price at which 
they will produce in either period depending upon the number of firms remaining. To reach 
the price of the contract, the acceptance this price has to be multiplied by the proportion 
specified by the contract. The solution concept employed is a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
After the game has been solved to reveal the interactions between the firms the second stage 
is to devise contracts the government can offer so the firms accept whilst it achieves the lowest 
possible price. 
In the second period there are three possible industrial structures: firm one has a monopoly, 
firm two has a monopoly or both firms are present in the industry. First assume only one 
firm remains in the second period. In this case the firm will exploit its monopoly position and 
charge a price of v as the government is unable to obtain a lower price elsewhere. Now assume 
both firms remain in the second period after accepting their first period contracts. The price 
achieved in the final auction for firm one's portion of the project is ß; firm two will only drop 
out of the auction when the price reaches (1 - 0)0 to ensure no loss is incurred whilst firm 
one would be prepared to let the price fall to (1 - 9)a before leaving the auction. The result 
is firm one wins the auction at price (1 - O), Q. Firm two will therefore accept the contract if 
the price, (1 - O)p2, is at least (1 - 0)0. Firm one will also accept only if p2 > 0; if the price 
is lower firm one can go on and in win in the ensuing auction as firm two will also reject the 
contract. As such the lowest price achievable for firm one's portion of the contract is (1 - B)ß. 
In the preceding interactions for firm two's portion of the second period project the auction 
price will be 0,3 for the same reason as before; firm two will drop out of the auction if it would 
186 
make a loss (when the price falls below 00) whilst firm one could continue as it would still 
make a profit meaning it would win. As firm one would win the auction it will only accept the 
contract if the price, p2, is at least 00 whilst firm two will only accept the contract if it covers 
costs (again p2 > 3). For the government, seeking to achieve the lowest possible price if both 
firms remain on the equilibrium path the minimum price it can pay in the second period is 
/3; the price will only be above 0 if the government has offered, and a firm accepted, a below 
cost contract in the first period (as the price of both contracts, if accepted, has to cover the 
costs incurred). 
If one or both firms have rejected their contracts in the first period then, by the rules of 
the game, their second period contract is offered to the other firm. If firm one rejects its first 
period contract then unless the government allows for the second period price being (1 - B)ß 
or higher firm two will have to reject the contract to produce firm one's second period portion 
meaning firm one will win the resulting auction at price (1 - B), ß. This results in firm one 
being punished for rejecting its contract by earning a positive profit in the second period! 
Conversely if firm one rejects its first period contract it will always be punished as firm one 
can always win the auction for price 00 earning a profit of B(ß - a) or even greater if p2 > 
the punishment means firm two does not produce in the second period and has to leave the 
industry. In order for firm two to be able to punish any deviation by firm one it is necessary for 
the government to give firm one a second period contract priced above its production costs of 
at least (1- 9), 3. This coincides with firm one's second period actions, as it will always refuse 
any contract with p2 < ß. As setting p2 -0 results 
in a second period profit the government 
can, to achieve the lowest possible cost, recoup it, either partly or wholly, through firm one's 
first period contract; should this first period below cost contract be rejected then there is an 
effective punishment available in the second period. Therefore p2 >ß and p2 > 0. 
In the first period firm one knows it will be making a profit of at least (1 - 0)(3 - a) in 
the second period if it accepts its first period contract whilst firm two will not make a loss 
if they both remain in the industry. When determining the actions for firm one's portion of 
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the first period project there axe three possibilities: either firm two has already accepted its 
contract to produce the remaining proportion or either firm one or firm two has won it in 
the auction. First assume the former, namely firm two has already accepted its contract at 
price Op 2. Therefore in figure 5.1 the top row is under consideration. By firm two's individual I 
rationality constraint the lowest price it will bid in the auction is (I - 0)-d where -(T ensures 
firm two earns a profit of O(p2 + P2 - 20) + (I - 0)(pl - [3) over the two periods. If firm 122 
two wins a monopoly in the first period it can charge v in the second period however it is 
unwilling to use the profit it could make if it lost the auction to lower its reservation price 
in the auction. If it loses the auction it will gain a second period profit of (1 - 0)(pl -, 3) 2 
as firm one rejected their first period contract whilst it will gain its own profit of O(p2 - 3) 2 
from accepting its second period contract. Whilst firm two will not compete away any first 
period profit it has earned if O(p2 _, 3) >0 it does have to recoup through a higher reservation 1 
price any first period loss if it is incurred, O(p2 _ 3) < 0. Accordingly firm two's individual 
0(p2_, 3)1+(l _0)(Zj_)3)+V_O = o(p2_0)+(I_O)(PI _0) rationality constraint is minf 0,1 22 
where minf 0, O(p 2- O)J represents any first period loss. Rearranging the constraint gives I 
0 _1_ 
[V 
_ Op2 _ (1 - O)p' + minf 0, 
O(p2 
-, 3)1]. Firm one can only obtain its second - 1-0 221 
period profit of (I - 0)(p2l - oz) if it accepts its first period contract; by rejecting the contract 21 
the government can offer firm one's second period portion of the project to firm two for the 
1 same price of (1 - O)P2 which will be accepted as A>0. This means firm one will leave 2- 
the auction when the price reaches (I - O)oz as it has to cover its costs. The result of the 
auction is a price of maxf oz, -dJ with firm one winning if a< -d. Before the auction both firms 
have an opportunity to accept or reject the contract. Firm two will accept the contract if 
p1l ý! maxf a, -dJ. A basic requirement for acceptance is that the price should at least afford 
zero profit meaning pi > -EE. If pi > -d >a firm two will go on and loose the auction even 
though it would not have made a loss by accepting the contract. If pi >a> rx firm two will 
go on and win the auction but at a lower price than if it had accepted the contract. Finally 
if cx > pi > rx firm two, by rejecting the contract, will go on and win the auction at a higher 
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price than offered by the contract. Thus firm two will accept if pi > max{ a, ä}. Firm one 
also has the opportunity to accept or reject the contract. It will accept the contract, by its 
individual rationality constraint, if pi > 2a - p2. This automatically holds by the rules of the 
game as the contract prices for each firm have to cover their production costs over the two 
periods, pi + p2 > 2cx, but at the lower bound for pi this leads to zero profit over the two 
periods. However if it rejects there is the possibility of winning the auction, if a< ix, but as 
the second period profit would be lost this is only profitable if the first period auction offers 
a greater profit than accepting the government's contracts over two periods, ä> pi + p2 - a. 
To summarise if firm two has already secured its portion of the production by accepting its 
contract firm one will accept its first period contract if a> -d and pi > 2a-p2 or if aG cý and 
pl >a+c- p2, firm two will accept the contract if p} > max{ a, cý} otherwise the auction will 
be reached with firm one leaving the bidding at oz and firm two leaving at -d. On the course 
of play firm two will not produce firm one's portion; firm one will always accept its contract 
unless it could go on and win the auction resulting in a higher profit overall. 
If firm two has won its portion of the work in the auction for price Og then it is not 
guaranteed any second period production as it rejected its own contract. Thus the penultimate 
row in figure 5.1 is under consideration. If firm one accepts its first period contract then firm 
two can only produce in the second period if firm one rejects one of the contracts. This affects 
firm two's reservation price in the auction; although by winning the auction it will gain a 
monopoly the profit if it looses the auction is only (1 - 0)(p2 - , 
Q) now. This means the 
reservation price becomes c=ß- -- [v - 0,3 - (1 - 0)p2 + min{ 0,0(g - Q)}]. It also affects 
firm one's reservation price as firm two's rejection of the contract means it will be offered a 
contract for 0 at price 0p2 in the second period as long as it either accepts its contract or wins 
the auction. In the auction firm one is biding for its survival and therefore will leave the auction 
when the price goes below (1- O)0 with 0= 110 
(01 - 0p2) ensuring firm one earns zero profit 
over the two periods. The result of the auction is a price of max{O, S} with firm one winning if 
0<s. Firm two's acceptance of the contract remains unaltered as it will accept the contract 
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only if p1l ý! maxf By firm one's individual rationality constraint) if it were to accept its 
first period contract, its true reservation price now falls to 110 
[2a P2 2 _0U_0 
2_ (I - 0)p1J as 
the profit in the second period increases to (1 _ 0)(pl _ Ce) + 0(p2 _ Ce). It is worth noting 22 
this is automatically satisfied by the requirement on the government to cover the costs of the 
firm-' However even if the contract price satisfies the individual rationality constraint it will 
still be rejected if,; is sufficiently high to allow firm one to win the auction and make a greater 
first period profit than is available in the second period if it were to accept its contract. As 
firm one makes a second period profit of 0(p2 - a) irrespective of whether or not it accepts 2 
its contract means the contract will be rejected if 0<ý and ý; > p1l + p2l - Ce. On the course 2 
of play firm two will not produce firm one's portion of the project; firm one can either accept 
the contract and enjoy the additional second period profit resulting from firm one's rejection 
of its first period contract or reject the contract and win the auction earning an even greater 
overall profit. 
The final alternative, for firm one's second period production, is that firm one has already 
won firm two's portion at price h; it makes no difference whether firm one has won firm two's 
portion by accepting the contract or winning the auction as the consequences, with regards to 
the second period, are the same. By firm one's individual rationality constraint it is unable to 
go below (I - 0)-y in the auction, where -y = oz - -L- [v -a+ O(p2 - a) + minf 0, O(h - 1-0 2 
since winning the auction results in it winning the monopoly but still maintains the profit 
of 0 (p2 _ 0z) 2 in the second period (following firm two's rejection of its first period contract) 
and any profit it may have gained from winning firm one's portion of the contract. Firm two, 
having rejected its contract, will be offered firm one's contract in the second period if it wins 
the auction (as both firms have rejected their first period contract they have to be offered the 
other firm's contract in the second period). This means its reservation price in the auction 
is 77 = 20 21; it is willing to bid away its second period profit as it can only obtain 
it by - P2) 
'In order for firm one to accept pl >1 [2a - Oa - Op2 - (1 - O)pl] or, rearranged, 
(1 - 0)(pl + pl) 1-0 2212 
2ce - Oa - Op2 2. As p1l + p2l 2ce, (1 0) (p1l + p2l) >2 (1 - 0) ce. As such firm one will always accept if 112 
2(l - O)a > 2a - Oa - 022 which only requires p2 > Ce. 2- 
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winning the auction. Ergo the price resulting from the auction is (I - 0) maxf -y, 771 with firm 
one winning if -y :ýq. Firm two will only accept the contract if p1l ýý maxf -y, 771. Firm one will 
accept the contract so long as it offers a greater profit than can be obtained by rejecting it given 
that, by accepting its own contract, it will gain a monopoly. If -Y > 77 then firm one will lose the 
auction so will accept the contract only if 0 (h - cz) + (I - 0) (pl, - a) +v-a0 (h - a) +0 (p22 - ce). 1 
This, however, always holds. 2 If firm one can win the auction, < 77, it will only accept the 
contract if 0 (h - a) + (I - 0) (p', - oz) +v-a. ý! 0 (h - a) + (1 - 0) (77 - cv. ) +v-a., or, when 
simplified, p11 ý! 77; since the same profit will be made in the second period it will either accept 
the contract or win the auction depending on which offers the greater first period price. Again 
on the course of play firm two will not produce firm one's portion of the project; the only 
condition under which firm one will reject its first period contract is the one which results in 
firm two being unable to accept the contract and unable to win the auction. 
As the actions for firm one's first period portion have been specified the play for firm two's 
first period portion can be derived. By backwards induction the different subsequent courses 
of play have been detailed above meaning firm two knows how firm one will respond when 
firm two's portion of the project is contracted in the first period. It is important to note that 
firm two, on the expected course of play, is unable to gain firm one's first period portion of 
the contract - firm one will only reject the contract it is offered if it can win the auction and 
earn a larger overall profit. The consequence for firm two is that unless it accepts its contract 
or wins the auction it will not survive the first period. As such the baseline if it were to accept 
it contract priced at Bpi is an overall profit of O(p2 + p2 - 2ß) if firm one subsequently accepts 
its contract or 0(pi + p2 - 2/3) + (1 - 8)(pi2 - 0) if it rejects. 
Given pi + p2 > 20, as the 
government has to cover the costs incurred if the contracts are accepted by the rules of the 
game, firm two will not make a loss if it accepts the contract and therefore there is no reason 
2The inequality simplifies to v> (1- B) (2a - pi) - Opt. As pZ > /3 the greatest value p2 can 
take, given the 
maximum the government will pay in a period is v and a minimum of 00 is required 
for firm two's contract, 
is p2 =i Ba . 
As pi + p2 > 2a, the minimum value pi can take is pi = 2a -iB. 
When this is put into the 
rearranged inequality it is clear that it holds. 
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for the firm not to survive to the second period. However the question of whether firm two 
can make a higher profit if it rejects its contract remains. In the auction for firm two's portion 
of the project firm two's reservation price, a, is dependent on whether or not firm one accepts 
its own contract. If firm one goes on to accept its contract then firm two will be offered no 
contracts in the second period and therefore is unable to bid below its production cost as 
it cannot recoup any losses meaning 0a1 = 00. If firm one rejects its contract then, if firm 
two wins the auction, it is able to obtain a second period profit of (1 - 0) (p2 - , 
ß) meaning a 
reservation price of 992 where Q2 =B (1 - 0)p2]; it only obtains the second period profit 
if it wins the first period auction. In the auction firm one will have a reservation price of Op. 
By winning the auction firm one makes a profit of 9(p - a) + (1 - B) (max{pi, 771 - a) +v-a. 
If firm one looses the auction but goes on to accept its own contract it will lead to a profit of 
(1- B) (pi - a) + 0(p2 - a) + (1- 0)(p2 - a) meaning firm one's reservation value in the auction 
is pl =e [(1 - 0) (P1 +p2 - max{pl, r7}) + 0(a + p2) - v]. If firm one goes on to accept its 
own contract at price pi then a1 > pl meaning firm two will always lose the auction. 3 If firm 
one rejects its first period contract, because it can win the. ensuing auction, then the second 
period profit falls by (1 - 0)(p2 - a) meaning the reservation price in the first period auction 
becomes p2 = p2 -B (v - a). However o72 > P2 meaning firm one will win the auction again. 4 
As such firm two is unable to win the auction for its first period portion of the contract - 
if it wishes to remain in the second period it has to accept the contract offered to it by the 
government. For completeness firm one will accept firm two's contract if pi > max{p2, a2}, 
the price has to be higher than can be obtained in the auction. On the course of play firm 
two has no choice but to accept the contract offered by the government; if it rejects firm one 
will gain the production either by accepting the contract or winning the auction. 
3If 0-1 > pi then ß>B [(1 - 0) (pi + p2 - pi) + O(a + p2) - v] as a-1 means firm one accepts its contract. 
Rearranging the inequality yields v> (1 - 8)p2 + Opt - B(ß - a). As the right-hand side 
is increasing in both 
p2 and the the maximum value they can take is Opt + (1 - O)p2 = v. Substituting into the inequality and 
rearranging gives 0> -B(ß - a) which always holds due to the cost differential. 
41f QZ > P2 then B 
[)3 - (1 - ! ß)p2] > p2 -B (v - a). Rearranging this gives v> Op2 + 
(1 - O)p2 - (ß - a) 
which always holds as v> Op2 + (1 - B)p2. 
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Given the actions of the firms in relation to the various prices offered by the government are 
described above it falls on the government to determine the optimal prices for the contracts. 
How optimal is defined from the government's viewpoint is contentious. The previous chapter 
described the MoD's original policy as optimal prices being determined by the market in a 
series of separate competitions but later evolving to include wider factors which, although 
relevant factors were listed, were never fully specified (for example weighting by importance. ) 
For the purpose of this chapter optimal refers to those prices that achieve the lowest overall 
cost to the government over the two periods of the project. A defence industrial strategy 
is defined as a series of contracts, which both firms will accept, that ensures an industrial 
structure which delivers the project for the lowest total cost. In figure 5.1 the equilibrium 
path in both period is for firm 2 to accept (A) followed by firm 1 also accepting (A). 
Proposition 10 If the optimal industrial structure is a duopoly, the objective function of the 
defence industrial strategy is min 0(pi + p2) + (1 - 0) (pi + p2) subject to: (1) pi + p2 > 2, Q, (2) 
pi+pl> 2a, (3)p2>, 0, (4)p ä>>0and(5)pi+pz-2oz>ýi-a. 
This proposition gives the necessary conditions for both firms to accept the contracts 
offered them if the government views a duopoly as the optimal industrial structure. The 
first and second conditions are the firms' individual rationality constraints which, according 
to the rules of the game, have to be adhered to by the government if the firms accept their 
contracts. The third and fourth conditions reflect the actions of both firms in the second 
period as both will reject any contract priced below a unit price of ß. The fifth condition is 
an incentive compatibility constraint, namely the inequality that needs to be satisfied if firm 
one is to accept its first period contract; the left-hand side gives the profit over two periods 
from accepting the contract, when both sides are multiplied by 1-0, whilst the right-hand 
side is the first period profit from rejecting and winning the auction. Condition 1 means 
firm 
two will accept its first period contract and condition 3 means it will accept its second period 
contract. Condition 4 means either firm will accept firm one's second period contract 
hence 
condition 5 is necessary to ensure both firms, on the equilibrium path, accept their contracts 
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(with condition 2 ensuring firm 1 can recoup its costs. ) 
The lowest possible total cost for the project is for the government to pay each firm's cost of 
production whilst minimising the size of firm two' portion, 0= Bmin (p1 +p2) + (1- Bmin) (p1 +p2 ) 
where 0 represents the total cost of the contract. Rearranging (5) and substituting pi +p2 = 2a 
into it yields the requirement that a>d in order for firm one to accept its first period 
contract - firm one will only accept a contract offering zero profit overall if it is unable to 
make a profit in the first period auction. Substituting the value of ä into a> cx gives 
v- (1- 0) (ß - a) > 0p2 + (1- 0)p 2- min{ 0,0 (pi - a) }. As the right-hand side is increasing in 
p2 the government needs to minimise this to maximise the range in which a> zx. However as 
p2 > ß, the lowest price the government can offer firm two in period two is p2 = ß. Given firm 
two's individual rationality constraint the government needs to set pi = ß; this coincides with 
minimising the right-hand side of the constraint. As the right-hand side is also increasing in P2 1 
the government needs to minimise its value, so p' From firm one's individual rationality 2 
constraint this implies its first period price is pl' 2a -P in the first. As such the 
government is able to limit the price of each firm to its costs of production if 0-a< 
with the lowest cost available if it holds when 0= meaning 0= 2a + 20(3 - a). 
If this does not hold, a< id, then the government has to offer more in the first period to 
O(p2 induce firm one to accept its first period contract. From (5) it is necessary that minf 0,1 
a) I+ (I - O)p1j - Op22 ý! (I - 0) (a +, 3) - v. To ensure this holds the government, again, needs to 
minimise p2 and maximise p2 meaning p2=2= )3. Given firm one has to be paid 
A in 211 P2 
the second period the lowest price achievable in the first period is pl Firm one 1 1-0 
cannot be restricted to zero profit as firm two is unable to provide the necessary constraint; 
firm one has to earn a profit over the two periods equivalent to the profit that it could earn by 
going to the auction in the first period. However given that it will earn a second period rent 
this can be used to reduce the first period cost of the project meaning -a need not be paid. 
., is V) =a+0+ 
0(0 - a) The total cost of the project, if )3 - ce > 
A- 
1-0 
From the government's perspective the best contract it is able to write is either a legally 
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binding, complete contract with firm one covering both periods paying ce in each period or a 
contract paying firm one 2a -v in the first and v in the second period. The first contract is 
unfeasible given the lack of commitment available, the second is unfeasible given that firm one 
could win the contract at a higher price and earn profit as the lowest price firm two can offer in 
the first period is 2ý -v whilst matching v in the second. Accordingly if the government is to 
contract and allow a monopoly in the first period the lowest price it could achieve for the whole 
contract is 20. If 0-a, < -A-, so a. > -6, then the cost of the project according to the game 1-0 
is 2a + 20,1, il, (0 - a) < 20 whilst if P-a> -A-, so a< -d, it is a+0+ Omil (0 - a) -A< 2)3. 1-0 
Thus if the government splits the contract in the first period and awards work to a firm that 
is less efficient the government will be able to complete the project at a lower overall cost as 
firm two's presence in the industry in the second period limits the profit firm one is able to 
earn - long term efficiency requires short term inefficiency as the higher first period costs of 
ensuring firm two remains in the industry are more than offset by the competitive benefit it 
is able to bring in the second period. 
Proposition 11 The optimal defence industrial structure Zs a duopoly. Firm two produces 
0,,, i,, for a price of 0,,, inp in both pertods. Firm one produces I-0.. j,, in 
both periods and 
rece%ves (I -0.. jý, ), 3 in period two. If 0-a< -ýL- then it earns 
(I - Oni,, )(2a - ý) in period 1-0 
one otherwise it receives (I -0.. i,, ) (a - 1"0). 
There are two comparative statics of interest. The first concerns the effect of the cost 
differential, 0-a, on the cost of the entire project. Assume 0 is fixed. If the cost differential 
is 
sufficiently small, 3-a< `3 , 
then d<& meaning firm two's buy-in price is below the price 2(1-0) 
necessary for firm one to achieve zero profit. If firm one remains on the equilibrium path it will 
accept the first period contract priced at (I - O)oZ resulting in zero profit over the two periods; 
if it rejects and leaves the equilibrium path firm two will accept the contract and obtain a 
monopoly for the second period. If the cost differential is slightly higher, 
"<0 
-a <V -0 2(1-0) - 1-0) 
then < -d <a meaning on the equilibrium path firm one will accept the first period contract 
priced at (1 - 0)& even though it could earn more in the first period by rejecting. 
Despite being 
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able to earn more, (1 - O)Zi, in the ensuing auction this is not sufficient to cover production 
costs and this loss cannot be recouped in the second period as firm one's second period portion 
will be offered to firm two who, remaining on the equilibrium path, will accept as it is priced 
at (I - O)P. Firm one is only able to earn a positive profit if the price that can be achieved 
in the auction is greater than firm one's marginal cost of production, -d > Ce. Accordingly if 
the cost differential is large, )3 - oz > firm one can reject any contract priced at (I - O)ii 
as it can win the auction at a price greater than cost meaning the government has to offer 
a contract priced at (I - O)a. Unsurprisingly the total cost of the project increases with the 
cost differential between the two firms; if the cost differential is small firm one is constrained 
to having to produce with normal profit, though if the cost differential is large then firm one 
is able to use this to earn a positive profit. 
The other comparative static of interest concerns how the total cost of the project varies 
as the split increases holding costs constant. Unsurprisingly the total cost increases in the 
split; if A ý: )3 -a then firm one is restricted to earning zero profit for all values of 0 meaning 
aý' = 2(3 - a). The cost differential represents the transfer of work from the lower cost firm 5-0 
to the higher whilst the 2 results from the rule of the same split being adhered to in both 
periods. If A<0-a then for some lower values of 0 firm one is able to earn a positive profit 
meaning ý! can be charged instead of Accordingly if A<3-a and 0<W then =0-a ao 
whilst 2(0 - oz) if 0>ý where 1- `13. The explanation for the decrease in the 80 O-a 
slope before ýstems from < 0. Although decreasing the split decreases the total cost of the 80 
project it also raises firm two's buy-in price for firm one's first period portion of the work and 
consequently makes rejecting the & contract more profitable. When 0<ý the government is 
no longer able to offer the & contract as it will be rejected and has to offer the & contract 
which earns firm one a positive profit. This means the savings associated from any further 
reductions in 0 are shared between the government and firm one resulting in the lower 
2a3oý- 
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5.3 Extensions 
The base model can be extended in a few ways. This section gives the more basic extensions 
(discount factors, different size projects, the effect of a partnership if there is a monopoly 
and a common second period cost shock) before the next two sections present more complex 
extensions: fixed costs and capacity constraints. 
5.3.1 Discount factor 
Firstly assume the second period cashflows are discounted at rate 6. The basic model demon- 
strates that in the second period both firms will charge a unit price of , 
ß, firm two will accept 
its first period contract as long as it earns zero profit overall and that c is the key value 
determining whether firm one accepts or rejects a zero profit contract in the first period. The 
presence of a discount factor increases ci to -d = /3 - as the second period monopoly 1-e 
profit holds a lower value. If a> ci then firm one will accept the zero profit contract with 
ä=a- 6(ß - a). If a>d then firm one will make a profit by rejecting the ä contract 
and only accept cx =ß- b(ß - a) - 
b(l 
B) in the first period. The presence of the discount 
factor increases both & and ä as firm one's second period rent is worth less. It also decreases 
the cost differential between firm one and firm two within which firm one can be restricted to 
earning zero profit as the ä contract is only possible if 3- cx < acv-ßý 
-e 
5.3.2 Different sizes 
The base model assumes the project is the same size in each period. Assume now that the first 
period is of size I whilst the second period is of size s. The effect is to alter the second period 
costs of firm one and firm two to sa and so respectively; the value of v remains unaltered 
(but v> so. ) Firm two's buy-in price is altered to -d 6(v-s'9) which is higher if s>1 1-0 1 
as the second period rent is reduced so the monopoly is worth less. If a> -ýý then firm one 
will accept the & contract with a=a- sj(ý3 - a); if s>I then & decreases in value as 
firm 
two's second period rent, when both firms remain, increases. If a< -a then firm one will only 
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accept the & contract with 6 ce) - the effect of s decreases the second 10 
term (given firm one's second period rent if both firms remain increases) but increases the 
third term (as the price it can get by rejecting the & contract has fallen. ) However overall the 
effect is to increase a if s>1. This means the effect of having a larger second period is to 
increase the cost differential within which the Ei contract is offered, a< and to 1-0 
increase the cost of the total project when the 6 contract has to be offered - the reverse holds 
if the second period work is smaller than the first. In essence this result is the comparative 
static for v. 
5.3.3 Partnership 
The previous chapter demonstrated the MoUs move towards a partnership model between 
it and a monopoly in the shipbuilding industry. This can be modeled by the MoD pursuing 
competition when there are two firms left in the industry but a partnership when only one 
firm is left. As before if both firms remain in the second period both charge a unit price of )3. 
However given the partnership if only firm one remains in the second period it only obtains 
ce + x(v - a), where x represents the firm's share of the rent, or loss, under the partnership, 
with the Government obtaining the remaining (I - x)(v - a). Likewise if firm two is the 
only firm in the second period then it obtains 3+ x(v - 0). The value of x depends on the 
respective bargaining power of the two sides, though the shipbuilding industry suggests the 
firm would have more power than the Government. 
The effect of having a partnership if a monopoly occurs is to increase -d as the second 
period monopoly rent is reduced (so zi xJ(v-P). ) As before firm one will accept the 1-0 
contract if a> -ZT (with the value of a unchanged as two firms are present in the second 
period) and reject the zero profit contract if a< -ýi- In this case the value of ii increases to 
6(0 - . ). xj due to the change in -d. The effect of the partnership is not only 1-0 0 
to increase the total cost of the project if the & contract is offered but also to increase the 
range in which the & contract is offered, if 3-a> then the ii contract has to be 0 1-0 
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offered. Under this procurement mechanism the MoD's current move towards a partnership 
with a monopoly needs to cease if this approach to procurement is followed as it can result in 
a higher project cost with no discernable benefit for the MoD. 
5.3.4 Common cost uncertainty 
In the model description one cause preventing the signing of a two period contract is uncer- 
tainty about second period costs. Assume in the second period there is a common project 
shock which increases the unit cost for both firms by either -- or ýý, with E< ýý and the expected 
value of the shock F= 7r-- + (1 - -F)T. Further assume both firms and the government are risk 
neutral. 
In the first period firm two will expect its costs to be 3+F meaning it will only consider 
firm one's first period portion of the project if it is offered at least Zi =3- If oz > Zi 1-0 
then firm one has no alternative but to accept the & contract where &=a- J(3 - a). If a< -ýi 
then firm one is able to earn a first period profit in the auction so the government has to offer 
the & contract where a) - Due to both firms being affected by the same 1-0 
second period cost shock both & and a are unaltered when compared to the basic model with 
a discount rate; for example firm one's expected second period rent payment increases to ý+F 
but its expected costs rise to a+F meaning it earns the same overall rent as before. However 
the presence of second period cost uncertainty increases the total cost of the project; not only 
is there a direct increase in firms' costs but also an indirect decrease as the cost differential 
6(v-O--6) 
within which firm one can be restricted to earning zero profit is reduced, a< 1-0 
5.4 Fixed costs 
The cost function of the firm has so far been composed only of variable costs. In this subsection 
it is assumed each firm has fixed costs, k for firm one and c for firm two. There are two possible 
scenarios: complete cost advantage and variable cost advantage. Complete cost advantage is 
defined as firm one having both lower variable and fixed costs than firm two so k<c and 
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a+k<0+c. Variable cost advantage occurs when firm one has a lower variable cost but 
higher fixed costs so k>c but the relationship between a+k and 3+c is unknown. 
5.4.1 Complete cost advantage 
First assume the fixed costs are large with k<c. If (I - 0) (3 - a) -k<0 then the presence 
of fixed costs limits firm one to produce in both periods at its variable plus fixed costs. Given 
that both firms remain in the second period firm one can either accept its variable plus fixed 
cost contract and earn zero profit or reject and earn a profit of (I - 0)(0 - 01) - k. As this 
is negative no profitable deviation from acceptance exists for firm one in either period, the 
profit in period two is (I - 0)(0 - a) -k<0 whilst the possible profit available in period one 
from the buy-in price, a=3- is (I - 0) (0 - a) - J(v -c -)3) -k<0. Although the 1-0 
government is able to enforce both firms earning zero profit it will only do so if it is cheaper 
than auctioning the whole contract for a total price of (I + J) (3 + c). For a split award 
contract to be cheaper requires (1 - 0)(3 - a) >k which contradicts the original assumption 
- although the government can enforce firm one earning zero profit it is cheaper to allow it to 
earn a profit and not pay the fixed costs of both firms. 
If (I - 0)(3 - a) -k>0 then firm one can make a second period profit by rejecting a 
variable plus fixed cost contract - this profit is analogous to the profit made in the absence 
of fixed costs and the game can be solved in the same way. On the equilibrium path firm two 
will receive a contract priced at 0,3 +c in the second period whilst firm one's contract is priced 
at (I - 0))3; if it is priced above this it just increases the cost of the project to the government 
whilst any lower price will be rejected as firm one can achieve this in the ensuing auction and 
earn the maximum profit available. As firm two is at a complete cost disadvantage it has no 
option but to accept its contracts, subject to its individual rationality constraint, however it is 
possible for firm one to earn a positive profit. If (i - 0) (-ýi - a) -k>0, where Zi 
6(v-, 3-c) 
1-0 
represents the minimum price firm two will charge to produce firm one's first period portion, 
firm one can earn a positive profit in the auction and therefore will reject any contract priced 
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below &= a+ (I - 
J(v-, 3-c-k). If (I - 0) (d - a) -k<0 then firm one is unable 1-0 
to make a profit in the auction and will therefore accept a variable plus fixed cost contract 
which, in the first period, offers a price of a- 6(o - a) + lj: ýý6k. The introduction of 1-0 
fixed costs raises a (the government has to pay firm one's fixed costs), -d (the possible second 
period rent is reduced by firm two's fixed costs) and Ev (the rise in -6 increases the profit firm 
one can earn). 
The question of the optimal 0 remains. If 0 ,-1_ 
k+J(v-, 6-c) then -k >0 0-ci 
meaning firm one will reject a cost based contract as it is able to earn a profit in the first 
period due to firm two's high buy-in price. Consequently (I - 0)& has to be paid to firm one 
in the first period which leads to the total cost of the project as *=3+ Joe + JO(O - a) + 
If 1<0<1k then firm one (1+6)c- 6(v-0-c-k) with 6(ý3 - a). ao 
will not be able to make a profit if it rejects a first period marginal plus fixed cost contract as 
a) -k < 0. This means firm one will be offered a price of (1-0); 3 in the first period 
with the total cost of the project reaching 0= (1+6) a+ 0(1+d)(P- a)+ (I+ J)(c+k) where 
all) =k TO (1+6)(3- a). At the upper bound the total cost of project is (I+ J)(O+c). If 0> 1-0 a 
then firm one is unable to make a profitable deviation in the second period with the result the 
government would prefer to award a sole source contract priced at (I + J) (P + c) rather than 
split the contract. As such no split in this range will be considered; even if 0 .. j,, >I- '0 
ka the 
government will not split the contract. As would be expected the presence of fixed costs does 
not alter the marginal effect of 0 on total cost for the lower values of 0; choosing the lowest 
available split leads to the lowest cost for the project. However fixed costs do rule out some 
of the splits available in their absence and thus truncates the cost curve if k is small. 
5.4.2 Variable cost advantage 
If k>c but a+k<0+c then the game is the same as for complete cost advantage. Although 
firm two has lower fixed costs the disadvantage of higher variable costs means it is unable to 
win any auction against firm one. For firm one the option of rejecting any contract priced 
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below (1 - 0)0 remains if (I - 0) (0 - a) -k>0 in the second period given the lowest firm two 
can bid is (I - 0)0 (assuming firm two has accepted its second period contract so its fixed costs 
have already been paid. ) Despite firm one's higher fixed costs these will always be covered 
by firm one accepting its second period contract, with either a or & in the first period, and 
therefore it is able to go as low as Oa in the second period auction for firm two's portion whilst 
firm two is unable to go below 0,3 +c> Ocv. In the first period firm one's options are the same 
as before whilst for firm two to deviate requires 0(ý -, 3) -c>0 where ý represents the price 
firm one will charge to produce firm two's first period portion, ý=a-1 . 
[x + 6(v -a- k)] 
where x is the firm one's project profit depending on whether & or a is charged in the first 
period. The constraint ensures both that firm two wins the auction and that it can make a 
profit if it does reject its cost contract and win the auction. Unfortunately for firm two the 
constraint never holds. 5 As such no profitable deviation from accepting its contract in both 
periods exists for firm two. Firm two is unable to take advantage of its fixed cost advantage 
due to the marginal cost disadvantage which causes it to loose any auctions (where the profit 
is made. ) However the effect of the increase in k is to increase the possibility that a monopoly 
will be awarded (as the increase in k decreases the threshold at which a monopoly is preferred, 
Omin >Ik 
Oz 
Even if a+k>3+c firm two faces the problem of earning a positive profit - firm two is 
still unable to win any auction due to its higher variable costs. The game does, however, have 
one difference to the complete cost advantage game. If the government offers a sole-source 
contract then the price will now be oz +k with firm two winning the production and earning 
a positive profit. This now has to form the constraint against which the split award contracts 
can be judged. If firm one is to be held to a zero profit contract with & in the first period 
then it is cheaper for the government to award a sole source contract to firm two. 
6 Likewise 
5 Rearranging the constraint yields Oý > 0,3 + c. if firm one is restricted to a then x=o so a- 
ce - k) and 0,3 = Ou - J(v -a- k) < 0,3 +c as P> oz. If firm one is able to earn a profit 
then (v 
x -0)(, B-a) -k-J(v-, 3-c) >0 and Oý = Oce-x-6(v-a-k) < 0,3+c as 
before. Note it is unlikely 
that firm one will compete away its profit if x>0. 
6rýor the total cost of a split award contract to be less than the sole source contract requires 
(1 + 6)a + 0(i + 
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if firm one can make a profit with the first period contract priced at & then the sole source 
contract is cheaper than the split award contract. ' Accordingly if oz +k< ý3 +c firm one 
will not gain any production as the government will award a sole source contract to firm two. 
This is the reverse of the preceding argument in that for all possible first period splits of the 
contract the lowest cost option is to allow firm two to obtain a monopoly in the first period; 
although firm one is able to constrain firm two to earning zero profit the price that has to be 
paid to firm one to cover its fixed costs is too high. Therefore despite it being value for money 
for firm two to constrain firm one rents' when it is less efficient most of the time, it is never 
value for money for firm one to constrain firm two when the situation is reversed. This and 
the preceding subsections gives rise to the following proposition. 
Proposition 12 The presence of fixed costs can switch the optimal industrml structure from 
a duopoly to a monopoly. 
Although this is a fairly obvious proposition it reiterates the role fixed costs can play in the 
industrial structure and that this role remains unaltered using this procurement mechanism. 
Given there is an upper bound on the extent to which the firms are able to increase their fixed 
costs the question of whether this will have any effect on the capital investments to reduce 
variable costs made by the firms arises. 
Assume there is a pre-game concerning investment. Firm one is able to increase its fixed 
costs by i in each period to reduce their variable costs by f (i) where f (i) > 0, f<0 and 
firm one's total costs in each period are cz -f (Z) +k+Z. Likewise firm two is able to increase 
its fixed costs by y in each period to reduce their variable costs by g(y) where g'(y) > 
0, 
6) (0 - a) + (1 + J) (c + k) < (1 + 6) (a + k) where the left-hand side is the cost of the split award contract and 
the right-hand side the cost of the sole source contract. Rearranging the inequality yields 0< Therefore 
for all plausible values of 0,0 <0<1, a sole source contract is cheaper. 
71f the split award contract is cheaper thenp + 6a + JO(p - a) + (i + J)c - J(v -0-c- k) < 
(I + 6)(a + k) 
where the left-hand side is the cost of the split award contract and the right-hand side the cost of the sole 
(1+6) (k-c)+6(v-, 3-c-k) -(0-11) 
source contract. Rearranging the inequality gives 0< dkp-a) . In order for firm one to 
be offered the Ee contract the total cost of the ii contract is greater than the total cost of the a contract. 
This 
means P+ 6ce+ JO(3 -a) + (1+6)c- 6(v -0 - c- k) > a) + 
(I +6)(c+k) or, 
rearranged, 0> (1 + 6) k+6 (v -3-c- k) - (I - 0) (0 - a) . Substituting this into the previous 
inequality 
means 0< 
(1+6) (k- 0 +6(V-O- c-k) - (0 <0 so for no positive values of 0 is the split award contract cheaper. -5(0-a) 
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g"(y) <0 and firm two's total costs in each period are 3- g(y) +c+y. Total costs are 
minimised where f'(%*) =I and g'(Z*) =1 so if a- f (Z*) +k+z* <, 3-g(y*) +c+y* then firm 
one has the possibility of earning a profit but if the inequality is reversed and is strict firm 
two will earn the profit. Unfortunately these are not the optimal investments to minimise the 
total cost of the project - irrespective of whether & or a is offered to firm one the total cost of 
minimising the project' occurs where f'(?, **) and g(y**) 1 with > %'** and y* > y**. 60 
If a-f (i) +k+< ý3 - g(y) +c+y for all ZE [Z**, Z*] and y [y**, y*] then firm two has no 
opportunity to earn a profit and the total project cost minimising investments will be made 
by the two firms. If it does not hold, especially when a-f (i**) +k+ i** <3- g(y**) +c+ y** 
but oz -f (z*) +k+ i* >3- g(y*) +c+ y*, firm one will increase its investment above z** to 
ensure that it will be awarded a production contract by the government. The key implication 
is that i> %** and y ý! y** - the procurement system will not result in under-investment by 
the firms. 
5.5 Capacity constraints 
Previously it has been assumed that a firm is able to produce the whole contract in the second 
period irrespective of the proportion it produced in the first period. This assumption is now 
relaxed by imposing second period capacity constraints -a firm is now only able to produce a 
multiple z of its first period production. As before let 01 represent firm two's first period split 
but now let firm one produce A, where 01 + A, > 1; the inequality stems from the possibility 
of the government wishing to increase the first period work to enable more competition in the 
second. Accordingly in the second period the maximum firm one is able to produce is zA1 
whilst firm two can produce zO1. When combined these provide a constraint within which the 
government has to award production in the second period, A2 C [maxf 0,1 -A1, minj 1, zA1}] 
and 02 E [maxf 0,1 - zA1 1, minj 1, zO1 1]. Let -X =1 and 
ý=1- If 01 <ý firm one will 
zz 
be guaranteed a certain portion of production in the second period as firm two is unable to 
8For & not only is the total cost of the project to the government minimised but the profit earned by 
firm 
one is also maximised at the same value. 
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produce the whole second period contract. Similarly firm two will be guaranteed a certain 
portion of production in the second period if A, <I If 01 >ý then firm two is able to 
produce the whole second period project meaning firm one is not guaranteed any second 
period production. If A, >A firm two is not guaranteed any second period production as firm 
one is able to undertake it all. In a slight alteration of the rules if a firm accepts its first period 
contract it will be guaranteed a portion of the second period production but not necessarily 
the same proportion as the first period. This is analogous to previous sections where firm two 
has been awarded0inin in both periods so some second period production has been ensured 
but as A, + 01 >1 guaranteeing the same proportions in the second period will lead to the 
project being too large and expensive in the second period than is necessary (as it provides 
no benefits). 
5.5.1 Limited expansion 
If only limited expansion is available in the second period, z<2, then there are four possibil- 
ities in the second period: both firms are guaranteed production, only one firm is guaranteed 
production or neither is guaranteed any production and both can compete for the whole 
contract. 
For comparison firstly assume that the government awards A>X to firm one and 0>ý to 
firm two in period one; this enables both firms to produce the whole second period contract. 
The first period cost of complete second period competition is to have a greater first period 
project as )ý +>I given z<2. To minimise the second period cost the government will 
award firm two Omin and firm one I- Omi,, both for a unit price of 0. As firm two is unable 
to earn a profit in the first period it will be offered 0 priced at 00. Firm two's reservation 
price in the auction for firm one'e first period contract is Zi == p- A(v - P). Firm one 
is unable to earn a first period profit if a> -5ý and will be offered, and accept, A& where 
&=a. - 
5(1-; 0"') (P - a). If a< -d then the government is unable to prevent 
firm one earning 
a profit and has to offer AFe in the first period where a=0- -)ý, (v - 0) -1 
(1 - O-i-) (0 - a) A 
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The total cost of the project is 0(&) = Aa + 6(1 -0.. i,, )ce + 00 + 60,1, ýO if the & contract is 
offered or V)(&) = A)3 - 
6(V 
- 0) + J(1 - Omin)01 + 00 + 60,. i,, 13 if the a has to offered. As the 
total cost is increasing in both A and 0 the cheapest project entails A and 0 The 
-(ce+f3) cost of this split is decreasing in z as and an increase in z lowers aa Z2 
the size of the first period project and thus reduces the first period cost. This split, however, 
is only feasible if z> 20 if z is too small then it is cheaper for the government 
to offer a sole source contract for price 0+ 6)3. 
The question of this section is does the government have to ensure both firms can compete 
for the whole second period project to achieve the lowest overall price. Consider the alternative 
case where A< -ý and 0<ý, meaning both firms are unable to produce the whole project in 
the second period and therefore both firms are guaranteed production in the second period. 
Assume A is large, given firm one's cost advantage, so firm two is guaranteed to produce 
maxf I- zA, 0,, Ii,, l whilst firm one is guaranteed 1- zO. Assume 01nila <1- ZA. In the second 
period firm two is able to charge (I - zA)v whilst firm one will earn (1 - zO)v + (zA + zO - 1)0 
on the remaining portion of the project; firm one will charge a unit price of v on the portion 
firm two is unable to produce and 0 on the portion both firms are able to produce. In 
the first period firm two is unable to reject a contract that offers zero profit overall as firm 
one would always be willing to accept and increase its profit. This means firm two will 
be offered Oý for its first period contract where 0- =0 -- AO (1 - zA) (v - 0). Firm two is 
able to bid A-d for firm one's first period contract where ýY =3- Jz(v - 0) as it has to 
earn some second period profit, (I - zA)(v - 0), to ensure it does not make a 
loss on its 
own contracts. If oz >d then firm one will accept the contract offering zero profit overall so 
&=a-A (1 - zO) (v - ce) -1 (zA + zO - 1) (0 - ce). If a<d then the government 
has to offer firm AA 
one AEi in the first period where ii = 0- -ý6[zA(v-, 3)+(1 -zO)(v-a)+(ZA+ZO- 
1)(3-4. 
The total costs of the two contracts are V)(&) Ace + 00 + 60 - 6zA(O - a) and 0(a) = 
AO + 00 + 60 - 6zA(v - a). For both contracts < 
2'ý- meaning the optimal split approaches aA ao 
A=I- Omin and 0= Omin if Z< The reason it only approaches the optimal split when 
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z is small is that whilst both A< -ý and 0<ý hold, Omi,, <1- zA does not (as it requires 
z<1 if A=1-0.. i,, ). If z is sufficiently large, so z> the scenario where A> )ý and 
0<ý is entered. 
Accordingly consider the case where A<A, 0<0 and Omi, >I- zA. In the second period 
firm two is now guaranteed to produce Omi,, for a unit price of v. Although firm two only need 
be awarded 1- zA it has to be given more to make the production feasible and knowing this it 
is able to charge v for all its production despite firm one being able to compete for part of it. 
Firm one will produce the remainder of the second period contract for (1 - zO)v + (zO - Omi,, ), 3 
charging v for its guaranteed portion of the contract and 0 on the portion that firm two can 
compete for. As firm two is restricted to earning zero profit it will be offered 0,3 for its first 
p erio d contract where (v - 3). Furthermore firm two will leave the auction for 
firm one's first period portion of the work at Zi =0 -M - Oinin)(V - 0). This is higher than A 
before as there is less second period rent available to firm two as some of it has already been 
allocated to firm two in order for the project to be completed. If a> -& then firm one will 
be offered a zero profit contract where a- [(I - zO)(v - a) + (zO - Omin)(o - a)]. If 
a< ýi then the government is unable to prevent firm one earning a profit meaning it has to 
offer a [(I - Omi,, ) (v - a) + (1 - zO) (v - o)]. The total costs of the project is either 
0(&) = Aa + 00 + 6(1 - 0,,, i,, )a + JOmi,, o or 0(a) = Ao + 00 + go - 6(1 - Omi,, 
)(v - a). As 
< the optimal split is A=1- Or,, i,, and 0= Oniý, if the & contract is offered. As firm ao 
one is restricted to zero profit this split is cheaper than increasing firm two's share to allow it 
to compete for the whole contract in the second period. However = meaning there N ao 
is no difference to total cost whether \ or 0 is increased so long as A+0=1. Irrespective 
of which split is chosen, providing A+0=1, it is cheaper for the government to allow only 
partial competition in the second period rather than complete competition-9 
9Let the subscript c denote the scenario where there is complete competition and p when there 
is partial 
competition in the second period. Note that ýb(Fep) is fixed and 
aV)(E") <0 so the price inequality needs az 
to be taken at the laxgest value of z permissable. For the partial competition case to 
be valid requires 
z< min 
ý 
OmIn As Omin < 
-ý =V=I- Omin. Given 1,11, z forms the upper bound and 1 -Omin 21-O. in 
this, ii, > Zip at A=1-O. jý, meaning there axe three possible cases. Firstly 
if a< Zip then in both cases 
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Next consider the case where A> and 0<& In this scenario firm one still has the 
possibility to earn a profit however this possibility is now denied to firm two (as firm one can 
produce the whole of the second period contract but firm two cannot). As before it is cheapest 
for firm two to produce Omin for Omi,, o in the second period but firm two can produce a further 
zO - Orjj,, if necessary. In the second period firm one is guaranteed a portion of 1- zO at price v as 
firm two is unable to produce it. Firm one will also produce the remaining ZO-Ornin though only 
for ý as firm two is also able to produce this portion. Firm two is unable to earn a profit so will 
accept 00 for its first period contract. Let -a == 0- (v - 0). Firm one is unable to earn a profit 
if cz > -d and is restricted to the i3 contract where aa- (1 - zO) (v - a) - (zO -0.. i,, ) ('3 - 
If a< ZT then firm one is able to earn a profit in the first period and will accept the Ev contract 
where Ei = ý3 -'ý (V - 0) (1 - ZO) (V - a) (ZO - Omin) a). An increase in A raises a due A 
to A increasing Zi. An increase in 0 also raises a, but this is now due to the second period rent 
being reduced, and also the first period procurement price for firm two. The total cost of the 
project with the a contract is ýb(&) = A01 + 6(1 - Omin)Oz + OP + JOminP- With the & the cost 
increases to 0(&) = A, 3 - Jv + 60 + J(1 - 0,,, i,, )oz + 00 + JOý. O- If firm one can be restricted 
to the marginal cost contract then the cost is increasing in both A and 0 but < 
20-(&) 
H ao 
As such the optimal first period split is A=1- Omin and 0= Omi, providing z> since 1-O. i. 
both firms are restricted to cost it allows for the lowest project cost. If firm one has to be 
offered the & contract then = 23ý(5). As for smaller values of z it makes no difference aA ao 
whether A or 0 is increased so long as A+0=I for zA >I and zO < 1. The total cost of the 
project with partial second period competition for large values of z is also cheaper than the 
Zi has to be offered to firm one. If the partial second period competition is cheaper then O(Fep) < V)(&, 
) 
(given V) (&,: ) <0 so )3 + 6,3 -6 (1 - Oý. i,, ) (V - a) < 
-ýCe + ýO +6 (1 - Omin) a+ MminO which rearranges 
to 3- 20mi,, 3 >-60min(V - O)which always holds as Omin < -ý. Alternatively if -dp <a< Zi,, so 
if there is 
complete second period competition then firm one is offered a whilst if there is only partial competition then 
6z need be offered, then the partial competition option offers the lower cost as both firms axe restricted to zero 
profit without the excess production and positive profit for firm one of the complete competition case. 
Finally 
if Uc < a, so & is offered in both cases, then the option offering partial competition in the second period 
is 
cheaper as both firms axe restricted to earning zero profit but with partial second period competition 
it is 
without the excess first period production. 
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project associated with complete second period competition. 10 
The final alternative is A< -X and 0>k This means firm two is able to produce the 
whole contract in the second period but firm one is only able to produce part of it. In the 
second period it is cheapest for firm one to produce zA and firm two to produce 1- zA, 
assuming 1- zA > 0,,, i.. Firm two is unable to earn a positive profit overall meaning it 
will be offered (I - zA) (v - 0). Firm one will receive zAO in period two, so in 
period one will be offered Ad. if a>a, where ce - 6z(, 3 - ov) and 13), A 
or AEi if a<a, where a= )3 - 6z(O - a) - -ý(v - 3). The total cost of the project is A 
either Aa + 00 + 6zAa + J(I - zA)O or Aý + 00 + 60 - 6(v - 6zA(O - a). 
However in both cases 20-- < 23ý meaning the government wishes to minimise 0 and maximise aA ao 
A. However eventually one of the constraints will be met (either A or 0 and one 
of the previously described scenarios will be entered (with the process of minimising 0 and 
maximising A continuing. ) 
If I- zA < 0,,, i. then in the second period firm two will produce 0 .. jý, and receive Ominv; 
as firm two is required for the project to be completed it can demand v for all of its second 
period production. Firm one will produce the remaining I- Omi,, for (1 - as firm 
two is also able to produce it. In the first period firm one will be offered the & contract 
if u>d, where-d = 3- and a-A(1-0 .. a), or the a AA 
contract if a< Zi, with a=3- J(1 - 0,,, i. )(v - a). The total cost of the project is either 
IOAs before let the subscript c denote when the first period split allows complete competition in the second 
period and p if there is only partial. Assume z> if this does not hold then the previous section 
applies (with A< 'ý, 0<ý and Omin >I- zA. ) Note that -ýip ý! a, with equality if A Therefore 
there are three possible cases. If -dp > a, >a then firm one is able to earn a profit in both cases. In 
order for the contract offering paxtial second period competition to be cheaper requires A, 3 - 6v + 6P + 6(l - 
Omin)O + 00 + 60min, 3 < )ý, 3 - 6(v - 0) + 6(1 - Omi,, )a + 
ý, 3 + This reduces to 8< -ý, 3 + ýO which 
always holds. If iYp > a. > Zi, then firm one will receive & if there is complete competition in the second 
period but a if there is only partial competition. For the partial competition option to be cheaper requires 
1-0 A)3-6V+60+6(1-Omin)Ci+0,6+60min, 3 < -ýa+01-Omin)a+ý)3+60min, 3. This reduces to a> ý)3-A(v-O) AX 
which holds as a> (v - 3) and z-1<1. This also requires Zip > a. 
If this inequality does 
not hold then in both cases firm one will be offered the & contract. However this will always be cheaper when 
there is only partial competition as the government does not have to pay for the excess first period production 
as it does not being any second period benefits. 
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O(a) = Aa + 00 + 6(l - 0ý,, j. )a + 60 .. jý, O or ýb(Ev) = AO + 00 + 60 - JA(l -0.. ý)(v - oz). 
Irrespective of the contract offered ýLO < 2ý-' meaning the government will seek to minimise 0 aA ao 
and maximise, A. As before one of the constraints will be met and a different scenario entered. 
The presence of capacity constraints with only limited second period expansion possible 
does not require the government to increase the size of the first period project to ensure there 
is competition available for the whole of the second period project. Rather, the contracts can 
be designed by the government to acknowledge that second period rents will be earned and 
therefore lower payments can be made in the first period. 
5.5.2 Rapid expansion 
Now assume z>2. There are two major differences between this and the limited expansion 
case. The first is that irrespective of the split one firm will always be able to produce the 
whole of the second period project. The second is that complete competition for the second 
period can now be ensured without having to pay for excess production in the first period. 
First assume A> -ý and 0>ý so both firms are able to compete for the whole of the second 
period contract. In the second period the cheapest split available is for firm two to produce 
0,1, i, l 
for 0 
.. i, 1,3 and 
firm one 1- Oni,, for (I - Orni,, ), 3. In the first period firm two will 
be offered, 
and accept, 00 to produce 0. Firm two's buy-in price is a (v - 0) which means firm one 
is restricted to the & contract if -d < a, where a- jý (I -0.. a), or can receive the 
a 
A 
contract if -ýi > a, where &= )3 -A [v -3+ (I - Omi,, 
) (, 3 - a)]. The total cost of the project is 
either V)(&) = Aa+0,3+J(1-OmiJa+JOni1,3 or 0(&) = AP+00+6(1-Omi. 
)ce+60mi. P-6(v-P)- 
If the & contract is offered then < so the optimal split approaches A=1- 
-ý and 
6A ao 
0=0 and the case where A>A and 0<0 needs to be considered. If the a contract is offered 
then 2±M) - LO-2- meaning the government is indifferent about the first period split so 
long 
6A - ao 
asA+B=1, A>)iand0>B. 
Next consider the case where A> and 0<ý so firm one can produce the whole of 
the 
second period contract but firm two cannot. In this case firm two's second period contract 
is 
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0 .. i,,, 3 whilst firm one has to be offered (1 - zO) v+ (zO - 0,. i,, ), 3 (with v charged for the portion 
firm two is unable to produce and 0 for the remainder). In the first period firm two is unable 
to reject 0,3 and will offer -a =3-A (v - 0) for firm one's portion. If ýý <a then firm one will A 
be offered the contract where &=a- -Aý [(I - zO) (v - oz) + (zO - 0,, i,, ) (0 - a)] whilst it will 
be offered the contract, where [V + (I - ZO) (V - a) + (ZO - Omin) (0 - a)]) if 
, ýi > cv.. The total cost of the project is either 0(&) =- Aa, + 0,3 + 6(l - Omin)a + Mmi,,, 3 or 
'O(ii) = IV3+ 0,3+ 6(l - Omin)CF, + 60minO - 6(V -0); these are identical expressions as for when 
there is complete competition available in the second period. Consequently for the & contract, 
the optimal split of A=I- Omin and 0= Onin makes this cheaper than if there is complete 
competition (as the first period cost is reduced by (0 - 0,, in)(O - a) due to firm two having 
less to produce and firm one more in the first period given their marginal costs). However if 
the a contract is offered then the total cost is the same as before meaning any split is possible 
solongas A+O= I and A >1 
For completeness the case where firm one is unable to produce the whole of the second 
period project needs to be considered, A<A and 0>0. First assume I- zA > Omi,,. In the 
second period firm one will produce zA for zAO whilst firm two will produce the remainder, 
I- zA, for (I - zA)v. Firm two is unable to eaxn this positive profit as it is unable to reject 
a contract for Oý in the first period where ý=0-ý (1 - zA) (v - 3). Overall firm two earns 0 
zero profit. Firm one is also unable to earn a profit if -d < oz, where 3- -ý'(v - 0), as it 
is restricted to the a contract (where &=a- Jz(o - a)) - If -d >a then 
firm one is able to 
earn a profit from the a contract, where ji =0- Jz(, 3 - a) -A (v -, 3). The total cost of the 
project is either 0(&) = Aa + 0,3 + JzAa + J(1 - zA)O or O(a) = A, 3 + 00 + 60 - 6zA(v - a). 
As before if the & contract is offered then the cost increases less in A than in 0. However 
the cost also increases less in A than in 0 if the & contract is offered. Thus irrespective of the 
contract offered the government will increase A towards )ý and decrease 0 towards 
3 until the 
regime described previously applies. 
The alternative is 1- zA <0.. i,, when A <'ý and 0>ý. In this case despite firm two only 
211 
having to be awarded the minimum level of production in the second period as it is guaranteed 
this it can charge 0 .. iiv for it. In the second period firm one will produce the remainder for 
(1 - 0,,, i,, )O. In the first period firm two is unable to earn a positive profit overall meaning it 
is offered Oý where ý=3- -on-(v -, 3). If -d > a, where -d =0- -ý(I- Omin)(V - 0), then 0A 
firm one is restricted to zero profit with a- -ý , ý(l -0.. in) 
(, 3 - a). If d<a then firm one 
can earn a positive profit with ii =3- -ý6(1 - Omin)(v - a. ). The total cost of the project is 
either V) (&) = Aa, + 0,3 +6 (1 - Omin) a+ 60mi,,, 3 or V) (a) = \O + 00 + 60 - 6(l - Omi,, ) (v - a) - 
As usual if the & contract is offered then a higher A and lower 0 is preferred whilst if the Ee 
contract is offered the first period split makes no difference to the total cost of the project 
provided A<X; if A> 'X then the total cost of the project is cheaper. " 
If rapid expansion is available to firms then it is possible for there to be competition 
for the whole second period project without excess production in the first period. In some 
circumstances possessing complete competition for the second period does not cost extra as 
firm one prices accordingly (via the i! contract. ) However if firm one can be restricted to 
the & contract then the cheapest first and second period split is A=I- 0ýýj,, and 0=0j,,; 
any other split either decreases A so work is transferred to the more expensive firm two or 
A is increased meaning firm two has to undertake unnecessary work to complete the project 
(unless it is increased so much that one obtains a monopoly and can charge v for the whole of 
the second period contract). If firm one has to be offered the & contract then any first period 
split costs the same so long as A+0=I and A> -ý. As for the limited expansion case there is 
no benefit to be obtained from ensuring complete second period competition though there is 
still the benefit derived from firm two being present in the second period as it (now partially) 
limits the price firm one is able to charge. Likewise government expenditure is no longer a's 
evenly divided between the two periods as v has to be paid for some portions of the second 
period project meaning the first period cost is lowered but the second period cost rises. This, 
and the preceding, subsections combine to form the following proposition. 
"In order for, \> -ý to be cheaper requires )3+50 -J(l -O. j. )(v -oe) > 0+6(l -Omin)Ce+60min, 
3-J(v -M which simplifies 
to v>0. 
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Proposition 13 Ensuring complete competition in the second period will not lower the total 
cost of the project when there are second period capacity constraints and, in some circum- 
stances, will increase the total project cost. 
5.6 Allocation of rent 
The preceding analysis ensures both firms are treated fairly both on and off the equilibrium 
path. The requirement of treating firms fairly off the equilibrium path gives firm one the op- 
portunity to earn an economic rent. In designing procurement competitions the government 
has to ensure firms are treated fairly under all scenarios whilst the previous chapter demon- 
strated the MoD has historically been fair in treating firms when they have wandered off the 
equilibrium path (for example the AOR procurement). However the possibility of earning an 
economic rent is not desirable from an economic theory viewpoint; given there is complete 
information the government should be able to design a procurement mechanism which enables 
them to capture all the rent. This section prevents such a model, though it relies on treating 
firms unfairly should they wander off the equilibrium path and therefore there are questions 
as to whether a government would be able to implement it. 
Assume the government follows an alternative procurement mechanism. The government 
begins by offering firm one a contract for a portion of the first period project. If firm one 
rejects the contract then a different contract, though for the same proportion, is offered to 
firm two. If firm two also rejects then firm one is offered their original contract. This continues 
until one firm accepts the contract they are offered. " After firm one's portion of the project 
has been allocated firm two is offered a contract for its portion of the first period project. If it 
rejects its contract then firm one is offered the same work for a different price, with the game 
continuing as before until one firm accepts. The second period proceeds in the same way as the 
first. As before if one firm undertakes no production in the first period then they are unable 
to survive into the second period. The firms have no outside options. The government's aim 
121n reality the price of each contract inight have to increase by a small amount between rounds, however 
this is excluded here to keep a pure strategy equilibrium. 
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is to offer contracts to each firm whereby the dominant strategy for each firm is to accept. If 
they reject their contract then, because a different contract is now being offered to the other 
firm, the other firm might immediately accept meaning the firm that rejected the contract 
might be forced to leave the industry. Let qt' denote the acceptance decision of firm Z' in period 
t for its portion of the work whilst ; ýt denotes firm i's acceptance price in period t for firm i's 
portion of work. 
In the second period if only one firm remains then the firm will only accept if the- unit 
price offered is v. Any offer below this will be rejected with the government unable to obtain 
a better price elsewhere. If two firms remain then firm two will only accept their contract 
i2> f q2 _ 
0; firm two will only accept the contract if they do not make a loss by undertaking 
the work. A similar requirement is in place for firm one, namely firm one will only accept a 
2 contract for firm two's second period portion if q2 > oz. Firm one will accept a contract for 
its portion of the project if q1 >a whilst firm two will be willing to undertake the work if 2- 
ýql > 3. Thus in the second period so long as a firm's marginal costs of production are covered 
the firm will accept the contract offered to them by the government knowing that either the 
other firm will accept the contract or, if they reject, no better offer will be made to them. 
In the first period, if firm one has already won its portion of the contract, firm two will only 
2 accept their contract if q, > 0. As the firm is unable to earn a second period profit it needs 
to cover its first period costs. Firm one, however, will now be willing to accept firm two's 
portion of the contract if i?, ý: oz - ý' [J(v - a) + minf 0, (1 - 0) (ql' - oz) 11; if firm two rejects 0 
the contract and firm one subsequently accepts then firm one will, on the equilibrium path, 
retain any profit already earned. Therefore firm two will be willing to accept the contract 
so long as it earns normal profits overall. If firm two has already accepted a contract for 
firm one's portion of the project then firm two will be willing to accept a contract priced 
at 412 ý! 0-1 [J(v - 3) + minf 0, (1 - 0) for its own portion of the 
first period 0 
project (where-denotes being off the equilibrium path). This price ensures firm two keeps 
the (1 - 0)(iý, -)3) profit it has already earned from accepting firm one's portion of the first 
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period project. If it accepts the contract then it gains a monopoly whilst if it rejects firm one 
might accept meaning a duopoly in the second period. Firm one will accept this portion of 
the contract so long as ý11 ý! a. Firm one will accept its first period contract if q11 ý! a whilst 
firm two will be willing to undertake the work if ý1' > ý. 
The government, seeking to minimise the total cost of procurement, is able to offer marginal 
cost contracts to each firm on the equilibrium path. The preceding text shows the dominant 
strategy for each firm is to accept their contract, otherwise the other firm will accept a 
contract priced at their marginal cost. If either firm rejects their first period contract then 
the other firm is offered that portion of work for a price that ensures they earn normal profits 
over the complete project. Thus the total cost of the projects on the equilibrium path is 
(I + J)[a + 0(3 - a)]. Thus if the government is prepared to treat firms unfairly off the 
equilibrium path it can restrict both firms to earning normal profit. 
By making these offers there is no necessity for two firms to remain in the second period. 
The government is able to make an offer for the whole first period project to firm one of 
2oz - v. In the second period firm one is able to charge v for the project as firm two no longer 
survives making the total cost of the project 2a. Thus this mechanism allows the government 
to obtain the best price overall, though too little is paid in the first period and too much in 
the second period. If firm one rejects this offer then firm two can be offered 2,3 -v in the 
first period and v in the second period to undertake the project alone. Thus the threat of the 
other firm being offered the monopoly for a price it would accept forces firm one to accept 
the monopoly with an overall price equal to the production costs. However the presence of 
another firm in the second period need not only benefit the price, for example there is the 
possibility of obtaining a better design if two firms remain or a higher quality product for the 
same price. There is also a political benefit to the government if it is able to maintain two 
firms, rather than being seen behind the closure of one. 
Note this procurement mechanism relies on threats by the government which are not always 
credible. Although the government is not modeled as a player of the game, in seeking to protect 
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its interests it would be likely to intervene and adapt the rules of the game to suit its purpose, 
as happened when the uninvited sole producer bid for the Type 45s was made. For example, 
if firm one rejects its first period contract then the rules state the government has to offer a 
contract to the higher cost firm which, if designed so that firm one accepts its own contract, 
ensures firm two will accept. Thus the threat to ensure firm one accepts its contract could 
entail a substantial price increase if firm one leaves the equilibrium path. A more realistic 
scenario would be that if firm one left the equilibrium path the government would choose 
to negotiate with firm one to obtain a price between its initial offer and the price it would 
obtain from firm two. Thus the mechanism lacks credibility off the equilibrium path. In the 
model in the previous section the government offers each firm a portion of the contract and 
the prospect of surviving. If a firm views the contract as being unfair then it is for the market 
to determine the price the contract can obtain. Thus the mechanism has inbuilt credibility by 
the opportunity to revert to the market when the process strays from the equilibrium path. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The defence industrial base in the UK, and elsewhere in the world, has been contracting since 
the early 1990s due to the Cold War peace dividend. The last chapter demonstrated how the 
MoD responded, or failed to respond, to the changed circumstances in naval procurement. This 
consolidation, combined with the procurement and naval policy responses by the MoD, has 
left them facing two companies able to design and build vessels (with a third yard, restricted 
to building them, currently out of favour for MoD contracts). As competition can no longer be 
relied upon to deliver the MoD's procurement objectives there is currently a desire to establish 
a single firm to ensure an effective partnership between them and the MoD will deliver for 
the future. In other defence product markets there are similar concerns over how an optimal 
defence industrial policy should operate in the future. 
The aim of this chapter was to show an alternative procurement mechanism to competition, 
with particular emphasis on naval procurement, which acknowledges not only the reduced 
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options available to the government but also the rational responses by firms. The result is 
a switch from direct competition for the project to directed buys, with the MoD offering 
acceptable contracts to each firm for a portion of the project. The dominant strategy for each 
firm is to accept the contract offered to it otherwise the other firm will accept the same contract 
causing the firm that rejected their contract to leave the industry. Although competition for 
the project results in short term efficiency the result can be long-term inefficiency. The directed 
buy approach offers short-term inefficiency but gains long-term efficiency, due to it being based 
on maintaining both firms' presence in the second period. Overall the directed buy approach 
offers a lower cost than can be achieved by direct competition (in the absence of fixed costs). 
By following this approach the requirement for a defence industrial policy disappears as the 
optimal industrial structure is a direct result of the cheapest cost of procurement - in most 
cases the maintenance of some competition in the second period is the foundation upon which 
the total cost of the project can be lowered. 
The analysis in this chapter is based on perfect information. Although integrated project 
teams (introduced as part of the smart procurement initiative) should lessen the informa- 
tion constraints between industry and the MoD significant disparities remain which means 
the model needs to be extended to include asymmetric information. Beyond this there are 
problems with the MoD implementing it - for the mechanism to work requires the MoD to 
take control of its procurement and have power in its dealings with industry. The last chapter 
argued that industry currently has more control of MoD procurement than the MoD itself 
and consequently the MoD has far less power in negotiations. Therefore a shift in the MoUs 
operation is necessary however it might be forced to undergo this shift as the defence indus- 
trial structure evolves in a manner detrimental to the MoUs interests. It would be better if 
the MoD reviewed its procurement procedures before it is forced to by industry (when it is 
too late). Whatever approach to procurement the MoD ends up adopting it will eventually 
have to take a more proactive role in determining the shape of the industrial base to protect 
its equipment programme (and budget). This paper presents one option available. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
This thesis considers two areas of public policy. The first was concerned with tax competition 
and policing. When taxes are determined at the local level it is possible for the jurisdictions to 
levy different taxes and thus influence the location decision of individuals; this consideration 
does not apply when taxes are determined by the central government. Therefore the pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium tax is a distorted version of the optimal tax, the distortion being 
the migration response of the taxpayers to a change in the tax rate at the equilibrium. If 
the equilibrium migration response is positive, then the equilibrium tax will be higher than 
optimal whilst it is lower than optimal if the equilibrium migration response is negative. This 
occurs irrespective of the crime, so long as the aim of the jurisdiction is to maximise the 
non-locational utility of its taxpayers. 
The result of either under- or over-taxation is too little or too many resources devoted to 
crime fighting. This does provide some benefits, for example if a crime only affects a small 
minority of the population then a tax can be levied when there is tax competition that would 
not be levied by a central government. The equilibrium tax can also have some interesting 
features. The first is the possibility of the tax becoming more distorted as taxpayers become 
more mobile. Although the expectation would be for taxes to approach the optimum as 
taxpayers become more mobile, the increase in mobility can increase the magnitude of the 
equilibrium migration response causing the tax to move further away from the optimum. The 
second is the central government is able to influence the equilibrium tax through their choice 
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of the sanction imposed on a criminal if he is caught. It is possible for the government to 
ensure no distortions occur if taxation is devolved, however this optimal sanction is optimal 
only from the fiscal viewpoint and is completely independent of the harm caused by the crime. 
Given the funding structure of the police in England and Wales, whereby local police 
authorities are able to impose their own taxes, an empirical investigation was conducted to 
test whether there was any evidence of tax competition between the police forces, Tests on 
the best response functions of a simplified version of the model suggested the presence of tax 
competition between police forces over the last 5 years cannot be ruled out. Therefore the 
policy implication is the ability to tax, and also to allocate funds between crimes, should 
not be devolved to local levels of government, rather these powers ought to be retained at 
the national level. When police force mergers reappear on the political agenda consideration 
should also be given as to how they are funded. 
There is more work yet to be done in this area. The first is to consider non-symmetric 
equilibria. One of the implicit assumptions of the model is that if both jurisdictions levy the 
same tax rate then half the taxpayers and half the criminals will reside in each jurisdiction. 
However there is also the possibility that all taxpayers, for reasons of safety, group in the 
same jurisdiction. Therefore the question would be whether a devolved tax system can cause 
ghettoisation. The second area that could benefit from more work is to investigate the effects 
of devolving the choice of sanction as well as the rate of tax. The final area that needs more 
work is when there are multiple crimes what happens when the local police force is able to 
determine their own tax and the allocation of funds between crimes. 
The second half of the paper considered the Ministry of Defence's naval procurement pro- 
gramme since the early 1980s. Chapter four argued the Ministry of Defence has been pre- 
occupied with the present and placed no consideration on the future when auctioning naval 
procurement contracts. Consequently the market determined the industrial structure despite 
the government being the major purchaser of its products. Whilst market interests should 
ensure short term efficiency it is possible for the market to develop in a manner to the cus- 
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tomer's detriment. The unfettered pursuit of competition led to the Ministry of Defence not 
possessing a defence industrial policy and therefore exposed to whatever the market provided. 
Due to a lack of orders some firms left the industry. The Ministry of Defence stated that 
this did not cause any loss of competition, rather it was beneficial as the overheads of yards 
excess to requirement no longer had to be met. An empirical investigation into the price paid 
for warship hulls suggests this is valid, however the data series ended in financial year 2000 
when the lack of care previously given to the industrial base started to cause the Ministry of 
Defence problems. Additionally the Ministry of Defence benefitted from the misspecification 
of yards at privatisation and the lack of orders after the conclusion of the Cold War. 
At the start of the millennium the lack of care given to the industrial base caused problems 
for the Ministry of Defence as it sought to enlarge its procurement programme (initially with 
the Type 45 programme and then with the CVF). As a result there was a shift away from 
competition towards partnership despite the relationship between the Ministry of Defence 
and the defence companies exhibiting very little trust. Furthermore, difficulties between the 
companies are preventing them from merging. Although this is a desire of the Ministry of 
Defence and they control contracts, in essence whether or not a yard survives, they still refuse 
to intervene in the defence industrial base and mold it to a shape they desire. The Ministry 
of Defence needs to overcome its reluctance to intervene in the market in order to protect its 
long term interests. 
Chapter five presented a model which demonstrated the benefits there could be (in terms 
of reduced prices) if a short term inefficiency (a higher price) is experienced. The mechanism 
requires the Ministry of Defence to shift to a system of allocated buys, offering each firm a 
portion of the contract for a price which the firm will accept (as the equilibrium path is based 
on accepting being the dominant strategy for each firm). The presence of competition in the 
second period overcomes difficulties associated with the enforcement of contracts. The model 
therefore suggests maintaining a duopoly has benefits compared to allowing a monopoly. 
There is more work to be done on the effects of not considering future projects when 
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procuring a vessel. The data series concluded before the start of the Type 45 and CVF 
programmes and once these are completed it will be interesting to investigate whether the 
closure of yards in the 1990s has had any effect on the final price of the projects. There are 
also a number of ways in which the model can be developed. The model be rerun but with 
asymmetric information regarding firms' costs (incase the integrated project teams do not 
know the true costs or the open book accounting in the partnership does not occur). Further 
the question of whether there is a role for public owned production also needs investigating. 
Although the Ministry of Defence has no desire to undertake production (and the model 
assumed either that it did not want to or would possess higher variable costs than 0) the 
possibility of a return to state production ought to be considered. 
This thesis has aimed to apply microeconomics to two issues that someone in government 
ought to be considering. There is more work to be done on both topics, however this thesis 
provides a base from which to start. 
221 
Bibliography 
[1] ANSELIN, L. (1988) Spatial econometrics: methods and models. Dordrecht: Kluwer Aca- 
demic Publishers 
[2] ANTON, J. J. and D. A. YAO (1987) Second sourcing and the experience curve: price 
competition in defense procurement. RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 18,57-76 
[3] ANTON, J. J. and D. A. YAO (1989) Split awards, procurement and innovation. RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 20,538-552 
[4] ANTON, J. J. and D. A. YAO (1990) Measuring the effectiveness of competition in de- 
fense procurement: a survey of the empirical literature. Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management, Vol. 9,60-79 
[5] ANTON, J. J. and D. A. YAO (1992) Coordination in split award auctions. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 107,681-707 
[6] APA (1999) Pounding the beat: a guide to police finance in England and Wales. London: 
Association of Police Authorities 
[7] AURIOL, E. and J-J. LAFFONT (1992) Regulation by duopoly. Journal of Economics 
and Management Strategy, Vol. 1,507-533 
[8] BECKER, G. S. (1968) Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 76,169-217 
222 
[9] BIRKLER, J., J. F. SCHANK, M. ARENA, G. K. SMITH and G. LEE (2002) The Royal 
Navy's New Generation Type 45 Destroyer acquisition ophons and Mplications. Santa 
Barbra: RAND 
[10] BLOCK, M. K. and R. C. LIND (1975a) Crime and punishment reconsidered. Journal of 
Legal Studies, Vol. 4,241-247 
[11] BLOCK, M. K. and R. C. LIND (1975b) An economic analysis of crimes punishable by 
imprisonment. Journal of Legal Studzes, Vol. 4,479-492 
[12] BOYER, M. and J-J. LAFFONT (forthcoming) Competition and the reform of incentive 
schemes in the regulated sector. Journal of Public Economics 
[13] BURTON, A. (1994) The rise and fall of Brittsh Shipbuilding. London: Constable 
[14] CASE, A. , J. HINES and H. ROSEN 
(1993) Budget spillovers and fiscal policy interde- 
pendence. Journal of Public Econom%cs, Vol. 52,285-307 
[15] CAMERON, S. (1988) The economics of crime deterence: a survey of theory and evidence. 
Kqjklos, Vol. 41,301-323 
0 
[16] CORMAN, C. T. JOYCE and N. LOVITCH (1987) Crime, deterence and the business 
cycle in New York City: a VAR approach. Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 69, 
695-700 
[17] CRONWELL, C. and W. N. TRUMBELL (1994) Estimating the economic model of crime 
with pane data. Review Of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 76,360-366 
[18] CULLEN, J. B. and S. D. LEVITT (1996) Crime, urban flight and the consequqnces for 
cities. NBER Working Paper 5737 
[19] DANA Jr, J. D. and K. E. Spier (1994) Designing a private industry; government auctions 
with endogenous market structure. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 53,127-147 
[20] DAVIS, M. (1988) Time and punishment: an intertemporal model of choice. Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 96,383-390 
223 
[21] DEFENCE COMMITTEE (1984) Statement on defence estimates 1984. London: HMSO 
[22] DEFENCE COMMITTEE (1988a) The future size and role of the Royal Navy's surface 
fleet. London: HMSO 
[23] DEFENCE COMMITTEE (1988b) Statement on defence estimates 1988. London: HMSO 
[24] DEFENCE COMMITTEE (1990) Statement on defence estimates 1990. London: HMSO 
[25] DEFENCE COMMITTEE (1991) Options for change: Royal Navy. London: HMSO 
[26] DEFENCE COMMITTEE (1996) Minutes of evidence: defence procurement. London: 
HMSO 
[27] DEFENCE COMMITTEE (1999) Major procurement projects survey: the common new 
generation frigate programme London: HMSO 
[28] DEFENCE COMMITTEE (2000) Major procurement pOlects. London: HMSO 
[29] DEFENCE COMMITTEE (2001) Major procurement projects. London: HMSO 
[30] DEFENCE COMMITTEE (2002) Major procurement pojects. London: HMSO 
[31] DEFENCE COMMITTEE (2003) Defence procurement. London: HMSO 
[32] DEFENCE COMMITTEE (2004) Defence procurement. London: HMSO 
[33] DEFENCE COMMITTEE (2005) Future capabilities. London: HMSO 
[34] DEFENCE COMMITTEE/TRADE AND INDUSTRY COMMITTEE (1995) Aspects of 
defence procurement and industrial policy. London: HMSO 
[35] DEFENCE COMMITTEE/TRADE AND INDUSTRY COMMITTEE (1998) Aspects of 
defence procurement and industrial policy. London: HMSO 
[36] DE FRAJA, G. and K. HARTLEY (1996) Defence procurement: theory and UK Policy. 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 12(4), 70-88 
224 
[37] DEUTSCH, J., S. HAKIM and J. WEINBLATT (1987) A micro model of the criminal's 
location choice. Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 22,198-208 
[38] DEVEREUX, M., B. LOCKWOOD and M. REDOANO (2002) Do countries compete 
over corporate taxes? CEPR No. 34 00 
[39] DILULIO Jr, I1 (1996) Help wanted: economists, crime and public policy. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 10,3-24 
[40] EHRLICH, 1. (1973) Participation in illegitimate activities: a theoretical and empirical 
investigation. Joumal of Political Economy, Vol. 81,521-565 
[41] EHRLICH, 1. (1981) On the usefulness of controlling individuals: an economic analysis 
of rehabilitiation, incapacitation and deterrence. Economic Review, Vol. 71,307-322 
[42] EMMERSON, C., J. HALL and F. WINDMEIJER (1998) Impact of capping on local 
sermce promsZon. London: IFS 
[43] FISHER, N. and S. GREEN (2001) Partnering and the UK construction industry the first 
ten years -a review of the literature, in NAO Modernising construction. London: HMSO 
[44] GEDDES, R. M. (1966) Report of the Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee 1965-66 London: 
HMSO 
[45] GOLDBERG, 1. and F. C. NOLD (1980) Does reporting deter burgulars? An empirical 
analysis of risk and return in crime. Review of Economtcs and Stahstics, Vol. 62,424-431 
[46] HAKIM, S., A. OVADIA, E. SAGI and J. WEINBLATT (1979) Interjurisdictional 
spillover of crime and police expenditure. Land Economzcs, Vol. 55,200-212 
[47] HANSARD Hansard London: HMSO 
[48] HINDRIKS, J. (1999) The consequences of labour mobility for redistribution: tax vs. 
transfer competition. Journal of Publtc Economtcs, Vol. 74,215-234 
225 
[49] HOGWOOD, B. (1979) Government and shipbuilding: the politics of industrial change. 
Farnborough: Saxon House 
[50) HOME OFFICE (2001) Crime in England and Wales 2005106. London: HMSO 
[51] JEHIEL, P., B. MOLDOVANU and E. STACCHETTI (1996) How (not) to sell nuclear 
weapons. American Economic Review, Vol. 86,814-829 
[52] JOHNMAN, L. and H. MURPHY (2002) British Shipbuilding and the State since 1918: 
a political economy of decline Exeter: University of Exeter Press 
[53] KLOTZ, D. E. and K. CHATTERJEE (1995) Dual sourcing in repeated procurement 
competitions. Management Science, Vol. 41,1317-1327 
[54] KOVACIC, W. and D. SMALLWOOD (1994) Competition policy, rivalries, and defense 
industry consolidation. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 8,91-110 
[55] LEVITT, S. D. (1996) The effect of prison population size on crime rates: evidence from 
prison overcrowding litigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 111,319-351 
[56] LEVITT, S. D. (1997) Using electoral cycles in police hiring to estimate the effect of 
police on crime. American Economic Review, Vol. 87,270-290 
[57] LEVlTT, S. D. (1998) Juvenile crime and punishment. Journal of Polffical Economy, Vol. 
106,1156-1185 
[58] LEWIS, T. R. and H. YILDIRIM (2002) Managing dynamic competition. American Eco- 
nomic Review, Vol. 92,779-797 
[59] LOVEDAY, B. and A. REID (2003) Going back: who should run Britain's police? Lon- 
don: Policy exchange. 
[60] LUTON, R. and R. P. McAFEE (1986) Sequential procurement auctions' 
Journal of 
Public Economics, Vol. 31,181-195 
226 
[61] MACDONALD, Z. (2002) Official crime statistics: their use and interpretation. Economic 
Journal, Vol-112, F85-107 
[62] MARCEAU, N. (1997) Competition in crime deterrence. Canadian Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 30,844-854 
[63] MATHUR, V. K. (1978) Economics of crime: an investigation of the deterrent hypothesis 
for urban areas. Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 60,459-466 
[64] McCORMICK, R. E. and R. D. TOLLISON (1984) Crime on the court. Journal of Po- 
litical Economy, Vol. 92,223-235 
[65] McGUIRE, T. and M. RIORDAN (1995) Incomplete information and optimal market 
structure: public purchases from private providers. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 56, 
125-141 
[66] MEHAY, S. L. (1977) Interjurisdictional spillovers of urban police services. Southem 
Economic Journal, Vol. 43,1352-1359 
[67] MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (1981) Statement on defence estimates 1981. London: HMSO 
[68] MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (1984) Statement on defence estimates 1984. London: HMSO 
[69] MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (1991) Statement on defence estimates 1991. London: HMSO 
[70] MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (1998) Partnering agreements between the MoD and its sup- 
pliers. London: HMSO 
[71] MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (2002) Policy Paper Number 5: Defence Industrial Policy. 
London: HMSO 
[72] MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (2005) Defence Industrial Strategy. London: HMSO 
[73] MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION (1995a) The General Electric Company 
plc and VSEL p1c. London: HMSO 
227 
[74] MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION (1995b) British Aerospace Public Lim- 
ited Company and VSEL p1c. London: HMSO 
[75] MYERS Jr, S. L. (1983) Estimating the economic model of crime: employment versus 
punishment effects. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98,157-166 
[76] NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE (1985) Ministry of Defence: design and procurement of 
warships London: HMSO 
[77] NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE (1992) The 1991 statement on major defence projects Lon- 
don: HMSO 
[78] NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE (1993) Ministry of Defence: the award of the contract for 
the landing platform for helicopters London: HMSO 
[79] NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE (1994) Ministry of Defence: defence procurement in the 
1990s London: HMSO 
[80] NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE (1996) Ministry of Defence: Major projects report 1995. 
London: HMSO 
[81] NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE (1999) Major Projects Report 1998 London: HMSO 
[82) NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE (2001a) Modernising construction. London: HMSO 
[83] NAT10NAL AUDIT OFFICE (2001b) Min%stry of Defence: Non-competitive procurement 
in the Ministry of Defence. London: HMSO 
[84] NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE (2005) Major projects report 2005. London: HMSO 
[85] NAT10NAL STATISUCS (2001) New Earnings Survey 2000. London: Office for National 
Statistics 
[86] OATES, W. (1972) Fiscal federalism. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich 
[87] OATES, W. (1981) On local finance and the Tiebout model. American Economic Review, 
Vol. 71,93-98 
228 
[88] PAULY, M. V. (1973) Income redistribution as a local public good. Journal of Public 
Economics, Vol. 2,35-58 
[89] PHILLIPS, L., H. L. VOTEY Jr and D. MAXWELL (1972) Crime, youth and the labor 
market. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 80,491-504 
[90] POLINSKY, A. A and S. SHAVELL (1984) The optimal use of fines and imprisonment 
Journal of Public Economtes, Vol. 24,89-99 
[91] PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (1985) Destgn and procurement of warships. Lon- 
don: HMSO 
[92] PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (1986) Naval warship and weapons procurement. 
London: HMSO 
[93] PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (1993) The 1991 statement on major defence 
projects and the 1990 summary of post costing activity London: HMSO 
[94] PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (1994) Ministry of Defence: the award of the con- 
tract for the landing platform for helicopters London: HMSO 
[95] PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (2000) Ministry of Defence: major procurement 
report 1998 
[96] PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (2001) Ministry of Defence: major projects report 
2000 London: HMSO 
[971 PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (2002) Ministry of Defence: major projects report 
2001 London: HMSO 
[98] PYLE, D. (1983) The Economics of crime and law enforcement. London: Macmillan 
[99] RIORDAN, M. H. and D. E. M. SAPPINGTON (1987) Awarding monopoly 
franchises. 
American Economice Review, Vol. 77,375-387 
229 
[100] ROB, R. (1986) The design of procurement contracts. Amerwan Economic Review, Vol. 
76,378-389 
[101] SAH, R. K. (1991) Social osmosis and patterns of crime. Jow-nal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 99,1272-1295 
[102] SCOTTISH AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (2002) Employment in shipbuilding on the Clyde 
London: HMSO 
[103] SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1998) Aid to ship- 
building. London: HMSO 
[104] SHERMAN, L. W. (1992) Attacking crime: police and crime control. Crime and Justice, 
Vol. 15: Modern Policing, 159-230 
[105] SINGER, E., A. CORNING and M. LAMIAS (1998) The polls - trends: genetic testing, 
engineering and therapy. Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 62,633-664 
[106] SJOQUIST, D. L. (1973) Property crime and economic behavior: some empirical results. 
American Economic Review, Vol. 76,399-412 
[107] SMITH, R. P. (1990) Defence procurement and industrial structure in the UK. Interna- 
tional Journal of Industrial Organisation, Vol. 8,185-205 
[108] TAUCHEN, H., A. D. WITTE and H. GRIESINGER (1994) Criminal deterrence: re- 
visiting the issue with a birth cohort. Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 76,399-412 
[109] TIEBOUT, C. M. (1956) A pure theory of local expenditure. Jowmal of Political Econ- 
omy, Vol. 64,416-424 
[110] TRADE AND INDUSTRY COMMITTEE (1989) Minutes of evidence: British Ship- 
builders. London: HMSO 
[111] TRADE AND INDUSTRY COMMITTEE (1990) Minutes of evidence: British Ship- 
builders NSEL. London: HMSO 
230 
[112] WILDASIN, D. E. (1988) Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition. Jow-nal of 
Public Economics, Vol. 35,229-240 
[113] WILSON, J. D. (1999) Theories of tax competition. National Tax Journal, Vol. 52, 
269-305 
[114] WITTE, A. D. (1980) Estimating the economic model of crime with individual data. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 94,57-84 
[115] WITTE, A. D. (1983) Estimating the economic model of crime: reply. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 167-175 
[116] WOLPIN, K. (1980) A time series-cross section analysis of international variation in 
crime and punishment. RevSew of EconomZcs and Statistics, Vol. 62,417-423 
[117] ZODROW, G. R. and P. MIESZKOWSKI (1986) Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation and 
the underprovision of local public goods. Journal Of Urban Economics, Vol. 19,356-370 
231 
